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ABSTRACT 
 
The current practice in economics is to allocate resources on the basis of our 
preferences as they are expressed in real or hypothetical markets. Our preferences 
suffer from a number of problems, however, especially when we value non-market 
goods, such as the environment or health. An alternative way to value non-market 
goods is through our experiences, or subjective well-being (SWB). SWB is based on 
our subjective reports of we think and feel about life. This thesis shows how the 
values of non-market goods may differ according to whether preferences or SWB are 
used. There are a number of problems with using SWB as an alternative method of 
valuation but, overall, this thesis concludes that SWB provides a promising way of 
valuing non-market goods.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
When deciding about legislation, policies or projects, governments and other such 
organisations usually determine whether the benefits outweigh the costs. This cost-
benefit analysis (CBA) is central to welfare economics, so that we allocate scarce 
resources that provide the greatest amount of benefit, which is termed as utility. Since 
the influential work of the economists Pareto (1909) and Fisher (1918), the utility a 
person derives from a good is a result of the choice that she makes in the market. 
Problems arise however when the policies or projects have benefits or costs that 
cannot be valued by choices in the marketplace. An obvious example would be 
pollution (air, water, noise etc.). In an unregulated market, polluters would have no 
incentive to account for the damage borne by third parties.  
 
Where markets do not exist (i.e. non-market goods, such as pollution), economists 
have developed methods for valuing such goods, which involve inferring a monetary 
value from observing people’s choices. This behaviour can either be from revealed 
preferences (RP) or stated preferences (SP), which generates an individual’s 
willingness-to-pay (WTP) for an intangible good.   
 
RPs are elicited from people’s choices in a range of markets such as the labour or 
housing market (Rosen, 1974). Many economists, however, such as Bishop (2003), 
argue that there are not enough revealed preference data to value the different 
attributes of the environment and health and other non-market goods that need to be 
valued. If these attributes are not valued, economists will find it difficult to implement 
a full CBA to legislators and policy-makers. For instance in the environmental 
domain, it would be difficult to set optimal pollution taxes, determine the quantity of 
permits for a good, and estimate natural resource damages, and other such policies. As 
a result, there is a potential need for SPs to value intangible goods, which inherently 
uses people’s stated WTP. The influential National Oceanic and Atmospheric 
Administration (NOAA) panel (Arrow et al, 1993: 4610) have suggested that stated 
WTP values are “reliable enough to be the starting point of a judicial process of 
damage assessment”.  
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RP and SP methods are expressions of what individuals want or desire at the time of 
the assessment in relation to different states of the world. So an individual’s WTP 
indicates the strength of their preference for a particular good. Preferences are 
fundamental to microeconomic theory (Kreps, 1990), and in many, if not all, 
instances, economic value is ultimately derived from individual preferences (Randall, 
1981). Consequently, preferences count in allocation decisions, and as preferences are 
satisfied, the person’s well-being is also increased. There is now, however, an 
increasing literature that suggests that preferences may not be a good guide to 
individual well-being and that preferences, both revealed and stated, are not consistent 
with the standard model of economic behaviour (DellaVigna, 2009). This has 
implications for non-market valuation. 
 
The standard model of economics stipulates that individuals compare the costs and 
benefits of certain actions or states of the world based upon their beliefs. Rational 
decision making entails: having a preference, choosing the actions that satisfy the 
preference, and having clear expectations about the outcomes of those actions. In this 
framework, preferences are said to be consistent, independent of other inferior 
considerations, and unaffected by framing (Kreps, 1990). There is an increasing 
literature however that suggests that choices are not consistent. It is argued that the 
way in which an option is presented and framed really matters (Kahneman and 
Tversky, 2000; Ariely et al, 2003), which makes choices malleable. It has been found 
that preferences depend on the reference point and as a result individuals are loss 
averse (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). There are also issues surrounding how the 
choice environment impacts upon individuals’ choices (Vlaev and Dolan, 2009). 
These problems have severe implications to non-market valuation from RPs and SPs.  
 
Despite the problems, Hausman (1992) has argued that the satisfaction of preferences 
surely has something to do with well-being. It could however be argued that unless 
preferences bear a significant relation to utility or well-being, we many not be able to 
justify the postulate of normative economics (Sagoff, 1994). Many of the problems 
briefly mentioned above can be attributed to attention, or the lack of attention. For 
instance, respondents’ attention in a real or hypothetical market is directed towards a 
limited subset of attributes and is therefore biased by a focusing effect, i.e. “nothing is 
life is as important as you think it is while you are thinking about it” (Schkade and 
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Kahneman, 1998; Dolan and Kahneman, 2008). Individuals place a great deal of 
attention on a good when they are willing to pay for it or buy it, but our attention will 
inevitably turn to many other things, and not just the good itself. It is arguable that we 
should start to think of alternative ways of measuring welfare that starts to focus on 
the attention that non-market goods have in our lives. That is, how does the non-
market good affect the experience of our lives? 
 
Some economists have turned their own attention to methods developed by 
psychologists that directly measure people’s experiences, also known as subjective 
well-being (SWB). That is the utility associated with the experience of actual states of 
the world as opposed to the utility inferred from preferences over those states.  
 
SWB is the umbrella term for the various guises of self-reported well-being, ranging 
from the ladder of life (Deaton et al, 2009) on the one hand to affect (Diener et al, 
1999) on the other hand. The ladder of life asks individuals to place themselves on a 
ladder on where they rank themselves in society. Affect is based on individuals’ 
moods and emotions at the time of assessment. Within the literature, life satisfaction 
is the most commonly used measure in the literature and is seen as a middle ground 
between the life evaluation and affect approaches. It has been found to be a measure 
with good internal and external validity and reliability (van Praag and Ferrer-i-
Carbonell, 2004; Kreuger and Schkade, 2008). The analysis of SWB data as a 
measure of utility assessment is providing some interesting findings, such as the 
degree to which the marginal utility of income diminishes (Ferrer-i-Carbonell and 
Frijters, 2004; Clark et al, 2008) and how expectations affect our well-being (Graham, 
2007). Some work has already been conducted to use SWB ratings to value non-
market goods (e.g. van Praag and Baarsma, 2005). Nevertheless, the distinction 
between SWB and preferences and the potential synergies or tensions between the 
two concepts has yet to be fully explored.  
 
We have little knowledge on how experiences differ from preferences for public 
policy. This thesis just does this for non-market valuation, which demonstrates the 
novelty and originality of the research. This thesis represents the first known 
empirical comparison between preferences and SWB for the same non-market goods 
from the same set of individuals, in addition to being the first research to use SWB to 
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causally value non-market goods in the UK. Indeed, little work has been done on 
using SWB for welfare appraisal in general. Furthermore, little is known of the effect 
that both the natural and urban environment has on SWB. This thesis proposes studies 
to address how the urban and natural environment, voting, terrorism, and non-market 
goods in general, might have an effect on SWB, how we can value such goods using 
SWB and how these compare to individual preferences. This thesis also represents the 
first finding of the causal effect of experiences on preferences, and the impact this has 
on individual valuation. It also shows the focussing effect of surveys on people’s 
SWB, providing important lessons to those in all domains of social science.  
 
The implications of this research are also potentially very important for public policy. 
Many governments (e.g. UK – HM Treasury, 2003) and international organisations 
(e.g. OECD, 1995) use preferences to determine whether a policy is efficient or not. 
We show that policies valued in such a way might generate different values if they 
were valued using people’s SWB. This research is still ultimately based on efficiency 
in the presence of CBA. While distributional concerns are not of prime importance in 
this thesis, it is acknowledged that such issues are very important for the appraisal of 
projects (Little and Mirrlees, 1974). Additionally, procedural justice is important in 
public policy, but this is also beyond the scope of this research. Since the focus is on 
the valuation of non-market outcomes using a single metric for use in CBA, the thesis 
does not discuss other accounts of well-being that are not best suited for this purpose 
e.g. objective well-being (Sen, 1999) or psychological well-being (Deci and Ryff, 
1999).  
 
We also avoid any direct interpersonal comparisons of utility. From the preference 
perspective, when valuing non-market goods, the marginal utility of income is unity 
(HM Treasury, 2003). So we implicitly assume that, in the elicitation phase, person 
A’s change in utility is equivalent to person B’s change in utility. Only in the 
evaluation of projects, in a CBA sense, do we adjust for the marginal utility of income 
(see Pearce and Ulph, 1995). From the SWB perspective, we also assume 
interpersonal comparability; not only because such SWB ratings have been shown to 
be interpersonally comparable (van Praag and Ferrer-i-Carbonell, 2004; Dolan and 
Peasgood, 2008), but because we are interested in the marginal effect of the non-
market good on SWB. So the identification strategy would implicitly have the control 
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and treatment groups compromising of similar individuals reporting similar marginal 
effects of the non-market good on well-being (Gruber and Mullainathan, 2002). The 
marginal change in SWB therefore from the treatment group is the same as the 
marginal change in SWB from the control group. As a result, we do not need to 
concern ourselves with interpersonal comparisons per se for this thesis on valuation, 
but we recognise some of the issues with intrapersonal comparisons in chapter 2. 
 
Since non-market goods are a significant part of welfare appraisal, it is crucial to get 
the values correct, which is why this is such an important area of research. If we have 
biased estimates of non-market goods from preferences, we may therefore have an 
inefficient allocation of public resources, hence the motivation for this thesis. It has 
previously been argued that while there are many flaws with preferences, using such 
an approach is “the best game in town” (Pearce et al, 2006: 34) – suggesting that there 
was no better alternative. If the effect of non-market goods on experiences can be 
measured accurately however, then we might have another, and possibly more 
accurate, valuation method for welfare appraisal.  
 
It is important not to underestimate the implications that such research might have for 
public policy. For instance, take the example of clean energy generation. When an 
energy company sets up an energy generation plant near people’s homes, the local 
people may not want it near their homes (for a variety of reasons such as they do not 
like seeing it in their area or alternatively they predict a decline in house prices 
because of visual, noise or air pollution). As a result, people may express a large WTP 
not to have the generation site near their homes. So the energy company should 
recognise such WTP values and compensate local residents accordingly. Suppose, 
however, that people actually adapt to the generation site, and that it actually 
improves the community through some sort of social cohesion or identity that makes 
themselves and/or the place feel more vibrant. We have to question whether we have 
compensated the wrong individuals, since before the project they warranted 
compensation through their preferences but once they experienced living near the 
project they feel better off. Such questions are of fundamental importance to public 
economics and relates to normative issues, such as whose preferences count and how 
adaptive preferences cause some difficulties for public policy (see Elster, 1999; 
Menzel et al, 2005). 
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Ultimately, this research might allow us to say something about SWB as a method for 
valuing non-market goods, than is currently expressed in the HM Treasury (2003) 
Green Book. Given that SWB can be expressed in both monetary and non-monetary 
benefits, we can provide an alternative way to express the benefits from public sector 
interventions in a way that allows comparisons to be made across a wide range of 
interventions. The framework has many similarities to the quality-adjusted life year 
(QALY) approach that has proved successful in the health sector (Dolan et al, 2005a). 
The Q in the QALY is currently valued through people’s preferences, but it could be 
easily valued by using people’s SWB. If we can do this across government 
departments, and that such departments only care about the subjective well-being and 
life expectancy gains of a policy, then it will provide a much more general basis 
comparing interventions across different sectors.  
 
Nevertheless, the major innovation of the thesis is that different methods are being 
used to value exactly the same good for the same people, and hence the valuations are 
directly comparable with one another. This is the novelty and uniqueness of this 
research. This research will further explore the feasibility of using measures of SWB 
to inform policy decisions surrounding non-market goods. The results generated will 
be of interest to any academic interested in how best to value non-market goods 
goods. There is little or no work in economics that has compared different methods in 
such a way, and, to date, the feasibility of using such measures for non-market 
valuation has not been fully addressed.  
 
Whilst being grounded in economics, this research aims to draw on theoretical 
developments from psychology and thus contribute to collaboration and debate across 
the social sciences. Camerer and Loewenstein (2003) have already argued that it 
would be a remarkable coincidence if the human brain were built to guarantee that all 
types of well-being were exactly the same. The differences among these different 
concepts of well-being is important because a deviation between preferences and 
SWB means that government might provide two different policies, one to satisfying 
wants, and another to provide the greatest enjoyment/experience.  
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Structure of the thesis 
 
There are two themes that will be underpinning the whole of the thesis and each 
chapter addresses at least one of these themes. Firstly, preferences and SWB might 
not give the same result for policy and welfare appraisal. Secondly, there may be 
some measurement problems in both preferences and SWB. The thesis starts off by 
exploring the two methods that can be used to value non-market goods, i.e. 
preferences and experiences (chapter 2). It provides a summary of the current 
methods for non-market valuation. It goes beyond just a descriptive literature review 
by providing up-to-date research on the problems with preferences and experiences, 
and how these problems translate to non-market valuation. Preferences and 
experiences are placed side by side so as to easily compare the two methods in the 
context of non-market valuation. We show that there is a great deal more to learn 
about the measurement of preferences and SWB, and where future research could 
help such measurement issues. 
 
We will then present a study (chapter 3) of how we can use people’s experiences for 
non-market valuation and how such values compare to the traditional preference-
based approach, in an urban quasi-experiment. The experiences used in this chapter 
are based on people’s life satisfaction and the non-market good is an urban 
regeneration scheme in a particular local area. This chapter illustrates that changes in 
utility from preferences do not equate to changes in utility from SWB. We find that 
the monetary values from SWB are significantly higher than that from preferences (of 
which stated preferences were significantly higher than revealed preferences). Several 
explanations for the difference between these three methods of valuation are 
proposed, namely: (i) stigma in revealed preferences; (ii) loss aversion the presence of 
mental accounting in stated preferences; and (iii) unspecified or unknown time 
duration in life satisfaction. Treating the effects of regeneration on life satisfaction as 
an annuity (i.e. a stream of money over time) moves the monetary values closer 
toward the preference-based monetary values.   
 
Chapter 4 extends on the preceding chapter by examining preferences and experience 
in a different context. We examine a quasi-experiment of a newly constructed wind 
farm, where we obtain life satisfaction data before and after the construction. This 
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chapter provides further support for the finding that stated preferences do not equate 
to people’s SWB. Using our own unique panel dataset, this research represents the 
first direct empirical comparison of preferences and SWB over time for a non-market 
good. We document of how the focussing effect creates a wedge between the 
monetary values from stated preferences and the monetary values from revealed 
preferences and life satisfaction. This chapter suggests that stated preferences may be 
prone to focussing effects.  
 
Chapter 5 uses the same non-market good as chapter 4, i.e. the wind farm, to 
determine the role of experiences on individuals’ stated preferences. Given the quasi-
experiment, we present the first study, to our knowledge, that has examined the role 
of exogenous experience on stated preferences. We show that people’s experience of 
the wind farm significantly changes their preferences, in comparison to those 
individuals without such experience of the good. So this chapter shows that 
experience can influence preferences, and this experience, we argue, is distinct from 
market experience, learning, and other types of information.  
 
This chapter uses ex ante and ex post WTP measures from the same individuals. 
Whilst this is usually a strength in econometric analysis, there could be an issue here 
that individuals in the second wave already assume that the wind farm is a bad since 
we have asked them the WTP question previously (in the first wave). So ideally we 
would like to determine the role of surveying the same individuals twice or more, and 
how this impacts on their responses to questions in the survey. Chapter 6 does this 
with respect to the affective forecasting hypothesis and the longitudinal nature of 
SWB responses. Much of the research on affective forecasting has used the same 
respondents over time (e.g. see Wilson and Gilbert, 2003), so too did the previous 
chapter – i.e. there is an initial focussing effect in that individuals mis-predict the 
severity and length of time of a state of the world in the future. Although this allows 
us to control for individual heterogeneity, it does mean that respondents might use 
their first response as an anchor for their second response, either because they recall 
what they were asked to think about previously or because they simply recall their 
previous SWB rating.  
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There have been no studies however that have tested the degree to which having been 
asked about something before an event affects the assessments of well-being after the 
event. To do this, we need an experiment in which respondents are randomised to a 
standard ‘before and after’ condition or to an ‘after only’ condition, thus allowing the 
‘after’ responses of the two groups to be compared with one another. In this chapter, 
we report on two experiments that were designed to test the well-being forecasts of 
the impact of two major European football games; the actual well-being impact of the 
game; and, crucially, whether having previously been asked about the game affects 
later well-being reports. This is different to panel conditioning since there is nothing 
to learn for respondents from answering two surveys on well-being (see Wilson and 
Howell, 2005). We show that being exposed to the initial survey biased the affective 
responses provided seven days later – this is the second focusing effect. That is, 
respondents who answered the survey twice base their second rating on their response 
to the first survey. The fact that respondents focussed their attention on the first 
survey and responded accordingly to the subtle cue, has large ramifications for using 
SWB responses for the same individuals within a short space of time. 
 
All of the chapters so far have sought to use primary data to determine how 
preferences differ to experiences, and how robust the methods are to focussing effect, 
experience and general longitudinal methods. There are secondary datasets however, 
that gather SWB data in the UK, i.e. the BHPS. So we can use the BHPS to shed 
further light on the issues already discussed in this thesis. Chapter 7 examines the 
affective forecasting hypothesis with respect to voting and elections. This chapter 
shows that voting in itself does not affect life satisfaction, and the outcome of an 
election does not impact on life satisfaction, even when linked to political party 
affiliation. This chapter demonstrates how research on SWB can be applied to voting 
behaviour. It seems that voters in large-scale elections succumb to the affective 
forecasting effect (Wilson et al, 2000). It has been found that individuals believe that 
the outcome of the election will affect them over a much longer period of time than it 
actually does. We find that individuals do not obtain any utility from voting in itself, 
and that voting for the winning party does not significantly increase utility.  
 
Lastly, in chapter 8 we show that it is possible to value experiences if no life 
satisfaction data are present and if the non-market good is international in its 
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consequences. Using the General Health Questionnaire (GHQ), we show how a non-
market good affects people’s SWB as measured in the British Household Panel 
Survey, where the interviews were conducted in September 2001. The results show 
that the September 11th attacks resulted in higher levels of mental distress for those 
interviewed after September 11th compared to those interviewed before. This natural 
experiment shows that the magnitude of this increase in mental distress is equivalent 
to 0.5% of the adult British population suffering with clinical depression, which 
would cost between £170million and £380million in treatment expenses. This 
provides one of the first examples of a terrorist attack in one country having spillover 
effects in another country. This study also shows that it is possible to bypass the 
income endogeneity problem for valuing non-market goods by people’s SWB, and 
that one can value intangible goods by other measures of SWB (beyond life 
satisfaction). 
 
Overall, it must be noted that this thesis goes against what is currently being 
researched in non-market valuation. Economists in the realm of non-market valuation 
are very embedded in the preference-based approach. This is understandable given the 
long history that non-market valuation has within CBA and welfare economics. For 
instance, as can be seen in Figure 1 below, the research using preferences for 
valuation and public policy has been substantial since the early 1990s. The research in 
SWB in economics is starting to increase, as is shown in Figure 1, and it has an 
increasing trend compared to the other areas, which is promising for this research 
area. It must be noted however, that this general work in SWB is still absolutely less 
than what is specifically being currently published by the standard non-market 
valuation methods. Many economists might have traditionally felt that there was no 
better alternative to value such goods (Pearce et al, 2006). There is now however, at 
least a promising complement that economists in non-market valuation should 
acknowledge and potentially use to determine how scarce resources could be 
allocated. Work on preferences has a twenty to thirty year head start in terms of 
research, so more research is needed on SWB to determine its potential as a way to 
value non-market goods and appraise public policy. There is significant potential in 
examining whether what people want in terms of non-market goods also improve their 
experiences as denoted by their SWB. 
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Figure 1: Number of articles, books and working papers on non-market valuation 
 
 
Note: This EconLit search was conducted on the 30th March 2009. Subjective well-being was also 
searched with “life satisfaction”. We have not illustrated other less used revealed preference techniques 
such as ‘cost of illness’ or ‘defensive expenditures’, and other less used stated preference techniques 
such as ‘choice modelling’. It is important to note that subjective well-being includes all articles in the 
economics field and not just those using subjective well-being for valuing non-market goods. 
 
 
To conclude, this thesis demonstrates that preferences do not equate to SWB for urban 
and rural non-market goods. It has also shown that preferences and SWB are both 
prone to some biases, so further research on these areas would be fruitful. SWB 
measures however can be a useful welfare guide for public policy-making and might 
potentially be a more robust measure of what matters for policy than examining 
people’s preferences is. It has to be noted however that the research on non-market 
valuation using SWB is still in its infancy and is literally thirty years behind that of 
generating monetary values from revealed and stated preferences (for instance, see 
Krutilla, 1967). So, we need more research on using SWB for economic valuation 
and, in so doing, we will be in a better position in the future to judge just how 
meaningful and robust this method actually is. We hope that this thesis has made a 
starting contribution to this area and we hope it will provide momentum for other 
researchers to conduct innovative research in this area.  
No. of a
rticles 
or book
s 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2. PREFERENCE-BASED AND EXPERIENCED-BASED 
APPROACHES FOR VALUING NON-MARKET GOODS 
 
 
2.1 Preference-based approaches 
 
2.1.1 Introduction 
 
Since the start of the twentieth century, economists have used people’s behaviour as a 
way to infer utility. People’s behaviour is related to their wants (Fisher, 1918), so the 
more they want or desire a good or service, the higher the utility it brings them. This 
approach became popular after Robbins (1932, 1938) and Kaldor (1939) argued that 
interpersonal comparisons of mental states were unscientific. Pareto (1909/1971) 
believed that economics could find its own laws, and make deductions from those 
laws, without the interference of psychology (Bruni and Sugden, 2007). This work 
was extended by von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944), who proposed a theory 
where it is possible to say something about what is ‘rational behaviour’ (Frechet and 
Borel, 1953). At the start of their book, von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944: 8) 
assume that 
  
“the aim of all participants in the economic system, consumers as well as 
entrepreneurs, is money, or equivalently a single monetary commodity. 
This is supposed to be unrealistically divisible and substitutable, freely 
transferable and identical, even in the quantitative sense, with whatever 
“satisfaction” or “utility” is desired by each participant.” 
 
According to this view, agents in decisions, games, and more generally in the 
economy, want to maximise their monetary income. This has become a proxy for 
utility, and as a result, utility is equated with money, as opposed to satisfaction or 
happiness.  
 
Given that money was their currency of utility, von Neumann and Morgenstern 
(1944) then devise a set of constraints for the preferences of agents. These constraints, 
or axioms, are that: (i) preference ordering always exists; (ii) if an individual prefers 
one option over another, she chooses that option; (iii) preference ordering of the 
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individual is consistent, i.e. preferences do not contradict one another (i.e. 
transitivity); (iv) preferences are independent of other considerations, including other 
options; and (v) preferences will be the same irrespective of how the options are 
presented (i.e. invariance). See Kreps (1990) and Mas-Colel and Whinston (1995) for 
a detailed review of these axioms.  
 
The standard economic model that originates from the above work is that individuals 
attempt to maximise benefits and minimise costs. So individuals compare the costs 
and benefits of certain actions or states of the world. Rational decision making entails 
choosing an action given one's preferences, the actions one could take, and 
expectations about the outcomes of those actions. So the constraints presented by von 
Neumann and Morgenstern are crucially important for preference consistency and 
exogeniety.  
 
These axioms result in the statement that an individual’s life goes better for her if she 
gets what she wants, and there are no constraints on what an individual wants, and all 
that matters for her utility is whether a desire is met. More recent formulations of 
preference satisfaction require that preferences are informed in the sense that they are 
based on the considered use of all relevant information and some accounts exclude 
certain ‘anti-social’ preferences, such as those related to malice or envy, even when 
they are informed (Harsanyi, 1996). All else equal, if an individual’s income 
increases, she is able to satisfy more of her preferences. It is not the income per se that 
makes her better off but, rather, the increase in choice that means she can satisfy more 
of her desires. With regard to non-market goods, the more income people have, the 
more able they are to satisfy their preferences for non-market goods, and therefore the 
more likely they are to pay more for such goods, ceteris paribus.  
 
Based on these fundamentals, the use of preferences for non-market goods has taken 
two routes, namely revealed preferences (RPs) and stated preferences (SPs). While 
the early literature used RPs for valuation, a great deal of recent work has used SPs 
for non-market valuation. Figure 1 in Chapter 1 illustrates the dominance of this 
approach. Although the two methods are structurally different, their underlying 
concept is the same; i.e. they are based on what people want. 
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2.1.2 Revealed preferences 
 
The theory of revealed preference demonstrates how one can construct utility 
functions from price and choice observations (Samuelson, 1938, 1948; Little, 1949; 
Houthakker, 1950). In order to value intangibles from revealed preferences, one has to 
observe real behaviour and choice in the market-place. From the observed price and 
choice, we can indirectly elicit the values that individuals place on the attributes of 
each choice. Economists assume that these revealed preferences are normative, so 
therefore they represent the individual’s true interests. There are a number of possible 
methods to elicit for non-market goods, which are presented in Table 1 below – all of 
which are in the Treasury Greenbook (HM Treasury, 2003). 
 
Table 1: An overview of revealed preference valuation methods  
 
Method Revealed behaviour Conceptual framework Types of application 
Hedonic pricing Property purchased or 
choice of employment 
Demand for 
differentiated goods 
Property value and 
wage models 
Travel Cost Participation in 
recreation activity and 
site chosen 
Household production, 
weak complementarity Recreation demand 
Cost of illness Expenditures to treat 
illness Treatment costs Morbidity 
Source: Boyle (2003) 
 
 
The hedonic pricing method (HPM) is the most commonly used method to value non-
market goods by RPs. This method is based on decisions to take a new job or buy a 
house among choices that have different level of attributes. Essentially, jobs and 
property are heterogeneous goods whose component attributes yield utility (Rosen, 
1974). Most work on the HPM has come from housing markets because the choices of 
housing location, and therefore neighbourhood amenities, are observable. So by 
observing the choices individuals make over heterogenous property with varying 
prices, one can estimate the implicit price of one of the component characteristics of 
the property (Taylor, 2003). These implicit prices produce the WTP for each 
characteristic.  
 
  21 
For instance, assume H represents the differentiated house with the following 
characteristics . The property is assumed to be sold in a perfectly 
competitive market, and the interactions of many of the producers and consumers 
together determine an equilibrium price schedule for the differentiated property, P(h’) 
– with the consumer taking the entire price schedule to be exogenous. So in the basic 
model, consumer utility is defined over two goods, H and x, a composite commodity 
representing all other goods (i.e. income after H is purchased). Consumer i, with 
demographic characteristics ai, has utility defined as: 
  
The individual seeks to maximise utility by choosing the differentiated property, h’, 
and the amount of x to purchase, subject to the budget constraint, . The 
individual will choose h’ and x such that the following is satisfied for each hi: 
 
which is the marginal rate of substitution of any housing characteristic, hi, and the 
composite commodity, x. The HPM is a well-recognised method for valuing 
intangibles both in the UK (Cheshire and Sheppard, 2002; Gibbons and Machin, 
2003) and in the US (Leggett and Bockstael, 2000). The HPM will be used in chapters 
3 and 4. 
 
The travel cost method (TCM) values intangibles used for recreational purposes in a 
particular location (Ward and Beal, 2000). For instance, natural areas are the focus of 
many recreational trips, but these natural areas do not have a market price. In order to 
obtain a value, the TCM assumes that travel and the recreational area are weak 
complements (Maler, 1974), so that the value of the recreational area can be measured 
with reference to values expressed in the market for trips to the recreational area 
(Atkinson et al, 2004). Therefore, in order to use the TCM, the researcher needs to 
obtain the number of trips that an individual/household takes to a particular 
recreational area over a specific period of time, and how much it costs that 
individual/household to travel to the recreational area. The latter usually includes 
obvious costs such as petrol expenses etc, but also the opportunity cost in allocating 
time to travel (e.g. ascertained by their wage rate). A specific issue or problem of the 
TCM is that the trip itself is usually a function of many other reasons. For instance, 
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the standard TCM cannot easily be applied to an international tourist on a cruise 
around various places, since there are multiple reasons why the tourist might choose 
the cruise.  
 
These two methods are the used most frequently for non-market valuation, but there is 
another method that can be used. The cost of illness (COI) method estimates the 
resource cost associated with a change in an intangible, rather than the WTP. The COI 
is the sum of the direct and indirect costs associated with illness, injury, or death. The 
former relate to the diagnoses, treatment, rehabilitation, and support of the ill or 
injured persons, and the latter relate to the value of output not produced because of 
morbidity or premature mortality (Dickie, 2003). COI is not an individual decision 
alone since the decision to incur these expenditures is made by social administrators 
and taxpayers (Atkinson et al, 2004). We highlight this approach here since it will be 
used later on in Chapter 8. 
 
2.1.3 Stated preferences 
 
In order to elicit preferences for goods which cannot be inferred from an existing 
markets, stated preference (SP) techniques are used. Contingent valuation (CV) is an 
integral part of SP techniques, and research on this area is more than sixty years old, 
with the first recognised study to value non-market resources by Ciraicy-Wantrup 
(1947).1 The use of CV has grown considerably since this seminal contribution, and 
the subject area that has become most associated with CV is environmental 
economics, although health and transport economists also use SPs. The main reason 
that these fields have used such techniques is that no market exists for many 
environmental and health goods, so the goods cannot be inferred from observed data. 
Therefore CV seems a natural way to elicit monetary values for non-market goods, 
which can then be used in CBA.  
 
The impact that CV has had on public policy has been widespread, not least because 
of the Exxon Valdez oil spill. The Alaskan state sued Exxon for damages to the local 
                                                 
1 There are also other frameworks with SP, such as choice modelling (CM). However, the dominant 
approach has been CV, and the arguments presented can also be assumed to also be representative of 
CM. For a further discussion of CM techniques, see Louviere et al (2000). 
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environment, and the state settled for compensation of $1billion. This damage 
settlement was supported by a CV study of the area (i.e. Carson et al, 1992). The size 
of this settlement spurred the academic community to determine whether the CV 
approach was a valid and robust scientific method. The main paper that spawned from 
this debate came from the Blue Ribbon Panel (i.e. Arrow et al, 1993), which was 
assembled by the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA). Even 
though the main premise of the Panel was to evaluate CV in terms of eliciting non-use 
values, the main benefit of this work was deriving rules of best practice for CV 
studies. Since the Blue Ribbon paper, CV studies have grown at an increasing rate, 
and the CV approach has been applied to many diverse non-market goods.  
 
CV studies have become popular within the UK, with practical guidelines provided by 
Bateman et al (2002). The UK HM Treasury (2003) endorses the use of SP techniques 
for valuing non-market goods, and it is also a popular method for US government 
policy (Boardman et al, 2008). Since 1993, three basic sections to a CV have evolved. 
Within the first section, a set of attitudinal and behavioural questions are asked 
regarding the good to be valued, so as to reveal the most important underlying factors 
driving respondents’ attitudes towards the public good. This is in place to confirm 
Ajzen’s (1991) model of planned behaviour, where our attitudes and beliefs shape our 
intentions which ultimately leads to our choices. Secondly, the contingent scenario is 
presented which includes the hypothetical scenario, a description of the constructed 
market, and the method of payment. Thirdly, the socio-economic and demographic 
characteristics of the respondent are asked. This is required in order to ascertain the 
representativeness of the survey sample relative to the population of interest, to 
examine the similarity of the groups receiving different versions of the questionnaire, 
and to study how WTP varies according to respondents’ characteristics (Pearce et al, 
2006). This further allows for benefit transfer (see Ready et al, 2004).   
 
The second section of the CV survey is where most debate occurs. Therefore it is 
worthwhile analysing why this aspect of the CV questionnaire is problematic. The 
hypothetical scenario presented usually has a description of attributes of the good. 
Boardman et al (2008) and Pearce et al (2006) argue that good practice for CV 
involves including both a description of the available substitutes for the good and a 
description of the proposed policy change and how the attributes of the good will 
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change accordingly (i.e. textual, photographs, drawings etc), although there is no 
consensus or rules for doing so. Where there are multiple aspects to the good, one 
should employ a top-down approach eliciting the value of the whole good first before 
valuing the subsequent parts.  
 
The description of the hypothetical constructed market is also critical to the design of 
a CV study. There are three main elements that deserve careful attention, namely the 
institution providing the good, the conditions for the provision, and the timing of the 
provision. The institution providing the good can be central government or local 
company etc, but this might ultimately affect a person’s WTP of a good. A similar 
effect might happen for the conditions of the provision, as well as the timing of the 
provision – we will return to these issues later on in this chapter.  
 
For the valuation of a non-market good, the researcher has an important choice 
between using WTP and WTA. To examine this further, it is beneficial to start with 
the preference function for an individual (in a similar vein to Just et al, 1982; 
Freeman, 1993; and Haab and McConnell, 2003), i.e. u(x, q), where x is a vector of 
private goods and q is a vector of public goods. The difference between x and q is that 
the individual chooses their quantity of x, not q, which is perceived as being 
exogenous. The individual maximises utility subject to income, y, so the indirect 
utility function V(p, q, y) becomes: 
 
                                                        (1) 
 
The minimum expenditure function m(p,q,u) is identical to the indirect utility 
function: 
 
                                                                    (2) 
 
The derivative of eq. (2) with respect to price gives the Hicksian or utility-constant 
demand. Therefore CV is a way of estimating the change in the expenditure function 
or the change in the indirect utility function.  
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Within this there are two ways of illustrating monetary measures, namely 
compensating and equivalent variation. WTP is the maximum amount a person will 
pay in exchange for an improvement in circumstances, or the maximum amount a 
person will pay to avoid a decline in circumstances. WTA is the minimum amount a 
person will accept for a decline in circumstances, or the minimum amount a person 
will forego an improvement in circumstances. Compensating variation is the amount 
of income paid or received that leaves the person at the initial level of utility, and 
equivalent variation is the amount of income paid or received that leaves the person at 
the final level of utility.  
 
From this, equivalent and compensating variation rely on the initial versus final utility 
for their distinction. Equivalent variation is the WTA for a situation where utility is 
improved and the WTP for a situation where utility declines. Compensating variation 
can be described as when the final utility is worse than the initial utility level, it is 
WTA, but when the final utility level is better than the initial utility level, it is WTP. 
Table 1 below illustrates how these ideas are inextricably linked together. We present 
these here since they are important to Chapter 5. 
 
Table 1. The connections between WTP and WTA, and compensating and equivalent 
variation.    
 
 Equivalent variation Compensating variation 
Utility increases WTA WTP 
Utility decreases WTP WTA 
 
For an individual, the WTP value is the amount of income needed to compensate an 
increase in the public good: 
 
            (3) 
 
where and increases in q are seem as desirable (i.e. ). The WTA 
value is the change in income that makes an individual indifferent to accepting one of 
two situations, where the original level of the public good (q0) and income at  
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is one situation, and the new level of the public good (q1) with income at y the other 
situation:    
 
                         (4) 
 
Therefore, when . The definitions of WTP and WTA correspond to 
the positive parts of the Hicksian measures, i.e. WTP with equivalent variation and 
WTA with compensating variation.  
 
While there is a theoretical distinction between WTP and WTA, most CV studies use 
WTP because the NOAA guidelines recommended this estimate since it is a 
conservative estimate, and it can flexible enough to include negative values (e.g. 
Atkinson et al, 2004). Whether the researcher chooses WTP or WTA should depend 
on the actual context of the policy and on who has the property rights to both the 
initial and new levels of the public good. Pearce et al (2006) note that determining 
property rights is not straightforward in practice, e.g. the EU Water Framework 
Directive, although table 1 can be adapted to include property rights (table 2). Section 
2.3 will discuss the possible differences in WTP and WTP empirically. 
 
Table 2: The connection between property rights and table 1. 
 
Property rights Society worse off: quantity 
decrease 
Society better off: quantity 
increase 
Right to the status quo WTA to tolerate loss WTP to secure gain 
Right to a new situation WTP to avoid loss WTA to forego the benefit 
Note: this table assumes that a quantity increase is good for welfare. Source: adapted from Pearce et al 
(2006: 141). 
   
The part of the CV method which has drawn the most attention is which elicitation 
mechanism is used. There are four main mechanisms that one can use namely: open 
ended (OE); bidding game (BG); payment cards (PC); and dichotomous choice (DC) 
(Bateman et al, 2002) The OE CV question asks the individual to give a point 
estimate of their WTP. The BG CV method is based on an iterative method for an 
individual’s WTP. Within this, the individual is asked whether they would be WTP a 
certain amount and the WTP amounts are increased or decreased depending on the 
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previous answer, with the iterative process stopping when the individual converges on 
an estimate. The PC method asks the individuals to choose a WTP estimate from 
predetermined list values on a card shown to the individual. The DC method purely 
requires a binary yes or no answer to whether an individual would be WTP a certain 
amount for a good.   
 
From these four, it seems that DC has become the preferred choice over the last 
decade (Pearce et al, 2006). The main reason for this is that the first three seem to be 
less efficient as they lack incentive compatibility, in that individuals can influence 
potential outcomes by revealing values other than their true WTP (Haab and 
McConnell, 2002). Within DC, a researcher could use single bounded DC or multiple 
bounds. A single bounded DC CV method would ask one question only. A double-
bounded DC CV method would ask whether they would be willing to pay £x, and if it 
is accepted (rejected), the researcher would ask whether they would be willing to pay 
£y (£z), where . The double bounded DC is thought to be superior to the 
single bound since more information is gathered than in the single bound method. 
There is also a possibility of using triple-bounded DC, which generates even more 
information. The problem with both double- and triple-bounded DC however is the 
loss of incentive compatibility due to the fact that the second or third questions may 
not be viewed by respondents as exogenous to the choice situation (Bateman et al, 
2001).  
 
An alternative one-and-a-half bounded DC has been put forward by Cooper and 
Hanemann (1995) and Cooper et al (2002). Within this, respondents are initially 
informed that costs of providing the good in question will be between £x and £y 
(where x<y), with the amounts x and y being varied across the sample. Respondents 
may be asked whether they are prepared to pay the lower amount x. If the response is 
negative no further questions are asked: if the response is positive then respondents 
are asked if they would pay amount y. Conversely respondents may be presented with 
the upper amount y initially and asked about amount x if the former is refused. This 
method might be more efficient than other bounds and less prone to any bias. Many of 
the larger studies use a DC approach. It must be recognised that most researchers are 
uncertain as to whether the PC method as opposed to the DC method should be used. 
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The former gives cleaner estimates if the sample size is small, which is true of many 
local provision of non-market goods. 
 
We will use a local and recent example of how WTP from the SP method can be 
applied in practice. The Summer Olympic Games can be considered a non-market 
good in terms of the benefit it brings to the local area for hosting the event. An 
Olympics may potentially provide the impetus for environmental and economic 
regeneration in the host city, as well as a boost to national pride and so on. Attempts 
to quantify the benefits of hosting major sporting events have focused exclusively on 
tangible gains (Lybbert and Thilmany, 2000; Hotchkiss et al., 2003; Rose and Spiegel, 
2009) with a clearly identifiable cash-flow. In fact, from these studies however, it is 
unclear whether hosting the Games is actually worth the cost.  
 
As the tangible benefits are low, we need to consider whether the non-market benefits 
are any better. Using a CV survey it is possible to establish the size of the non-market 
benefits of the London 2012 Bid, which might help justify staging the event on cost-
benefit grounds. Atkinson et al (2008) asked residents from London, Manchester and 
Glasgow for their WTP to host the 2012 Olympic Games in London on the basis of 
the non-market impacts that this event might provide. They found that respondents’ 
WTP in London, Manchester and Glasgow was £22, £12 and £11 respectively in extra 
council tax payments. So, for the six million Londoners, the non-market benefits can 
be aggregated as £132 million.  
 
2.2 Experience-based approaches 
 
2.2.1 Introduction  
 
 
The previous section presents two ways of valuing non-market goods. Both of these 
methods are ultimately based on well-being as a function of income, or the 
satisfaction of preferences. There is however another way of documenting well-being, 
and that is through people’s happiness (Parfit, 1984).2 Before the work of Fischer 
(1918), Robbins, and van Neumann and Morgenstern (1944), mental states were of 
                                                 
2 We acknowledge that there is another way of documenting well-being, that is through people’s 
objective well-being, but we do not focus on this in this thesis since it is a method that cannot readily 
be applied to welfare appraisal. 
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central importance to economics. The works of both Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart 
Mill demonstrated this. Bentham believed in the ‘greatest happiness principle’, and 
succulently argued that “(n)ature has placed mankind under the governance of two 
sovereign masters, pain and pleasure. It is for them alone to point out what we ought 
to do, as well as to determine what we shall do” (Bentham, 1823: 1). This influential 
argument turned into a procedure for estimating the moral status of any action, which 
was called the ‘hedonistic calculus’. Bentham stated that pleasures and pains can be 
ranked according to their value, such as intensity, duration, certainty of a pleasure or a 
pain, which results in the aggregation of happiness by pleasure pain (Spiegel, 1991). 
Mill (1863) continued Bentham’s line of thought but believed that there was a need 
for a qualitative separation of pleasures. While Bentham treated all forms of 
happiness as equal, Mill argued that intellectual and moral pleasures are superior to 
more physical forms of pleasure. Nonetheless, Mill’s work was important for not only 
furthering some of the work in economics using the hedonic calculator, but also for 
developing an understanding of the issue of negative spill-overs to other people. 
Mills’ (1859) ‘harm’ principle supports the freedom of the individual, so that each 
individual has the right to act as he wants, so long as these actions do not harm others. 
If the action only directly affects the person undertaking the action, then society has 
no right to intervene, even if it feels as though the actor is harming himself. Society 
only has the right to intervene if the actions harm the well-being of other individuals. 
Given that Mill was primarily concerned with happiness as a measure of well-being, 
we could argue that what Mill had in mind was that harm to people can be calculated 
by examining their happiness. This therefore provides the first incidence of an 
economist to argue that negative externalities, such as pollution or other such non-
market goods, should be valued in terms of people’s happiness. 
This was taken further by the English marginalists, such as Jevons (1871/1970), 
Edgeworth (1881/1967) and Pantaleoni (1889/1898), to reduce Benthamite utility to a 
one-dimensional measurement scale of the individual perception of pleasure and pain 
(Cohen, 1997). Such efforts are characterised by their ‘hedonimeter’. Edgeworth 
posited that the development of a hedonimeter that would measure utility directly, 
which he felt was necessary for the extension of utility analysis to the real world. 
Hence, this work connected the mathematical complexity of human behaviour with 
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the utility of utilitarianism. The Paretian turn however seemed to end this close link 
between economics and psychology, and little dialogue took place between the two 
disciplines during the 1950s and 1960s – apart from Simon (1955). Nevertheless, this 
dialogue did re-open between the two disciplines at the start of the 1970s. The 
meeting of Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky was pivotal for this revival. 
The contribution of the Kahneman and Tversky work was two fold.3 Firstly, they 
placed the psychology of decision theory to real world situations to reflect real 
uncertainty – this will be documented in section 2.3. Secondly, they made the 
distinction clearer between the normative solution to a problem and the subjective 
answer given by real-world individuals. In one of their seminal papers, Kahneman and 
Tversky (1979) argued that because real world behaviour of individuals deviates from 
the standard economic model, the academic community should move to a descriptive 
theory, where utility depends on the individual’s subjective perception.  
Kahneman and Ritov (1994) and Kahneman et al (1997) have showed that there is a 
conceptual difference between preferences and experiences. Within the latter concept, 
we depart from von Neumann and Morgenstern’s money equating utility theory, to 
examine aspects of people’s lives that are subjectively perceived by themselves. The 
situation in economics is succinctly summarised by Wansbeek and Kapteyn (1983: 
249):  
 
“Utility seems to be to economists what the Lord is to theologians. 
Economists talk abut utility all the time, but do not seem to have 
hope of ever observing it this side of heaven. In micro-economic 
theory, almost every model is built on utility functions of some kind. 
In empirical work little attempt is made to measure this all-pervasive 
concept. The concept is considered to be so esoteric as to defy direct 
measurement by mortals. Still, in a different role, viz., of non-
economists, the same mortals are the sole possessors of utility 
functions and can do incredible things with it”.  
 
Since the 1990s, economists have begun to recognise that measuring experiences (or 
utility) is one of the key emerging research themes within economics and the work 
from psychology enabled experiences to be measured. Table 1 in chapter 1 illustrates 
the increasing popularity with using SWB in economics.   
                                                 
3 Main contributions were Kahneman and Tversky (1972, 1973, 1979) and Tversky and Kahneman 
(1971, 1973, 1974). 
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There seems to be two key reasons as to why economists, especially in the field of 
non-market valuation and public policy, would want to define utility in terms of 
experiences. Firstly, preferences and experiences are different concepts of well-being 
and as a result, what we prefer might not be the same as to what we enjoy best. There 
is increasing evidence that individuals are unable to choose the greatest amount of 
well-being for themselves, and individuals might want goods which either decrease 
their well-being , or does not increase well-being as much as a different choice would 
have provided – i.e. ‘mis-wanting’ (Wilson and Gilbert, 2003). Secondly, given the 
vast amount of research in psychology, experiences can now be measured with a 
degree of accuracy (Frey and Stutzer, 2002; Graham, 2007). These two reasons are 
clearly very important for economists in non-market valuation since the government 
(or other such organisations) might actually allocate scarce public resources to non-
market goods that individuals might want but which might reduce the quality of their 
experiences over time.  
2.2.2 Subjective well-being  
 
The most used measure for experiences is the life evaluation account. Within 
Sumner’s (1996) evaluative account, an individual’s life goes well for her if she has a 
positive attitude, in terms of affirmation or endorsement, towards her life, which has 
both a cognitive and an affective component. The cognitive aspect is an evaluation of 
the conditions of an individual’s life, and the affective component is an evaluation of 
how enriching or rewarding their life is, and whether they feel satisfied and/or 
fulfilled. The affective component of the evaluative account is not a measure of utility 
in the Benthamite hedonist sense, but feelings of contentment and satisfaction. 
Clearly, pleasure and pain will contribute to both aspects of this account, but it allows 
the person to decide how much pleasure and pain matter for their overall evaluation of 
their lives. 
 
A key element of the cognitive aspect is how well we have met our expectations, 
which suggests that a life evaluation is broader than the utility that Bentham had in 
mind. Essentially, it allows the individual to choose how important affect is in 
comparison to them meeting their expectations in the future and how they have met 
them in the past. So it could be construed as being a less restrictive concept of 
  32 
subjective well-being than hedonic calculus/utility. How often people make such an 
evaluation is uncertain, but when individuals are not evaluating their life, the 
underlying components of their evaluation (e.g. their preferences, attitudes, feelings) 
exist and therefore a hypothetical evaluation of that person’s life may be made 
(Sumner, 1996). So an individual’s well-being is determined by factors they would 
use if they were to evaluate themselves at that time.   
 
Psychologists have used such an evaluation that provides both a cognitive and 
affective element. Diener et al (2003) and Diener and Seligman (2004) present well-
being as peoples’ positive evaluations of their lives, which inherently includes affect, 
engagement, satisfaction, and meaning. As a result, SWB is an individual’s 
assessment of their life, which encompasses how an individual thinks and feels about 
their life (Diener et al, 1999). Therefore, the SWB approach reflects the weights 
attached to their hedonic experience alongside their assessment of how well life is 
going for them more generally (Dolan et al, 2008). This is clearly different to the 
hedonic calculus approach (see Kahneman et al, 2004; White and Dolan, 2008). This 
life evaluation method was initiated in economics by Easterlin (1974), who used a 
‘Satisfaction with Life Scale’, where statements such as “I am satisfied with my life” 
and “in most ways my life is close to ideal” are rated on a one to seven scale, ranging 
from “strongly disagree” to “strongly agree”. There are various ways of measuring 
SWB through surveys, but most studies do use the Likert scale, which goes from zero 
to ten (e.g. Clark and Oswald, 1994; Blanchflower, 2004; and Van Praag and Ferrer-i-
Carbonell, 2004).  
 
To sum up, SWB has a both a cognitive element, in that it determines whether a 
person’s aspirations have been met, and an affective element, in that it determines the 
extent to which one finds one’s life to be enriching and feels satisfied and fulfilled by 
it. SWB allows each individual to freely choose how important each dimension is to 
her own well-being (Sumner, 1996), which actually suggests that SWB is quite an 
autonomous measure of welfare. It is not easy to formalise SWB, but economists have 
started to determine what a SWB function would look like. A standard SWB function 
could be approximated to: 
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                (5) 
 
where SWB is subjective well-being, which takes on the value from zero to ten, and 
U(…) is the observable utility or well-being, but the exact structure is hidden from the 
interviewer. The Z vector includes a set of determinants of SWB, and t represents the 
relationship between the Z vector and well-being over time. The residual  represents 
the noise influencing the relationship between actual and reported well-being, such as 
the cognitive inability to accurately communicate their well-being levels in a survey 
or in an interview.  
 
In order to use SWB as a measure of utility, there needs to be validity and reliability 
in the actual measure. Sandvik et al (1993) have showed that individuals are able to 
recognise and predict the satisfaction of others, suggesting that SWB is observable 
and comparable between individuals. Furthermore, van Praag (1991) has argued that 
individuals can easily translate verbal labels, e.g. very good, in to roughly the same 
numerical values. Sandvik et al (1993) and Shizgal (1999) have demonstrated that 
there is a strong positive correlation between SWB ratings and emotions such as 
smiling and frowning. The research on Duchenne smiles (i.e. a type of smiling that 
involves a muscle near the eye called orbicularis oculi, pars laterali, which can 
distinguish between true and feigned enjoyment) are correlated with SWB (Ekman et 
al, 1988; 1990). 
 
There has also been neurological evidence as to the extent of the validity of SWB 
responses. For example, Urry et al (2004) have shown, using Electro-
encephalography, that left-right brain asymmetry is shown to be associated with 
higher levels of positive affect and SWB.4 This left-right asymmetry is also associated 
with quicker recovery from negative affect shocks, and also to cortisol levels, which 
are related to responses to stress (Clow, 2006). While this brain asymmetry has 
something to do with genetics, both Davidson (2004) and Huppert (2006) argue that 
early social experiences have a significant effect, and that it is possible to manipulate 
                                                 
4 Davidson (2004) argued that in right handed people, positive feelings are associated with more brain 
wave activity in the left prefrontal cortex, whereas negative feelings are more associated with the right 
prefrontal cortex; hence the importance of left-right brain asymmetry. 
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the asymmetry in adults using magnetic fields to stimulate activity in the left frontal 
portion of the brain.  
 
Another strand of literature suggests that SWB at a particular time can predict future 
behaviour. Therefore, individuals might know what activities decrease their well-
being and these activities are gradually discontinued over time (Kahneman et al, 
1993; Frijters, 2000). Freeman (1978) and Clark et al (1998) have shown that 
satisfaction in an individual’s job is a strong predictor of their resignation, and that 
lower SWB predicts future marital break-up (Gardner and Oswald, 2006). Evidence 
from Di Tella et al (2003) found that rises and falls in suicide rates move in the 
opposite direction to changes in SWB, and Bray and Gunnell (2006) showed that 
there was a negative correlation between SWB and suicide. Guven (2007) has found 
that higher SWB: increases savings; reduces risky behaviour; impacts on future 
expectations; reduces the likelihood to smoke; and reduces the likelihood to migrate 
to another country. The latter is also implied in Blanchflower and Shadforth (2009). 
 
Furthermore, illnesses such as heart disease (Sales and House, 1971), strokes 
(Huppert, 2006) and hypertension (Steptoe and Wardle, 2005; Blanchflower and 
Oswald, 2008) are highly correlated with SWB. Cohen et al (2003) found that people 
with higher SWB were less likely to catch a cold when exposed to the cold virus, and 
recovered faster if they did catch a cold, than those with lower SWB. 
 
In terms of statistical reliability, single-item SWB measures have been found to have 
moderate reliabilities, usually between .40 and .66, even when asked twice in the 
same session one hour apart (Andrews and Whithey, 1976). Kammann and Flett 
(1983) found that single-item well-being questions under the instructions to consider 
“the past few weeks” or “these days” had reliabilities of .50 to .55 when asked within 
the same day. Krueger and Schkade (2008) improved on the earlier studies by 
analyzing the reliability of a standard self-reported life satisfaction measure and of 
affect measures collected from a diary method. Over a two-week period, the 
correlation of net affect (i.e., duration-weighted positive feelings less negative 
feelings) measured two weeks apart is 0.64, which is slightly higher than the 
correlation of life satisfaction (r = 0.59). They argue that a potential reason for the 
modest reliability of SWB measures compared with education and income, which 
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typically have reliability ratios of around 0.90, is the susceptibility of SWB questions 
to transient mood effects. 
 
In addition to this, Lyubomirsky et al (2005) provide a meta-analysis on the work 
examining the link between positive affect and other behaviours or skills. They found 
consistent evidence that positive affect increases: sociability and activity; altruism; 
liking of self and others; the immune system; and effective conflict resolution 
strategies. They also found, but to a weaker extent, that positive affect increases 
original thinking. As a result, higher SWB is an important determinant to become a 
productive member of society and the economy. 
 
Moving to the other direction of the relationship, from the Z vector in equation (3.1), 
Dolan et al (2008a) argue that there are five major determinants of SWB: (i) income 
(absolute or relative – social and temporal); (ii) health (especially psychological 
health); (iii) employment (unemployed; long time sick; carer); (iv) personal 
relationships (divorced or separated; living alone); and (v) social capital (e.g. talking 
frequently to neighbours). Regarding how income is a determinant of SWB, there has 
been much debate in the literature as to whether absolute income is as important as 
relative income.5 Easterlin (2001) has found that individual income has a significant 
effect on SWB, and is at is greatest strength amongst low-income groups (Biswas-
Diener and Diener, 2001), and lowest strength for higher income groups (Cummins et 
al, 2004). However, absolute income does not always increase SWB (e.g. Wildman 
and Jones, 2002), and there are problems with causality of well-being, i.e. higher 
initial levels of well-being might ultimately lead to higher levels of income (Graham 
et al, 2004). This has implications to deriving monetary values for SWB, which we 
will highlight later on in chapters 3 and 8. 
 
Relative income is perceived as being a key determinant of well-being. Luttmer 
(2005), Ferrer-i-Carbonell (2005) and Blanchflower and Oswald (2004) find that 
relative income significantly affects SWB, and Easterlin (2001) believes that this 
dominates the absolute income effect. McBride (2001) however believes that the 
relative income effects is less at lower income levels, where absolute income matters 
                                                 
5 The literature review by Clark et al (2008a) devote the whole paper to just this issue. 
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much more, but Fafchamps and Shilpi (2006) have found that poor households in 
Nepal do not care less about relative consumption than high income households. 
There is a debate not only on the effect of relative income, but also on how relative 
income should be measured. The Hirschman tunnel effect, i.e. other people’s incomes 
impact on my well-being positively because I expect my income to increase in the 
future, might be prominent for some individuals or some societies. Clark et al (2009) 
finds similar effects for pay in the labour market. At this time, we do not have a very 
clear idea of the causal effects of absolute and relative income on SWB.  
 
If there is a clear causal effect of an event on SWB, we can start to value such events 
for public policy. So we can place a value on public non-market goods which can feed 
in to CBA. This would then also allow us to compare such values with people’s 
revealed and stated preferences, which has not been previously done for non-market 
goods. The way that SWB can be used to elicit monetary values has been provided by 
Baarsma (2000), Clark and Oswald (2002), Frey et al (2004) and van Praag and 
Baarsma (2005), essentially using the compensating differential approach from labour 
economics.  
 
In order to value a non-market good, we need to firstly specify the SWB function 
within an ordinary least squares, ordered logit or ordered probit regression:6 
 
 (6) 
 
 
where SWBi is individual i’s SWB, ln(Y)i is the natural logarithm of household 
income, Ni is the non-market good, X’ are the personal and social characteristics, and 
 is the standard error term. With the estimated coefficients of the micro-
econometric SWB function for the non-market good ( ) and household income ( ), 
we can calculate the shadow price of the non-market good or implicit utility-constant 
trade-offs between the good and income. We measure the shadow price by the income 
compensation (IC), i.e. the decrease in income necessary to hold utility constant if the 
                                                 
6 See Ferrer-i-Carbonell and Frijters (2005) and Van Praag and Ferrer-i-Carbonell (2004) for the costs 
and benefits of using each framework.  
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quality/quantity of the non-market increases. In an indirect utility function, this would 
be given by: 
 
 
 (7) 
 
where v(.) is the indirect utility function, yi is the initial household income, N0 is the 
inferior non-market good and N1 is the superior non-market good. Given the 
specification of the micro-econometric SWB function expressed in equation (3.2) the 
position of IC in the indirect utility function, IC can be defined as:  
 
         (8) 
 
where  is average household income of the sample population. This is derived by 
using equation (7) from the regression (6) to form: 
 
€ 
ˆ β 2N0 + ˆ β 1 ln(y0 + IC) = ˆ β 2N1 + ˆ β 1 ln(y0) (9) 
 
hence: 
 
€ 
ln(y0 + IC) =
ˆ β 2(N1 − N0)
ˆ β 1
+ ln(y0)  (10) 
 
Therefore, this IC generates an income compensation of the non-market good that can 
then be used in CBA. 
 
The seminal work to date that uses SWB to elicit the value of a non-market good is 
that of van Praag and Baarsma (2005). They examine residents located within an area 
around Amsterdam airport, and use a life evaluation question, i.e. the ladder of life – 
which has recently been used by the Gallup world poll (Deaton et al, 2009). They find 
that actual objective noise is not significant in explaining the SWB for these residents. 
This is not surprising since one would expect that those who have an indifference to a 
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certain level of noise would locate themselves near the airport, i.e. some aspect of 
residential sorting. Within their regressions however, once they included a subjective 
perception of noise, this term became negative and significant.  
 
We shall assume that the estimates from their study are causal just to demonstrate 
how they value noise pollution even though they are prone to a reporting bias. Their 
value of noise was not linear in noise level, since they found that an increase in noise 
from 20Ku to 30Ku is equivalent to the change from 30 Ku to 45Ku in SWB terms. 
From their results, an increase of noise from 20Ku to 30Ku should be compensated by 
around €34 for a monthly net income of €1,500, and from 20Ku to 40Ku should be 
compensated around €57. Given that they calculated that the monthly value of 
insulation was €22 (on housing rent), it is therefore more beneficial to pay the 
compensation to individuals rather than to insulate every house in the vicinity of the 
airport. 
 
As a result, using people’s SWB to value non-market goods seems a promising 
avenue for research. If the causal estimates are found for the non-market good, we can 
obtain the marginal rate of substitution of income for the non-market good, and this 
then can feed into CBA and public policy more generally. There is therefore a large 
potential in this method in economics, but how this method compares to preferences is 
a largely untouched area. But before we can start to think about such possibilities, we 
need to set out some of the issues of valuing non-market goods by using people’s 
preferences and experiences.  
 
2.3 Problems 
 
2.3.1 Consistency 
 
2.3.1.1 Are preferences consistent? 
 
The premise of WTP is based upon the theory that individuals make choices so as to 
maximize a utility function, using all the information available, and processing this 
information appropriately. In this rational model, individuals’ preferences over all 
bundles of consumption of private and public goods are assumed to be time-
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consistent, affected only by own payoffs, and independent of the framing of the 
decision. Therefore, once one asks a sample their WTP for a good, it is seen as being 
logical and correct to derive a demand function for the whole population from this 
sample. There is a growing list of papers in psychology and behavioral economics 
however that document aspects of behavior in market settings that also deviate from 
the forecasts of the standard theory (DellaVigna, 2009).  
 
One of the main problems of WTP is in terms of risk preferences.  The study that 
really demonstrated the problem of risk preferences for the standard model is 
Kahneman and Tversky (1979). They propose a reference-dependent model of 
preferences that, unlike the standard model, fit a great deal of the experimental 
evidence on risky choice. Their ‘prospect theory’ stipulated that choices consist of 
two stages, editing and evaluation. In the editing stage, all possible outcomes of the 
decision are ordered following some heuristic, so individuals decide which outcomes 
they see as basically identical and they set a reference point and consider lower 
outcomes as losses and larger as gains. In the evaluation phase, individuals then 
behave as if they would compute a value based on the potential outcomes and their 
respective probabilities. Due to the reference point, the theory measures gains and 
losses and not absolute wealth, so it is the change in wealth that becomes important 
not the wealth in its absolute form. They formalize this mathematically to argue that 
there is a bigger impact of losses than of gains for the same absolute value, which has 
been called ‘loss aversion’.  
 
The above work makes an explicit reference to how the reference point is shaped by 
the endowment effect - which results in an asymmetry between WTP and WTA. In a 
laboratory experiment, Kahneman et al (1990) randomly allocated mugs to one group 
of subjects. They used an incentive-compatible procedure to elicit the WTA for 
subjects that received the mug, and the WTP for subjects that were not allocated the 
mug. According to the standard theory, the two valuations should on average be the 
same. The median WTA of $5.75, however, was twice as large as the median WTP of 
$2.25. They found that wealth effects did not explain this discrepancy.  
 
In practice, it is very difficult to find any studies where . Horowitz and 
McConnell (2002) conduct a meta-analysis of forty-five usable non-market studies 
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where both WTA and WTP are reported. They argued that the discrepancy between 
the two values was higher the further away the good being valued is from being an 
ordinary private good. They conclude that this discrepancy between WTP and WTA 
is not due to strategic and hypothetical bias, or either incentive incompatibility.   
 
The psychological mechanisms noted above by Kahneman and Tversy have prompted 
economists to provide three theoretical reasons for this problem. Firstly, an income 
effect is very important, i.e. real income changes in a different way according to 
whether the individual has to pay or receives compensation. Willing (1976) however 
has argued that the discrepancy must be small since it should not matter whether one 
adopts the Marshallian measure of surplus or a measure based on compensated 
demand curves. He further elaborates that any error in using the Marshallian measure 
of surplus is proportional to the income elasticity of demand and consumer surplus as 
a fraction of income. Therefore, the errors should be small (i.e. a few percentage 
points), hence the income effect cannot be solely responsible for the disparity between 
WTP and WTA.   
 
Secondly, substitution effects are believed to be responsible for the disparity 
(Hanemann, 1991, 1999; Carson et al, 2001). In the environmental context, there are 
little substitutes, so very large levels of compensation are needed for environmental 
goods. Carson et al (2001) argue that in this context, both income and substitution 
effects are present and the ratio of WTP to WTA depends on the ratio of the income 
effect to the substitution effect, where the latter is very small. But the results from 
Kahneman and others document that such discrepancies exist for goods with many 
substitutes. 
 
Thirdly, endowment effects have become very prominent in explaining the disparity. 
An endowment point, i.e. a good (or bundle of) already owned by an individual, has 
more psychological salience if it is lost rather than if an equal good is obtained (i.e. 
loss aversion) (Tversky and Kahneman, 1991). Therefore, losses are valued more than 
gains, and the valuation function exhibits diminishing marginal valuation the further 
away from the reference points one gets (Knetsch, 1989). Although this would 
obviously cause a large discrepancy in the WTP and WTA values, Shogren et al 
(1994) argued that whether endowment effects are prominent depend upon 
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substitution effects. They found that WTP and WTA converge when there are close 
substitutes, so that the endowment effect does not show up regardless of the degree of 
substitutability. Knetsch and Sinden (1984) and Morrison (1997) both however 
argued that endowment effects magnify the substitution effect by shifting the 
indifference curve.  
 
While there is some debate about whether experience can reduce the WTP – WTA 
disparity in an experimental setting (see List, 2003, 2004; Plott and Zeiler, 2005; Isoni 
et al, 2009), there is clear field evidence of the disparity in housing markets 
(Genesove and Mayer, 2001), and the importance of reference points and loss 
aversion in the supply of labour (Mas, 2006; Fehr and Goette, 2007) and insurance 
markets (Sydnor, 2006). The asymmetry between WTA and WTP, replicated in a 
number of studies, has important implications for markets that are characterized by 
low volume of trades. Non-market valuation is usually based on one-off trades of 
buying or selling. There are very rarely repeated trades, limiting the experience people 
have in the real or hypothetical market. All of these reasons provide some evidence as 
to why , but if the third reason is more crucial than the first and second 
reasons, this would question the underlying theory of demand and WTP (Pearce et al, 
2006). While this is an empirical matter, WTA values are theoretically required in 
valuation, especially where property right permit them – but not many researchers 
now use such a method. If we omit WTA, can we really elicit consistent preferences 
for a non-market good? 
 
A reason why this may not be the case is through social preferences or altruism. A 
large number of laboratory experiments calls into question the assumption of pure 
self-interest. For instance, a large number of studies using the dictator game (where a 
subject (the dictator) has an endowment of $10 and chooses how much of the $10 to 
transfer to an anonymous partner) find that about sixty percent of subjects transfer a 
positive amount (Forsythe et al., 1994) – although the standard theory of self-
interested consumers would suggest a zero amount. 
 
Field evidence of this phenomenon would be charitable giving. When a fund-raiser 
contacts a person directly, the situation resembles a dictator game, except for the lack 
of anonymity. Field experiments in fund-raising, including List and Lucking-Reilly 
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(2002) and Landry et al (2006), estimate the effect on giving of variables such as the 
seed money (the funds raised early on), the use of a lottery, and the identity of the 
solicitor. Charitable giving is increasing in the seed money (List and Lucking-Reilly, 
2002) presumably because of signaling of quality of the charity, and in the 
attractiveness of female solicitors for door-to-door fund-raising, especially for male 
respondents (Landry et al., 2006). The latter result implies that giving in door-to-door 
fund-raising is not purely the result of altruism, suggesting a more instrumental view 
of giving. Overall, however, these field experiments do not yet answer the key 
question of what motivates most giving, genuine social preferences or more 
instrumental reasons, such as social pressure.  
 
This is crucially important because WTP is usually supposed to be about our own 
self-interest (excluding any existence value). But if we value a good for own our well-
being and someone else’s well-being, and then another person values a good for their 
own well-being and then for the other person’s well-being, we are left with a great 
deal of double counting. This is demonstrated by both Bergstrom (1982) and (Jones-
Lee, 1992). Bergstrom (1982) demonstrated that the value of statistical life should be 
set at the same level as is appropriate under conditions of pure self-interest. Jones-Lee 
(1992) extends this to shown that for all degrees of pure paternalism (i.e. in which 
concern for other people, whether weakly or strongly felt, ignores their preference, the 
implied value of statistical life is also identical to that which emerges under 
conditions of pure self-interest. Once such concerns enter people’s preferences, then 
the values for non-market goods will vary. Jones-Lee (1992) shows that such 
concerns can inflate WTP by around 10 to 40 per cent.   
 
2.3.1.2 Are experiences consistent? 
 
As we have seen in this chapter, SWB has good reliability and validity. There has 
been little research into whether asking individuals their SWB affects their SWB 
rating. This is highly related to the Heisenberg uncertainty principle in physics, which 
states that one cannot measure the energy of a particle because the act of measurement 
affects the particle’s energy level. Similarly, one could argue that introspection about 
happiness may be impossible since introspection affects happiness (Schooler et al, 
2003). Ariely (1998) and Ariely and Zauberman (2000) showed that once respondents 
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created a moment by moment evaluation of an event or aspect of the day, their overall 
evaluation of the experience as a whole was influenced by the momentary responses 
they produced.  
 
Wilson and Schooler (1991) used an experiment based on the quality of strawberry 
jam to see the effect of evaluation. The control group had to give a gut-reaction 
evaluation to a number of different jams, whereas the intervention group had to 
analyse their reasons for their answers for the preference. These ratings were then 
compared to ratings of experts. They found that the control group had a much higher 
correlation with the experts as opposed to the participant group, suggesting that 
reflection caused the participants to emphasize the inferences that they made about 
their experience and ‘lose touch’ with their actual hedonic feelings. Due to normative 
issues of the experts’ opinions, Wilson et al (1993) did a follow up study without such 
‘expert ratings’ and still found that greater evaluation undermined individuals’ ability 
to decipher the utilities that they had actually experienced. Therefore, when 
individuals are forced to make quick gut judgements, their hedonic appraisals seem to 
reflect better their actual hedonic experience.  
 
While measuring SWB might affect SWB itself, it could also be that the act of 
eliciting their SWB makes them behave in a different way which might affect their 
future SWB ratings, i.e. the Hawthorne effect. The Hawthorne effect of measurement 
occurs when individuals that are been observed during a research study temporarily 
change their behaviour.7 Over time this has broadened to include the fact that 
increased attention on the individual makes them change their behaviour (Parsons, 
1974; Adair, 1984). So the measurement or evaluation of an event might not only alter 
how individuals appriase the situation, but also affect the experience itself (Schooler 
et al, 2003). Firstly, evaluation may detract from the amount of attention that is 
devoted to the activity itself, which may in turn detract from the experience. 
Secondly, it is possible that engaging in hedonic evaluation might lead to 
disappointment and regret. For instance, Schooler et al (2003) conduct an experiemnt 
to find that monitoring happiness reduced individuals’ ability to benefit from 
apleasurable experience, which suggests that monitoring one’s ongoing experience 
                                                 
7 It is a well established measurement artifact although Levitt and List (2009) question some of the 
original data at the Hawthorne plant. 
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can undermine one’s ability to gain utility. Furthermore, trying to be happy lowered 
the mood and led to fustration, which undermined their ability to feel the pleasure that 
they sought. However, this experiment is unable to truly show whether monitoring 
reduces percieved happiness because it detracts from the experience, or because it 
forces individuals to make a more realistic evaluation of their hedonic state. Overall, 
it must be recognised that the mere act of asking a SWB question might affect 
experiences. There is a need for greater research in this area and relates to the 
comparability of experiences over time. 
 
Consistent experiences relates to how comparable the responses are within and 
between individuals. Robbins clearly stated that experiences were not possible to 
compare between individuals. This inter-personal comparability is not really a 
problem when the study design has a clear identification strategy. To use experiences 
in non-market valuation, we have to use the causal estimate of the effect of the good 
on experiences. So by assumption we have to have a randomized, experimental or 
quasi-experimental design that mitigates worries on inter-personal comparability.    
 
Intrapersonal comparability on the other hand is difficult to mitigate. Intrapersonal 
comparability requires that the same individuals use the scales, whether numerical or 
verbal, similarly over time. For the end points to be equivalent for life satisfaction 
questions, the individuals must have equivalent conceptions of the worst and best 
levels of satisfaction over time. This goes back to Stevens (1958), who argued that 
adaptation level theory illustrates the judgment relativity of labels and not adaptation 
in the conventional sense. When asked a life satisfaction question, respondents must 
usually decide for themselves what the endpoints of the response scale represent. 
Thus, one person may interpret the ten out of ten as the highest life satisfaction they 
have thus far experienced. Another person may interpret it as the highest level of life 
satisfaction they can imagine experiencing on Earth. This is not necessarily a problem 
unless the non-market good changes the end points over time within individuals that 
biases the estimates.  
 
For instance, individual A and individual B might have the same endpoints in t1, and 
in t2 only A becomes a victim of a major flood that destroys her property and 
belongings. This flood in itself could change the endpoints in life satisfaction, as A 
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might not think that life in t1 was pretty good in comparison to t2, so their whole 
assessment of life satisfaction might be shifted downwards by a factor τ. So assume 
that the flood normally reduces life satisfaction by one point, but that the flood causes 
τ=-1 (i.e. a seven in t1 is equal to a six in t2), we would therefore have complete 
adaptation from the flood, although this is being caused by scale re-calibration and not 
adaptation in the conventional sense.   
 
There is little evidence on this for SWB, but there is some research on ‘reference 
shifts’ within assessment of health-related quality of life (HRQoL) (Albrecht and 
Devlieger, 1999; Allison et al., 1997; Breetvelt and van Dam, 1991; Carver and 
Scheier, 2000). Reference shifts are defined as:  
 
“a change in the meaning of one’s self-evaluation of a target construct as 
a result of a) a change in the respondent’s internal standards of 
measurement (scale recalibration, in psychometric terms); b) a change in 
the respondent’s values (i.e. the importance of different domains which 
make up construct) c) a redefinition of the target construct” (Sprangers 
and Schwartz, 1999: 1508).  
 
Many of these health studies could be replicated looking at SWB measures. This 
would shed light on whether it is appropriate to directly compare SWB responses 
across changes in circumstances such as changes in health states, and a whole host of 
other non-market goods. The importance of scale recalibration for public policy 
becomes a normative issue. 
 
2.3.2 Framing 
 
2.3.2.1 Are preferences unduly affected by framing? 
 
A key tenet of psychology is that the context and the framing of a situation matter. 
Two equivalent decision problems that are framed differently may elicit different 
responses. Tversky and Kahneman (1981) presented a classical example, where one 
group of 152 subjects were asked how they would respond to the outbreak of a 
disease which is expected to kill 600 people. Two alternative programs to combat the 
disease are presented: ‘if Program A is adopted, 200 people will be saved. If Program 
B is adopted, there is 1/3 probability that 600 people will be saved, and 2/3 
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probability that no people will be saved.’ When faced with this decision, 72 percent of 
subjects preferred program A. A second group of 155 subjects were presented with 
the same scenario, and asked their preference between Programs C and D: ‘if Program 
C is adopted 400 people will die. If Program D is adopted there is 1/3 probability that 
nobody will die, and 2/3 probability that 600 people will die.’ Programs C and A are 
equivalent, and Programs B and D are equivalent. When asked, however, only 22 
percent of subjects preferred Program C, compared to 72 percent preferring Program 
A.  
 
This framing effect is related to reference-dependent preferences, i.e. individuals 
evaluate the outcomes relative to a reference point, in the first frame that no one is 
saved, in the second frame that no one dies. Compared to this reference point, the 
outcomes are framed as gains in the first case (hence the risk-averse choice) and as 
losses in the second case (hence the risk-seeking choice). This example illustrates a 
general feature of human decisions: judgments are comparative, and changes in the 
comparison point can affect a decision, even if they do not affect the underlying 
economic trade-offs.  
 
An example of framing is that of anchoring. Ariely et al (2003) (using Tversky and 
Kahneman’s (1974) general approach) presented individuals with six products 
(computer accessories, wine, luxury chocolates and books) and asked them whether 
they would buy each good for a dollar figure equal to the last two digits of their social 
security number (ranging from 00 to 99). After this, they stated their maximum WTP 
for each product. They found that individuals with above-median social security 
numbers stated WTP values from 57 to 107 per cent greater than subjects with below-
median numbers. For instance, for a bottle of average wine, those in the lowest 
quintile of social security number distribution were willing to pay on average $9 
whereas those in the highest social security number quintile were willing to pay on 
average $28.   
 
The most compelling evidence that preferences are constructed due to framing is from 
the preference reversal literature. There is significant evidence that the the price of 
risky prospects is systematically different from the choice ordering. The reversal of 
preference was first studied by psychologists, and Lindman (1965; 1971) first 
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discovered it with subsequent tests by Slovic and Lichtenstein (1968) and 
Lichtenstein and Slovic (1971). Grether and Plott (1979) brought preference reversals 
into the mainstream economics literature. Preference reversal has been found outside 
of experimental settings (see Tversky and Thaler, 1990, and Prelec and Loewenstein, 
1991, for discounting reversals, and Clark and Oswald, 1996, for reversals in 
perceived fairness in the labour market).  
 
One of the most illuminating examples of preference reversal come from Hsee’s 
(1998) work. He presents two hypothetical servings of ice cream, one by Vendor H 
and one by Vendor L. They were illustrated by drawings as reproduced in Figure 1. It 
is clear that Vendor H's serving was contained in a larger cup than Vendor L's, but 
Vendor H's serving was under filled while Vendor L's over filled. Overall, vendor H's 
serving contained more ice cream, hence more valuable, than Vendor L's.  
 
Figure 1: The two goods taken from Hsee (1998) 
 
 
The questionnaire for this study had three between-subject versions: separate-H, 
separate-L and joint. In each separate evaluation version, participants read the 
following: "Imagine the following scenario: It is summer in Chicago. You are on the 
beach at Lake Michigan. You find yourself in the mood for some ice cream. There 
happens to be an ice cream vendor on the beach. She sells Haagen Dazs ice cream by 
the cup. For each serving, she uses [a 10 oz cup and puts 8 oz of ice cream] [a 5 oz 
cup and puts 7 oz of ice cream] in it”. These instructions were followed by one of the 
two drawings reproduced above. Respondents were then asked "What is the most you 
are willing to pay for a serving?". The joint evaluation version was parallel to the 
separate evaluation versions except that participants were told that there were two 
vendors on the beach. Participants were presented with the information, including the 
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drawings, for both vendors. They were then asked "What is the most you are willing 
to pay for a serving from each vendor?" Hsee used 69 college students from a large 
Midwestern university, and each respondent received one version of the questionnaire 
and completed it individually. Upon completion every participant received a cash 
payment.  
 
The theory of preference reversal would predict that Vendor L's serving would be 
valued more in separate evaluation, and Vendor H's serving would be valued more in 
joint evaluation. The reasons for these predictions is that in separate evaluation, even 
though the amount of ice cream was the only value of concern, this attribute was hard 
to evaluate independently. Lacking a comparison, it was difficult to determine 
whether a serving with 8 oz ice cream (or with 7 oz ice cream) was good or not. The 
size of the cup provided a reference point. Presumably, respondents compared the 
amount of ice cream against that reference. The resulting `relation' attribute (over- 
versus under-filling) was easy to evaluate: Most consumers would find an over-filled 
serving appealing, and an under-filled serving unappealing. Thus, the over-filled 
serving (Vendor L's) would be valued more highly in separate evaluation. In joint 
evaluation, respondents could compare one option against the other, could recognize 
that Vendor H's serving contained more ice cream than Vendor L's, and would make 
their valuations accordingly.  
 
The WTP for Vendor H in the separate evaluation was $1.66 and the WTP for Vendor 
L in the separate evaluation was $2.26, where the difference is significant at the five 
per cent level. In the joint evaluation, respondents were WTP $1.85 from Vendor H 
and $1.56 from Vendor L, where the difference is significant at the one per cent level. 
As predicted, there was a clear less-is-better effect in separate evaluation, and a clear 
preference reversal between joint and separate evaluations. In the separate evaluation 
versions, Vendor L's serving was valued significantly more than for Vendor H's, even 
though Vendor L's serving contained less ice-cream. In joint evaluation, the effect 
was reversed: Vendor H's serving was valued significantly more. For a review of such 
studies, see Hsee et al (1999). 
 
Outside of the preference reversal literature, Benartzi and Thaler (2002) show that the 
choice of retirement depends substantially on the format of the choices presented. A 
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field study by Duflo et al (2006) on microcredit in a developing country confirms 
such framing, and they link such effects with attention. This framing can easily occur 
in non-market valuation studies, as how one frames the good or scenario, will 
obviously have an effect on the values elicited. This calls in to question whether 
giving more information to the respondent is desirable, especially in hypothetical 
scenarios. For instance, not only are framing effects more prominent with more 
information (Thaler, 1980; Slovic et al, 1982), but the influence of the level of 
information on a subject’s WTP for a non-market good is potentially significant, 
particularly when non-use values are being elicited (Munro and Hanley, 1999). 
Furthermore, placing responsibility on the researcher for the supply of information 
creates ethical dilemmas. To the extent that subjects view interviews as unbiased 
sources, the possibility of altering the information set gives the unscrupulous 
researcher the opportunity to produce results that reflect the experimenter’s 
preferences rather than those of the respondents. To the extent that this occurs, the 
whole process of using preferences for policy is undermined. Murphy and Clinch 
(2003) argue that is important for WTP values and the values used in CBA. 
 
2.3.2.2 Are experiences unduly affected by framing? 
 
Due to the fact that SWB contains an affective component, it is liable to be influenced 
by framing. At the extreme end for example, if the interviewer is in a wheelchair, 
good health might become significant in their SWB responses. While this can be 
overcome by good survey design (Frey and Stutzer, 2002), the extent to which it 
occurs is unknown. On the validity side, biases may sometimes arise since people 
may not know how happy or satisfied they really are, and the responses could be 
distorted by ego-defence mechanisms, in that it might be socially desirable to 
underestimate/overestimate their level of well-being, especially in the presence of 
other people, and this is something we do not know enough about. 
 
There may also be problems of ordering effects for SWB, similar to that of survey 
methods. Bertrand and Mullainathan (2001) have argued that subjective data is 
vulnerable to ordering effects, which can be applied to SWB data. So it is important to 
examine the ordering or placement of the SWB question within the existing surveys to 
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examine if there are any discrepancies between these surveys.8 The European Social 
Survey (ESS) has an eleven point global or life satisfaction question, which is situated 
in the politics section, immediately following a question on where you would put 
yourself on a left/right political scale. Hence, we would argue that how satisfied you 
are about the political situation of your country is likely to affect your SWB rating 
and analyses would more likely pick up an effect of political persuasion and 
inequality on life satisfaction. This is exactly what was found in Pichler (2006).  
 
The Euro-Barometer survey has a four point life satisfaction question within the first 
section of the survey, meaning that it is less likely to be prone to ordering effects, 
although it immediately follows a question of whether the individual is able to vote in 
a political election. This earlier voting question might provide an explanation as to 
why Alesina et al (2004) find that Europeans’ (using the Euro-Barometer survey) 
SWB is much more correlated with their political persuasion than Americans’ SWB 
(using the GSS survey). It must be noted however that the position of the life 
satisfaction question within the Euro-Barometer does fluctuate, in that in some years 
it is positioned immediately after a financial situation question (e.g. Euro-Barometer 
number 30, 32, 34) and in others it is positioned after a question regarding what 
material goods the respondent has within the household (e.g. Euro-Barometer number 
22). This finding of SWB correlated with political persuasion might contradict to 
what is found in chapter 7 using the BHPS. 
 
The two main panel data sets analysed in the literature are the British Household 
Panel Survey (BHPS) and the German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP). The BHPS 
has a seven point life satisfaction question that follows domain satisfaction questions 
(i.e. health, household income, house, partner, job, social, amount of leisure, quality 
of leisure). The GSOEP has an eleven point life satisfaction question in section 8.1 
which is after a section on education and qualifications, and the life satisfaction 
question is immediately after questions regarding satisfaction with various domains 
(i.e. amount of spare time, health, local public transport, environment, job, household 
and personal income, standard of living and democracy). The life satisfaction ratings 
                                                 
8 The surveys we will highlight are all examined and analysed in Layard et al (2007). 
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in both the BHPS and GSOEP therefore might be biased by the domains that are prior 
to the LS question. 
 
The wording issue has been explored to an extent by Peasgood (2009). She found that 
those with higher levels of education were less likely to respond at the top end of the 
life satisfaction scale. So there may be a difference in interpretation of the word 
‘satisfaction’ for some groups. Other concerns relate to whether people use different 
implicit anchors when responding to these evaluative type questions. Anchors may 
vary from the ‘the best and worst life any human being is capable of experiencing and 
I am capable of imagining’ to ‘the best and worse life imaginable given my 
background, my current personal and socio-economic circumstances’. If an 
individual’s choice of implicit anchors is related to their characteristics, such as 
education, age or income, this will undermine interpersonal comparisons (Dolan and 
Peasgood, 2009). Comparisons between different explicit anchors would also help 
understand the potential role of individual characteristics on how these questions are 
answered.   
 
Overall, it seems that there is little consistency as to where the SWB question is 
situated within the existing surveys, and there could be some possible ordering effects 
within these surveys. At the very least, if domain satisfactions are to be elicited, this 
should be done after life satisfaction is elicited so as to minimise any bias that the 
domains may have on the overall life satisfaction rating. There be issues with how the 
question is frames in terms of language, but this requires much more research. 
 
2.3.4 Affective Forecasting  
 
The standard economic model assumes that decision-makers are on average correct 
about the distribution of the states of the world. There is however well-documented 
evidence that people have incorrect beliefs due to projection bias (DellaVigna, 2009). 
It must be noted however that projection bias has been a source of inquisition since 
Adam Smith’s time. For instance, Smith (2002: 173) argued that “the great source of 
both the misery and disorders of human life, seems to arise from over-rating the 
difference between one permanent situation and another”.  
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In non-market valuation, consumers are required to project their current preferences 
onto future periods. In health valuation, they are asked to project their current health 
preferences onto different health states in the future. In environmental valuation, they 
are asked to project their current environmental preferences onto different 
environmental states in the future. The model of projection bias was presented in 
Loewenstein et al (2003), where they assumed that utility u is a function of 
consumption c and of a state variable s, that is, u = u(c, s). The current state is s’ and 
the future state is s. When predicting the future utility û(c, s), an individual with 
projection bias expects utility û(c, s) = (1-α)u(c, s) + αu(c, s’) rather than u(c, s). The 
parameter α∈[0,1] captures the extent of projection bias, with α=0 denoting the 
standard case and α=1 the case of full projection bias. The evidence from the field 
and lab experiments is that α>0. 
 
Empirically, Gilbert et al (1998) asked subjects to forecast their happiness in 
correspondence of an event, and compare these responses to the responses after the 
event has occurred. Thirty-three current assistant professors at the University of Texas 
forecast that getting tenure would significantly improve their happiness (5.9 versus 
3.4 on a 1-7 scale). The difference however in rated happiness between 47 assistant 
professors that were awarded tenure by the same university and 20 that were denied 
tenure is smaller and not statistically significant (5.2 versus 4.7). Similar results apply 
for the election of a Democratic of Republican president, kidney dialysis, moving 
accommodation and a range of other domains. This can be linked to focusing effects, 
which Schkade and Kahneman (1998) arguing that “nothing in life is quite as 
important as you think it is, while you are thinking about it”. Schkade and Kahenman 
found that people mis-forecast the effect that weather has on people’s subjective well-
being. This will clearly have implications for consistency of preferences, but the 
starting point originates from incorrect beliefs. 
 
Conlin et al (forthcoming) present evidence of projection bias using a data set of two 
million orders of cold-weather apparel items. They consider the effect of weather at 
the time of purchase on the probability that an item is returned, conditional on 
purchase. According to the standard model, colder weather at the time of purchase 
should not affect the probability of a return, or may affect it negatively (since colder 
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weather at the time of purchase is correlated with colder weather over the subsequent 
days). Projection bias, instead, makes the opposite prediction. On colder days, 
individuals overestimate the use that they will make of a cold-weather item, and hence 
are ex post more likely to return the item. This prediction holds whether the projection 
bias regards future utility, (‘I expect to like cold-weather items very much’), or future 
weather (‘I expect the coming winter to be very cold’). Conlin et al find that a 
reduction in the order-date temperature of 30◦ F (for example from 40◦ F to 10◦ F) 
increases the average return rate of a cold-weather item by four percent, which is 
consistent with projection bias. A simple structural model of projection bias implies 
estimates of α≈0.5, implying that consumers predict future tastes roughly half-way 
between present tastes and actual future tastes. A caveat to this research might be that 
on colder days more ‘marginal’ individuals (which are more likely to return) order 
cold-weather clothing.  
 
Nonetheless, in a number of domains, people seem to consistently mis-predict their 
future well-being. This is worrying for using preferences as a guide to well-being and 
for valuing non-market goods since many of the valuation studies are on states of the 
world that have not yet been experienced, so they require no or negligible projection 
bias. Given the lack of experience of non-market goods, it could be that α tends 
towards one for non-market states of the world. 
 
2.3.5 Income and future/existence utility 
 
If the main objective for a policymaker is to use SWB for the non-market valuation 
aspect of a CBA, then the monetary valuation of experiences is necessary. The 
problem to date is that we do not really know how both absolute and relative income 
translates into SWB, and what, if any, variables can be used as an instrumental 
variable. In recent times the debate on this has gathered pace and the interested reader 
should consult Clark et al (2008) and Layard et al (2008). The absolute income 
coefficient used in papers that have attempted to monetise their SWB results have 
used the income coefficient for their population, but this could clearly vary across 
similar populations. So a program in one area could be valued higher than the same 
program in another area simply because of differing income coefficients. Clearly, 
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more research on the relationship between income and SWB is needed. There might 
also be a need for a rough and ready coefficient that can be used across all non-market 
studies, such as the discount rates that are currently employed in CBA. At the very 
least, the rough and ready coefficient could be adjusted to account for income levels 
as already done for the benefit transfer method in CBA. 
 
In the very long run, if all policies were evaluated by SWB, a joined up approach 
might be to use the weights from the SWB regressions without monetising. So we 
could have a form of cost-happiness analysis, which will be similar to using QALYs 
that are currently employed by the National Institute for Health and Clinical 
Excellence (NICE). So monetising experiences might be a problem for establishing 
SWB into public policy, in the long-run, it might not necessarily be such a large 
problem. 
 
Another foreseeable problem with SWB is that it examines the stocks and flows of 
events on SWB that have been experienced. An individual would have to experience a 
non-market good sometime during their life for it to contribute toward their SWB. 
The expectation of a future event can obviously be incorporated into SWB. So the 
potential loss of a specie in the future, or the loss of a good which we might use in the 
future, i.e. an option, can clearly affect SWB. Some economists might however argue 
that for public policy, we might need a monetary value on events that have not already 
happened, such as a serious flood in London in the future. But individuals in the UK 
have already experienced serious floods, for instance in Gloucestershire in 2007, so 
we can value floods in one area and extrapolate it to London. Many disasters or 
negative externalities have happened to someone in the past.   
 
Given that there is no method to extend well-being into the future, it is clear that SWB 
might not incorporate non-use value of a good. For example, according to the 
preference satisfaction account, the total value (T) of a good comprises of its expected 
use value (N), and its non-use value which is made up by existence value (X) and 
bequest value (B): 
 
 T = N + (X + B) 
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This essentially states that an individual might derive value for a non-market good in 
terms of its pure existence and for its existence in the future, so latter generations can 
enjoy the wetlands. Krutilla (1967) first analysed this existence value and thought it to 
be derived from either selfish or altruistic motives. These selfish or altruistic motives, 
however, are not small. Navrud (1988) analyses a scheme to improve water quality 
where (E + B) accounted for 63% of the total value of the good.  
 
From the perspective of experiences, there cannot be a value given to a good if 
someone somewhere does not experience it. To predict the value of a good on 
experiences by a close substitute might give some indication of its value. For 
preferences, as long as people are willing to pay for the existence, then it surely must 
matter to their utility. But if they receive no benefit in terms of their experience, at the 
point of purchase (beyond warm glow) or in the future, then this construes as classic 
mis-wanting. From an objective well-being account, it could be that such goods, 
which are never experienced by the individual, provide the possibility of that person 
becoming a flourishing individual since we cannot appreciate that good today. It is 
doubtful though that individuals have clear preferences for such goods because they 
will not be consumed by the good (so they lack experience) and consequently they 
lack the feedback from the good, and the goods are, mostly, very complex.   
 
Existence value turns the debate into philosophy and whether intrinsic value of 
something is possible. Both preferences and experiences would not believe that 
‘things’ (and not necessarily goods) have value in themselves because they are placed 
on Earth, over and beyond the instrumental value they give to humans. The 
philosophical debate is lively in this area (see Pinchot, 1914; Armstrong and Botzler, 
1993). What an experiences argument would look like however is that we cannot 
value such ‘things’ for public policy because they do not derive any utility for any 
human being on Earth.  
 
2.6 Conclusion 
 
Since the late 1960s, psychologists have been arguing that people do not really know 
what they prefer in a choice setting, so that preferences seem constructed as when the 
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situation arises. As a result, choices seem to be inconsistent, liable to framing, and 
affected by a whole host of theoretically irrelevant factors. Economists have been 
slow to acknowledge such effects however, and when economists make policy 
recommendations, they are typically made based upon preferences, implicitly 
assuming that these preferences are identical to their normative preferences (Beshears 
et al, 2008).  
 
At the start of the 1990s, Diamond and Hausman (1994) argued that SPs do not 
measure the preferences they attempt to measure, and that improvements in survey 
methodology are unlikely to change such a view. This argument is primarily due to 
the fact that SP studies do not derive values of preference but values of attitude. For 
instance, Kahneman and Ritov (1994) believe that people respond in attitudes, and 
just because they express a monetary term does not necessarily mean they express a 
preference. This corresponds to the warm glow effect in expressing support for good 
causes that are more to do with attitudes and not preferences (Andreoni, 1989). 
Studies such as Schkade and Payne (1993) support such an argument. They used a 
think aloud strategy for evaluating CV responses, and found that a significant amount 
of people stated that they just made up the answer, and others mentioned comparisons 
given to charities.   
 
As we have seen in section 2.3, revealed or stated preferences could be viewed as 
being malleable, so that choices and behaviours can be changed, even for private 
goods. Whether it is RPs or SPs, it has been shown that people’s choices are not 
always consistent for non-market goods. The contribution of this chapter is to show 
how the general problems with preferences can extend to inconsistency and framing. 
By documenting and classifying the problems with both RPs and SPs for private 
goods, where there is plenty of feedback or experience, illustrates the point that these 
problems would possibly be more severe for preferences for when there is little 
feedback or experience, i.e. non-market preferences. Some have argued that if both 
valuation methods provide the same values, which some argue goes some way to 
show validity of sing SPs (Griffin et al, 1995; Johnston, 2006). But this chapter 
clearly shows that both types of preferences might not necessarily reveal ‘true’ values 
since those values might have been biased in very similar ways.   
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If we can concede that the problems with RPs and SPs cause valuing non-market 
goods problematic by these methods, we could use other types of preferences that can 
be used in the social welfare function. For instance, Harsanyi (1982; see also Scanlon, 
1991) suggest that we might want to distinguish between self-regarding and ideal-
regarding preferences. The problem with this is that it then becomes difficult in 
distinguishing between a whole host of preferences that are informed and uniformed, 
rational and irrational, considered and ill-considered, ephemeral and enduring, 
spontaneous and adaptive, citizen and consumer etc (Jeffrey, 1974; Griffin, 1986). 
The issue with this line of argument is that if our RPs and SPs are biased, how do we 
know that our normative preferences are not biased as well, and how would one 
mobilise a system of where we determine how one set of preferences are good for us 
whereas another set are not? These issues are unresolved and they will be argued for 
some time.  So using such normative preferences for non-market valuation might be 
highly problematic. 
 
Overall, the problems and anomalies of preferences provide some very practical 
limitations of von Neumann and Morgenstern’s (1944) standard theory. The research 
on preferences in the future might go down two concurrent routes. Behavioural 
economists are beginning to use data that lie outside the traditional scope of 
economics, namely questionnaires about mental states and data such as neural 
imaging on psychological processes inside the brain. On a classical RP view, neither 
sort of data is of interest, but this data can indeed be of use, provided it is interpreted 
correctly (Fudenberg, 2006). Camerer and Loewenstein (2003) have argued that this 
is inevitable as it is unwise and inefficient to do economics without paying some 
attention to good psychology. On the neurological side, having a model that is better 
accord with the underlying structure of the brain can be valuable, as it may lead to 
more accurate out-of-sample predictions (McClure et al, 2004; de Quervain et al, 
2004). This might give us a greater understanding of preferences, but this is too early 
to tell. 
 
The subjective assessments of mental states, i.e. their experiences, might also be an 
alternative way of overcoming the problems of using people’s preferences for valuing 
non-market goods. This is different to the neurological approach since it does not try 
to provide a better understanding of the brain and how individuals make choices. It 
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does however provide us with a different interpretation of well-being that is based on 
what people enjoy rather than what they want. The link between people’s preferences 
and experiences however has not been fully established, and is an untouched area in 
non-market valuation. This measure of experiences is normally associated with the 
measurement of individual subjective well-being.  
 
This chapter documents the approach used by economists to measure SWB. Research 
in this area has been increasing but there is a lack of research in valuing non-market 
goods using SWB and applying such values into a CBA. More importantly, there has 
been no research to date that has determined whether the well-being we get from non-
market goods is the same irrespective of whether our welfare measure is preferences 
or experiences. This chapter has identified a very large gap in the literature and 
recommends for further research to close this gap, which will make for more effective 
government policies.  
 
There might be some problems to using SWB though for valuing non-market goods. 
The issues surrounding the consistency and framing seem particularly pertinent for 
using such values in CBA. The use of such data can however also be useful in other 
settings, such as trying to examine policies to change behaviour (Dolan and White, 
2007). Moreover, to look at what behaviours SWB can predict in a causal setting 
would advance the literature somewhat. There has been some tentative experimental 
work on this from Oswald et al (2009) and Cohen (1997).   
 
It must be noted that many organisations, such as the OECD, and national 
governments, such as the UK Government, are starting to use SWB as a metric for 
policy. So knowing how preferences and experiences compare and where we expect 
to observe some discrepancies is clearly important for welfare economics and public 
policy. Overall, this chapter contributes to the field by showing how little we know of 
using SWB for non-market valuation, where the gaps in the literature are, and some of 
the problems that could arise in the future when using SWB in comparison to 
preferences. 
 
 
  59 
3. COMPARING WILLINGNESS-TO-PAY AND SUBJECTIVE 
WELL-BEING IN AN URBAN QUASI-EXPERIMENT  
 
 
 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
As we have seen in the previous chapter, there has been no comparison of monetary 
valuations from preferences and experiences. The non-market good we use to 
compare between WTP and SWB is an urban regeneration scheme in the UK. 
Regeneration does encompass some private goods (e.g. new house fascias) but when 
the whole area becomes regenerated, and when the area has a pleasurable aesthetic 
appeal, urban regeneration becomes a non-market public good. Regeneration is 
usually targeted at individuals in poor and materially deprived neighborhoods. In the 
United States, there have been individual-based strategies (i.e. a demand side policy), 
such as the Moving to Opportunity schemes, where individuals are given vouchers to 
move from deprived to less deprived neighbourhoods, whereas in the United 
Kingdom, there have been attempts to physically regenerate the neighborhood where 
individuals remain in situ (i.e. supply side policy).  
 
An illustration of the importance that the UK Government places on urban 
regeneration is their recent New Deal for Communities (NDCs). The NDC is an area-
based initiatives launched in England in 1998. The aim of the NDCs were to reduce 
the gaps between some 39 deprived neighbourhoods and the rest of the country 
primarily in relation to five outcome areas: crime, education, health, worklessness, 
and housing and the physical environment.  In the 39 NDC areas, each on average 
accommodating about 9,800 people, and each NDC has attracted approximately £50m 
of Government investment. A large proportion of that money is for physical 
improvements. 
 
Within our own study, our neighbourhoods are perhaps more tightly defined than in 
other studies, such as the NDCs, Katz et al (2001) and Luttmer (2005), Kling et al 
(2007), where the analysis of secondary data means the neighbourhood is defined 
according to reasonably large areas – this point is also made by Clark (2009) and 
addressed in Clark et al (2009b). In contrast, we gather primary data from two 
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spatially separated neighbourhoods that are within the same political or census 
boundary. These two neighborhoods have populations of less than one thousand 
individuals and are spatially distinct from one another, in that they are separated by a 
major train line and a school, but one area has recently had urban regeneration and the 
other has not. This allows us to assume a quasi-experiment of an exogenous change of 
policy at the local level. The use of quasi-experiments in environmental economics 
and non-market valuation is increasing, e.g. Greenstone (2002), Chay and Greenstone 
(2005), Deschenes and Greenstone (2007) and our paper is in a similar spirit to these 
seminal papers.  
 
It is worth noting that the link between health and the environment goes back 
centuries, especially in terms of housing and sanitation (Gesler, 1998). Towards the 
end of the nineteenth century, architects believed that visual contact with nature was 
beneficial to the emotional and physiological health of individuals (Ulrich and 
Parsons, 1992). More recently, there has been a great deal of research, especially in 
the field of environmental psychology, on identifying individuals’ relationship with 
nature along with their aesthetic preferences for such environments (Gullone, 2000). 
While economists have been long trying to monetise the effect of the environment on 
RPs and SPs, other social scientists have been trying to tease out the impact of the 
environment on human health. 
 
From the outset, it is clear that the environment can have a negative effect on human 
health through: (i) allergies; (ii) poisoning; and (iii) respiratory disease and pesticide 
exposure. These can cause disease, cancer and possible death. However, most 
research has gone in to demonstrating how humans can benefit from exposure to an 
environment. A highly influential paper is Ulrich (1979), who analysed students’ 
reactions to slides of urban and natural environments. He found that those watching 
the natural environment slides had a significantly higher positive affect than those 
watching urban environment slides. By positive affect, he means feel elated or 
pleased. Ulrich (1984) also found that a natural view helps to increase the chances of 
recovering early from hospital treatment, and Moore (1981) has identified that prison 
inmates that have natural views from their cell were less likely to use health-care 
facilities. Tennessen and Cimprich (1995) has found that views to nature through a 
window can increase attention, providing some support for Kaplan and Kaplan’s 
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(1989) theory that natural environments help maintain or restore the capacity to focus 
and concentrate.  
 
How the environment effects individuals’ SWB can be split in to two parts: both the 
urban environment and the natural environment. There have been a number of studies 
that have included a dummy variable within their SWB functions so as to determine 
whether urban living is negative for SWB. For example, Gerdtham and Johannesson 
(2001), Frey et al (2004), Graham and Felton (2006), Hudson (2006), and Spellerberg 
et al (2006) all find that living in a highly populated urban area, compared to either a 
smaller urban town or a rural village, is significantly bad for SWB. However, Shields 
and Wheatley Price (2005) do not find a bad effect of urban living for SWB. Using 
the BHPS cross-sectionally for respondents in the UK during 1996, Ferrer-i-Carbonell 
and Gowdy (2007) find that living in a house that has pollution, grime or other 
environmental pollutants reduces SWB. van Praag and Baarsma (2005) found that 
noise pollution around the Schipol airport in Amsterdam has a significant negative 
effect on SWB once controlling for everything else. 
 
Propper et al (2004) analyse mental health (i.e. the General Health Questionnaire) and 
neighbourhood effects from the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS). They define 
five important aspects of the neighbourhood, i.e. socio-economic disadvantage, 
mobility, age, ethnicity, and urbanness,9 and find that these aspects do not 
significantly affect individuals’ mental health. These neighbourhood characteristics 
however might not necessarily be important to individuals’ mental health and they do 
not consider the quality of the urban environment. Sirgy and Cornwell (2003) suggest 
that the neighbourhood effects SWB through community satisfaction, but they do not 
control for individual effects. Using panel data from the United States, Luttmer (2005) 
find that there is a strong negative association between neighbours’ earnings and 
SWB.  
 
An issue with each study is selection bias and reverse causality. On selection effects, 
it might be that those who are more likely to move to a rural area are those who are 
more likely to enjoy living in a rural location and therefore have a higher SWB. This 
                                                 
9 Urbanness is mostly made up of the % of people working in agriculture which is not so different to 
the SWB studies that include dummy variables for ‘urbanness’.    
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is not a generalisable result since not everybody would obtain greater SWB from 
moving to a rural area – so it is in essence a local treatment effect. On reverse 
causality, it might be that happier people move to rural areas. Overall, there are little 
to no studies to date that have examined an actual neighbourhood or local area and 
determined whether place or aesthetics matter for SWB.  
 
While there has been a link shown between urban environments and SWB, there has 
been less evidence on the natural environment and SWB. At the macroeconomic 
level, Welsch (2006) has found that air pollution across European nations has a 
significant negative effect on SWB. For example, he found that nitrogen oxide 
induces a negative and significant effect on people’s SWB. However, Welsch’s study 
has the problem of omitted variables bias since it does not account for the majority of 
determinants of SWB. Brereton et al (2006), using Irish cross-sectional data, have 
shown that factors such as population density, access to and quality of facilities and 
services, the environment and climate are important determinants of SWB, and can be 
just as important as the most critical socio-economic and demographic factors. 
Consideration of these variables, which are generally ignored in the SWB literature, is 
according to Brereton et al (2006) crucial in understanding what increases SWB. 
However, this study also does not account for a great deal of determinants of SWB, 
e.g. relative income, so its shortcoming is the very problem in which they argue to be 
problematic in other studies. Redhanz and Maddison (2003) have shown that extreme 
weather conditions are detrimental to SWB. 
 
The problem for all of these studies on the environment is reverse causality and/or 
selection effects. It is well-known that urban environments have ‘residential sorting’, 
so that deprived, ill-health, poorly educated individuals tend to be place in poor living 
environments by social construction. Therefore, it is unsurprising that these areas, 
which are characterised by high pollution or high population density, have lower 
SWB since those individuals already living there are more likely to be unhappy or 
have lower life satisfaction. The only causal study to date using life satisfaction is 
Luechinger (2009). He uses an exogenous change in air filters of major power plants 
in Germany, to show that air pollution does indeed affect life satisfaction in a harmful 
way. A vast amount of research on the urban and natural environment is needed to 
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determine what parts of the environment is more susceptible to affect different 
individuals’ SWB. 
 
3.2 Valuation methods 
 
3.2.1 Revealed preferences  
 
As shown in chapter 2, considerable research has been conducted on hedonic house 
price models, especially in the valuation of air quality (Smith, 1995). There has been 
relatively little research into the using the hedonic pricing method to value the effect 
that urban regeneration has on house prices. Taking our example of where one area 
has had urban regeneration and the other area has not, we would expect the difference 
in house prices to reflect the willingness to pay for the regeneration holding all other 
attributes constant. Typically, we would have a vector of housing attributes z = 
(z1,…,zN) and an amalgamated good, x, which includes private goods except housing. 
We assume individuals to have the following utility function, u(x, z), and that 
individuals maximise their utility subject to the budget constraint , where 
P(z) is the price of a house with attributes z, and Y is household income. In this case, 
the individual maximises utility by choosing: 
 
        (1) 
 
where the marginal price of a regenerated house, zR, equals the marginal rate of 
substitution between zR and x; that is, the marginal WTP for regeneration. Once the 
identification of the hedonic function is stated, we can estimate the WTPRP by 
ordinary least squares (OLS).  
 
3.2.2 Stated preferences 
 
The CV survey elicits an individual’s maximum WTP for a given good. It is assumed 
that an individual wishes to maximise utility subject to income, y, where the indirect 
utility function, in this case for the regeneration (R), is: u(R, y). The regeneration 
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helps to change the z’s discussed in 3.2.1. An individual’s stated preference 
willingness to pay (WTPSP) is the income loss equivalent to the regeneration: 
 
       (2) 
 
where and that an increase in R is seem as desirable (i.e. ). We are 
using WTP rather than willingness-to-accept (WTA) since we are investigating an 
increase in utility from an initial lower utility level. Moreover, residents do not have 
property rights over government sponsored regeneration (see Knetsch and Sinden 
(1984) for greater discussion on compensation measures). 
 
3.2.3 SWB-based valuation 
 
Following the work on SWB in economics to date outlined in chapter 2, our notion of 
SWB is based on how satisfied an individual is with their life. To place a monetary 
value on a non-market good, we use the standard compensating differential approach 
as outlined in Chapter 2. We specify a utility function, which for the sake of 
exposition includes only income and regeneration:  
 
         (3) 
 
where v denotes some SWB i.e. life satisfaction. The u(y, R) function is the 
respondents’ true utility which is only observable by the individual. Therefore, h[.] is 
a non-continuous non-differentiable function which maps actual utility to subjective 
well-being. The error term, ε, captures the fact that individuals cannot accurately map 
underlying true utility (u) on to SWB (v).  
 
In order to estimate a function such as (3), one can use ordinary least squares (OLS), 
ordered logit or ordered probit regression. There is, however, some evidence that it 
makes little difference to the estimated coefficients if we were to assume cardinality 
and estimate the model using OLS (Ferrer-i-Carbonell and Frijters, 2004). The SWB 
function will therefore be:  
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     (4) 
 
where ln(yi) is the natural logarithm of household income, Ri is the regeneration as in 
(2), X are the personal and social characteristics, and  is the standard error term. By 
using the estimated coefficients for the regeneration ( ) and household income ( ), 
we can calculate the income compensation (IC) for the regeneration or alternatively 
the implicit utility-constant trade-offs between regeneration and income. The IC is 
defined as the increase in income necessary to hold utility constant if the house and 
area are not regenerated. In an indirect utility function, this would be given by: 
 
       (5) 
 
where v(.) is the indirect utility function, y0 is the initial household income, R0 is the 
condition of the area prior to regeneration and R1 is the condition after the 
regeneration. Given the specification of the micro-econometric SWB function 
expressed in equation (4) and the position of the IC in the indirect utility function, the 
IC (at mean income level) can be defined as:  
 
       (6) 
 
where  is average household income of the sample population.  
 
3.2.4 Comparing the methods 
 
If preferences and experiences are theoretically equivalent, then equating (1), (2) and 
(5) gives: 
 
  (7) 
 
Hypothesis:  
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If: (i) R0 and R1 are identical, i.e. the change in the regeneration is the same for 
revealed and stated preferences, and for SWB; and (ii) the initial income level, 
y0, is identical in both the u(.) and v(.) functions; then: 
 
        (8) 
 
In order for this equality to hold, the marginal rates of substitution in preferences and 
experiences must be identical. This is the hypothesis that we test.  
 
3.3 Methodology 
  
3.3.1 Background to the quasi-experiment  
The urban regeneration programme we use to begin comparing WTP and SWB was 
targeted at the Hafod area of Swansea, Wales, UK. The specific details of the 
regeneration programme are not especially relevant to this paper – it is the 
comparison of WTP and SWB in the context of a quasi-experiment are the important 
methodological features – but it consisted of four main elements: renewal of fascias, 
gutters and roofs of houses; renewing property front boundary walls and paths/paved 
areas; road resurfacing; and provision of new improved feature street lighting. The 
Hafod area has roughly 950 residential/commercial properties and, by the end of 
2007, over 500 properties had been renewed since 2001. This renewal to date has cost 
around £10million and is expected to cost £20million by completion in 2011. An 
adjacent neighbourhood, Landore, was chosen as the control area as it has very 
similar characteristics to Hafod apart from the fact that it has not had the regeneration 
– see Table 1 for a comparison of the two population groups. These two 
neighbourhoods were almost identical in terms of deprivation indices before the 
regeneration and so the urban regeneration can be treated as having been 
approximately randomised between Hafod and Landore. The Swansea Local 
Authority obviously had to choose one area to regenerate and did not have the 
resources to regenerate both areas together (this regeneration was the first of its kind 
in the Swansea Local Authority area). As a result, the Hafod area was chosen to have 
the regeneration funding over Landore. 
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3.3.2 Revealed preference data 
 
The most robust comparison of revealed preference across the two areas will come 
from house price data obtained from market transactions. House price data are 
available online from the Land Registry (i.e. www.houseprices.co.uk), which also 
contains data on type of the house (flat, terraced, semi-detached or detached) as well 
as whether it is leasehold or freehold. Several dummy variables were also used to 
account for whether each individual house is on a one-way street and whether it is 
overlooking a park.  
 
Furthermore, we use subjective assessments of crime from our survey and average the 
value across each individual street. We do not have data available on floor area (both 
internally and externally) and the number of rooms or bedrooms each house has. 
While these factors have been found to account for a large degree of variation in other 
samples (Leggett and Bockstael, 2000), the majority of houses in this area were built 
at the same time under similar specifications, so there is a great deal of homogeneity 
between the houses. As a result, we do not need to control for internal floor area in 
our linear and semi-log functional forms.   
 
3.3.3 Stated preference and SWB data  
 
Apart from the SWB questions, the survey took on the same format of a traditional 
CV survey. The survey comprised four sections. Section 1 contained a global life 
satisfaction question followed by a number of domain satisfaction questions. Section 
2 included attitudinal questions, including those relating to the local area. Section 3 
included the WTP section, and only households who had not had the regeneration had 
this part of the survey. Section 4 elicited demographic information. 
 
The initial life satisfaction question used the International Wellbeing Group (2006) 
question: “Thinking about your own life and personal circumstances, how satisfied 
are you with your life as a whole?”. Possible answers range from zero (completely 
dissatisfied) to ten (completely satisfied). Bertrand and Mullainathan (2001) have 
argued that subjective data is vulnerable to ordering effects. This is indeed a problem 
for many surveys since the life satisfaction question is normally situated in the middle 
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of the survey (as in the British Household Panel Survey), usually coming after domain 
satisfaction questions, which may bias the ratings given. Therefore, in this study, the 
life satisfaction question was the very first question on the survey and questions about 
domain satisfactions follow life satisfaction.  
 
In developing the WTP question, it would have been a very complex task to ask 
respondents to value all aspects of the regeneration programme, so the main features 
were stated within a top-down approach, i.e. participants had to place a value on the 
whole bundle of goods together and then subsequently value each good individually. 
Respondents were initially asked for their overall WTP for: (i) resurfaced exterior 
walls of their house; (ii) new front garden walls and paths of their house; (iii) new 
improved feature street lighting; and (iv) resurfaced roads and pavements. The first 
two are quasi-private goods whereas the latter two are public goods. A follow-up 
question asked how this overall amount was broken down into values for (i) and (ii) 
together and (iii) and (iv) together. The top-down method is the accepted approach 
within the literature (Pearce et al, 2006), 
 
We use the payment card (PC) method for our WTP estimates. We could have used 
the DC method, but this requires larger samples than available through our quasi-
experiment (Bateman et al, 2002). Respondents were asked to circle one value from a 
possible sixteen values, ranging from zero to one hundred pounds sterling (about 
$200). The question was worded as follows: “Taking all these improvements together, 
what is the highest amount, if anything, that you would be willing to pay on behalf of 
your household per month for the next 3 years for these improvements?”  
 
The final section included a number of background variables that have been shown to 
be associated with SWB and WTP responses, such as: gender; age; marital status; 
employment status; social capital; health; and gross household income. The 
questionnaire was posted by mail in March 2007 to 950 households in Hafod and 675 
households in Landore. SWB responses may be best elicited in private where there 
will be limited bias from the presence of an interviewer. 
 
3.4 Results 
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We received 364 (22.4%) completed questionnaires. Given the relative complexity of 
the survey and the fact that response rates are lower in more deprived samples, this 
seems acceptable and it is broadly comparable to some other published studies which 
have multiple valuation methods in the survey (e.g. Bala et al, 1998). In any event, the 
response rate is less problematic given the representativeness of the sample. Table 1 
shows that the sample is comparable to the National Census which took place in 2001. 
Within the sample, 61% reside in the renewal area (although 19% of the 61% live on 
roads which are not regenerated) and 39% reside in the control area. Of those who 
have had their home renewed, the average time since renewal was 2.2 years. 
Importantly, all of the individuals living in the regeneration area have been living in 
their house since the regeneration took place, which mitigates any residential sorting 
problems.  
 
3.4.1 Revealed preferences 
 
Between April 2000 and May 2007, 511 properties were sold within the whole area. 
Figure 1 shows the average house price every six months for the two areas (the 
official announcement of the regeneration area took place in 2001). It is clear that 
there are no significant differences in house prices between the two areas in 2000. 
Regression (1) in Table 2 gives the baseline regression where the time period is after 
the regeneration (i.e. 2002 to 2007). The time trend variable takes on the value of 1 in 
April 2000 and up until 86 in May 2007. The marginal effect of time on house prices 
is £1,033 per month – this is reflected in the increasing trend of both areas in Figure 1. 
Being in a semi-detached home (the majority of houses are terraced) or living on a 
one-way street will have an effect of increasing house prices by £9,520 and £6,413 
respectively. Having a house overlooking a park increases house prices by £14,689. 
However, being in the regenerated area does not significantly increase house prices 
although it does have a positive effect. The regeneration variable here encompasses 
houses that are in the regenerated area or not and is not based on whether the house 
has actually been regenerated or not. Note that the adjusted R2 is quite high for a 
hedonic regression despite the fact that floor space, the number of bedrooms, and the 
quality of interior are not controlled for, supporting the notion that there is a great deal 
of homogeneity in the housing stock in this area. 
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Regression (2) in Table 2 has the same specification as regression (1) apart from the 
fact that the functional form has slightly changed in that we have assumed a non-
linear relationship between house prices and the right hand side variables. Again, as in 
regression (1), the coefficients which drive the variation in house prices are: being a 
semi-detached property; being on a one-way street; overlooking a park; and the time 
trend. Comparing (1) and (2), it seems that (1) has the better fit despite the fact that 
we have not used the log likelihood test since our variables are binary. 
 
Table 3 takes the same specification as Table 2 although different time periods are 
analysed to determine how the house prices have evolved over time since the 
regeneration. Row 1 illustrates the baseline regression in Table 2. Row 2 gives the 
data pre 2002 (i.e. 2000 and 2001) and it is clear that being in the regenerated area has 
no significant effect on house prices within our sample. Rows 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 
illustrate the hedonic function for the following years: 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005 and 
2006-2007 respectively. It is clear that living in the regenerated area does not 
significantly increase house prices for any particular year. Row 8 changes the 
independent variable so it becomes one when the exact road the house is situated on 
has been regenerated and zero otherwise, as opposed to being a dummy variable for 
the area. This regression shows that for the whole sample, even when we are more 
specific about the regeneration time periods, being in a regenerated house and street is 
not significant in increasing house prices. A difference-in-difference model was also 
estimated using the announcement of the regeneration area in 2001 as the policy 
change and we also found a non-significant result as above.         
 
3.4.2 Stated preferences 
 
The distribution of the overall WTP estimates is given in Figure 2. The positive skew 
on the data is comparable to many other WTP payment card studies. We use the 
parametric approach to estimating the WTP values from the payment card. This has 
the benefit of accounting for interpolations between monetary amounts stated on the 
payment card. The two parametric approaches analysed here are OLS (WTPOLS) and 
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interval data (WTPINT) regressions.10 Rows 1 and 2 in Table 4 show the parametric 
WTP values based on OLS (WTPOLS), and interval data (WTPINT) respectively based 
on estimates in Table 5. Regressions (1) and (2) in Table 5 present the WTPOLS and 
WTPINT for regeneration, respectively. Outliers are omitted using the Belsley et al 
(1980) procedure. Both regressions use individual characteristics as independent 
variables, which allow us to establish whether the determinants of stated preferences 
are similar to those of life satisfaction. From regressions (1) and (2), we obtain WTP 
values of £228 and £245, respectively. Given that household income is significantly 
related to higher WTP values in regression (2), this provides some validity to our 
estimates. Other variables, such as age and marital status, are also important in 
explaining WTP values. 
 
3.4.3 SWB responses 
 
Figure 3 illustrates the distribution of life satisfaction ratings (which had a 100% 
completion rate) and breaks down the data for those living in the regenerated area as 
compared to those not living in the regenerated area. The mean life satisfaction ratings 
for the regenerated area and non-regenerated area are 6.60 and 6.32, respectively, and 
this difference is not significant.  
 
It is important to note that within our sample we have three different population 
groups: A – those who live in a house and on a street which has been regenerated; B – 
those who live in the regenerated area but not in a house and on a street which has 
been regenerated; and C – those who live in the adjacent area which is not to be 
regenerated. Our two main analyses are: (1) comparing A and B with C; and (2) 
comparing A with B and C. For (1) we are interested in the well-being effect of living 
                                                 
10 We can obtain a parametric WTP of the regeneration by regressing relevant independent variables 
on the WTP, and by using the coefficients to obtain the WTP value. The mean WTP value for the 
payment card from OLS therefore is: 
  
where β0 is the intercept, βj is the coefficient on the jth variable with the mean of that value given by 
. However, if the intervals are too coarse, OLS will be biased and it is preferable to use interval 
regressions (Whitehead et al, 1995). For these interval data regressions, the mean WTP value is (see 
Cameron and Huppert, 1989):    
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in the regenerated area as opposed to not living in a regenerated area. For (2) we are 
interested in the effect of living in a regenerated house and street as opposed to not 
living in a regenerated house or street irrespective of whether one is in the 
regeneration area or not.  
 
The problem for (2) however, is that population B is expecting the regeneration in the 
future which might actually make them feel better and increase their well-being (for 
instance, Loewenstein, 1987, has found that individuals derive some utility in 
expecting a positive future outcome – see also Graham and Pettinato (2002) regarding 
positive expectations of upward mobility). Furthermore, there might be endogenous 
neighbourhood effects (Manski, 1993) from the regeneration on to the life satisfaction 
of individuals who have not yet had the regeneration, which might further complicate 
the analysis. That is, individuals who have had their house and road regenerated might 
feel better and therefore might be more likely to have social contact with neighbours 
that have not had their house or road regenerated, which might make those neighbours 
feel better. This is consistent with Topa (2000) who finds that local spillovers are 
higher in neighbourhoods with less educated workers. So we can then provide an 
additional analysis: (3) comparing A with C and omitting B. Our variable of interest 
becomes therefore the marginal effect of being in a regenerated house and on a 
regenerated road as compared to not being in a regenerated house and street. These 
are reflected in the regressions in Table 6. 
 
Table 6 provides these three analyses where life satisfaction is regressed on key 
variables using OLS and omitting outliers using the approach suggested by Belsley et 
al (1980). Regression (1) in Table 6 relates to (1) above, which has the standard SWB 
function as seen in other studies. It is clear that being in the regenerated area 
significantly increases life satisfaction by roughly 0.5 points at the 5% level – in our 
data this is equivalent to roughly a third of the effect of being unemployed and 
looking for work. In keeping with existing evidence (see Dolan et al, 2008), the 
variables that are significantly associated with SWB are age, marital status, and 
unemployment. What is interesting here is that household income does not increase 
life satisfaction for this population group.  
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Regression (2) places all non-regenerated households in the control group, and it is 
clear that regeneration to house and street does not significantly improve life 
satisfaction. This result is complicated however by the fact that people who have 
expectations about future regeneration, and possibly gaining some life satisfaction as 
a result, are in the control group. Regression (3) omits this group, so we have a 
straight comparison between those who have had regeneration and those who will 
never have it in the foreseeable future. Now, the coefficient on regeneration is 
positive and the coefficient is larger than in regression (1).  
 
As well as examining the sample as a whole, we have also restricted the sample to 
persons of working age (18 years of age to state pension age, which is 65 for males 
and 60 for females) on the grounds that the economic concerns of retired individuals 
are likely to be different to those of working age. Evidence from the life cycle 
hypothesis illustrates that wealth in old age is largely allocated to bequests (Menchik 
and David, 1983; Modigliani, 1986), indicating that the income received by older 
individuals will not be overly used for current consumption. This illustrates the 
problem of examining the income of older individuals in such datasets. Indeed, older 
individuals seem to care primarily about or place greater importance on their 
superannuation assets and pension income, and not about income per se (Heady and 
Wooden, 2004; Brown et al, 2005) in comparison to working age individuals.  
 
In Table 7, the population in regressions (1), (2), and (3) are only those under state 
pension age. From regression (1), regeneration significantly improves life satisfaction 
by around 0.6 points. The logarithm of household income is also positive and 
significant, which means that we can calculate the IC from equation (7). For this 
sample population, the IC for urban regeneration is roughly £24,900. Regression (2) 
compares sample A with B and C, and given that B have future expectations, the IC 
from this function is lower at £17,400. Regression (3) compares A with C and values 
urban regeneration at £19,000. This value assumes that household income has the 
natural logarithmic form. If we assume a linear relationship between household 
income and life satisfaction, the IC here becomes £14,000.      
 
It is also important to note that the urban regeneration might influence individuals’ 
life satisfaction indirectly through other key variables. Such variables might be social 
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capital and neighbourhood negative externalities. For instance, regression 1 in Table 8 
includes how often each individual speaks to family, friends and neighbours. It is 
clear that speaking to friends is important to life satisfaction although this association 
does not undermine the positive and significant regeneration result. However, by 
controlling for these factors reduces the income coefficient which generates higher 
ICs. Regression 2 includes the local negative externalities which might be reduced 
with urban regeneration i.e. levels of crime and noise from neighbours. Both variables 
are negatively associated with life satisfaction although significant at the ten per cent 
level. Overall, the effect of urban regeneration on SWB is largely independent of 
indirect effects, and the aesthetic appearance of the house and road directly improves 
an individuals’ SWB. 
 
One additional important variable could be relative income, which has shown to be 
important not only at the national level (Easterlin, 2001; Clark et al, 2008a) but also at 
the regional level (Ferrer-i-Carbonell, 2005: Luttmer, 2005). If some of the income 
effect is relative in our population group, controlling for the income of others would 
be expected to lead to an increase in the size of the income coefficient. The relative 
income variable in Table 8 is the natural logarithm of average annual income in both 
neighbourhoods (i.e. Hafod and Landore) with respect to age (i.e. <25 years old, 25-
34, 35-44, 45-65, and 65>) and gender, giving ten reference groups. Regression 3 in 
Table 8 shows that by including relative income, the absolute income level effect 
slightly increases and the coefficient on relative income is negative (as in Ferrer-i-
Carbonell, 2005; and Luttmer, 2005) although not significant. Nevertheless, the 
coefficient on regeneration remains roughly the same magnitude. 
 
A potential problem with the life satisfaction equations above is that household 
income could be endogenous i.e. if life satisfaction depends on household income, 
and household income is itself a function of life satisfaction, then the parameter 
estimates are biased and inconsistent. Within our data, we have two possible 
instrumental variables that can be used; namely, whether or not your partner is in 
employment and whether or not you are in rented accommodation. Neither is a perfect 
measure and instrumental variables are notoriously difficult to find in happiness 
research (Knight et al, 2007; Oswald and Powdthavee, 2008a), but both can be used to 
give some indication of the problems with endogeneity 
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In Table 9, regression (1) uses regression (3) in Table 7 – i.e. the baseline regression – 
and regression (2) uses regression (5) in Table 8 – the full specification. For both 
regressions, an over-identification test suggests that the instruments are valid. The 
instruments are not weak in regression 1 although they might be in regression 2. 
Nevertheless, it is important to note that the coefficients on regeneration are roughly 
the same size (or slightly higher) but the instrumented estimates produce higher 
coefficients on household income – increasing the size of the estimated effect by 
between two-fold and three-fold. This increase in the magnitude of the income 
coefficient, which is also found in Luttmer (2005) and Oswald and Powdthavee 
(2008), suggests that the bias under OLS is negative, i.e. more satisfied individuals 
tend to work less to earn income. This has implications for our previously estimated 
income compensations. For the baseline case, our IC is £6,400 per year, while it is 
£7,600 for the full specification although the instruments may be weak for the full 
specification. 
  
3.5 Discussion 
 
From revealed preferences, it seems that the urban regeneration is not positively 
valued through house sales. These may be the least robust of all of our estimates. 
First, given that the regeneration is still occurring in some places within the 
regeneration area, and the fact that people may be reluctant to move from their 
regenerated house due to lack of mobility, it is unlikely that the housing market in this 
area would have fully cleared. There have been houses sold after regeneration has 
taken place so this mutes any self-selection effects. However, it is known that all 
houses and roads in the regenerated area will eventually be regenerated so the benefit 
of this should already be capitalised into house prices. It is important to note that the 
local council has stated that only those houses in the Hafod area are to be regenerated 
and not those in other surrounding areas like Landore – so there should be not be any 
expectation effects in house prices elsewhere.  
 
Second, the regenerated and non-regenerated areas are within roughly the same 
housing market, so that people who would buy a property in one area would also 
consider buying in the other area since the areas and housing types are very similar. 
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Therefore, residents selling their homes in the non-regenerated area are likely to be 
aware that the housing stock is of better quality in the regenerated area, which 
imposes a negative externality on those living in the non-regenerated area in the form 
of private costs of improving the quality of their own homes.  
 
Third, and possibly most plausibly, regenerated areas are known by locals as poor 
areas, and by naming these areas as ‘renewal areas’ provides a signal to society that 
there is a need for government intervention. So, it is very much probable that this 
signal creates a stigma effect. The effect of stigma on house prices has already been 
shown in other hedonic price studies of adverse environmental consequences (e.g. 
Kohlhase, 1991; Messer et al, 2006). There has been little research on how urban 
regeneration might create a stigma, although anecdotal evidence suggests that this is 
indeed the case (Robertson et al, 2008).  
 
From stated preferences elicited through a CV survey, it seems that urban 
regeneration generates a positive benefit and is a non-market public good which 
individuals do want, with willingness to pay values at around £230 to £240 per year 
for three years. It is entirely possible that, in generating their WTP per month, 
respondents did not pay attention to the duration over which they would make this 
payment. Indeed, other studies have shown that the responses are insensitive to the 
payment period – i.e. temporal embedding (Stevens et al, 1997) – and so it likely that 
higher values would have been elicited from using a longer time frame over which 
payments would be made. If we assume that temporal embedding occurs and that 
people would be willing to pay each year for the average length of the time they live 
in one house (12 years according to the Department for Communities and Local 
Government, 2006), then the total WTP for the regeneration would be roughly £2,800.  
 
The stated WTP values may be below their true values a result of loss aversion in the 
presence of mental accounting. Essentially, loss aversion can be applied to all 
negative departures away from the status quo (Bateman et al, 1997), hence individuals 
may recognise the benefits from the urban regeneration but they may not be willing to 
sacrifice a large proportion of their disposable income (i.e. the negative departure) for 
the regeneration. It has already been found that loss aversion can explain sub-optimal 
transactions in a marketplace (Knetsch, 1989) and a reluctance to upgrade durable 
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items (Okada, 2001). As a result, the benefit of the urban regeneration might be much 
higher than their unanticipated consumption budget (i.e. their mental account), and 
beyond this budget, individuals are far more motivated to avoid losing their income 
than they are to gaining the benefit from the regeneration (Thaler, 1999). Indeed, 
Bateman et al (2005) state that if an individual faces an unanticipated buying 
opportunity (i.e. the WTP choice) which they can finance only by foregoing some 
specific consumption plan, the act of buying the non-market good involves a definite 
loss, as distinct from the possible gain from the non-market good (e.g. urban 
regenration). This problem is highlighted in chapter 2 for preference-based valution.  
 
The value of the regeneration estimated from SWB responses is around £6,400 
(instrumenting for household income) to £19,000 per year (not instrumenting for 
household income). Assumptions about duration are also important for estimates 
based on the SWB ratings. It is possible that the life satisfaction ratings might 
incorporate individuals’ past experiences and future expectations of the urban 
regeneration, which means the monetary value of £6,400 estimated from them should 
be treated not as a per year value but as a value weighted over a finite time horizon. If 
we assume an equal weighting over the average duration of occupancy, the annual IC 
would be £533. If we assume that the occupancy time is higher (which is not 
unreasonable since properties in these areas have a relatively low turnover rate), the 
IC value would decrease further. However, the occupancy duration would have to be 
twenty-seven years in order to equate the IC and stated preference WTP values.  
 
The time frame over which gains in SWB are expected to last has not been addressed 
in any of the papers we are aware of, e.g. Blanchflower and Oswald (2004) and van 
Praag and Baarsma (2005) both assume that the ICs are annual and do not extend 
beyond the last or current year. However, it is unknown whether life satisfaction 
ratings incorporate the benefits or costs of a good or a circumstance from past 
experiences and/or future expectations. This assumption is crucial when applied to 
welfare appraisal, since the annual ICs would inherently double-count the benefits or 
costs of a non-market good and therefore would bias the cost-benefit analysis. 
Therefore, there would seem to be good grounds for viewing the ICs as a total value 
over a finite horizon. Clearly, the actual assumption made on how life satisfaction 
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incorporates future expectations is crucial to the methodology of the value of the non-
market good by experiences, and merits further investigation. 
 
For a robust CBA, there needs to be clearly specified benefits and costs for each year 
that the policy or program is present. From RPs and SPs, a significant value today 
counts as the benefit or cost today that can be discounted into the future, providing the 
values do not change over time. The question that needs to be asked about 
experiences is, do we see the SWB benefits as a one off benefit that can be discounted 
into the future, or do SWB responses already include the future through expectations? 
To take an example, if a non-market good made individuals’ life satisfaction increase, 
is it because the good has made them feel good over the last ten years or is it because 
they feel that the non-market good will make them feel better next year? While we 
originally argued that the flexibility and autonomy of using a life evaluation measure 
make it appealing, the downside is that it might be too free an instrument for cost-
benefit analysis.  
 
An evaluative account is not specific over the time scale to which it applies, both in 
the language of the questions (some do not even give a specific time scale) and in the 
likely time scale which subjects would use when reporting about the general state of 
their life (even when a time scale is specified within the question there is little 
evidence to suggest that this is the time scale used by respondents) (Peasgood, 2008). 
This has rarely been discussed (notable exception is Levy-Garboua et al, 2007) as 
shown in chapter 2, but it is a very important feasibility issue for using SWB in a 
CBA. This area requires further debate and is similar to the argument of using SWB 
for health states. The current problem there is that it is very difficult to value life 
using SWB, whereas it is straightforward to do using preferences, although the nature 
of the number might not be accurate in itself. So there might be a requirement to 
change the end-point of the scale so as to make the very dis-satisfying life as being 
equal to a dead state. 
 
A further consideration is the possibility that we have not controlled for a factor 
within our regression that is important to the SWB of the intervention group but not 
for the control group. A difference-in-difference estimate would correct this but given 
that these two neighborhoods are in a similar geographic location and that they are 
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both materially deprived neighborhoods, it is unlikely that we have omitted an 
important third factor, suggesting that our results are not spurious. A more likely 
explanation is that we have not correctly specified the well-being function with 
respect to income. If we have not fully captured the effect of income on SWB, and the 
true effect is much larger, the value from life satisfaction would be lower and would 
tend toward the value derived from the stated preference method over the duration of 
time spent living in the house. Furthermore, it must be noted that we started our SWB 
approach on the premise that life satisfaction is a reliable proxy for experiences. This 
is one of a number of ways however of measuring SWB, so we would need to know 
more about how such an intervention affects other measures of SWB. 
 
Overall, and notwithstanding the relatively small-scale exploratory nature of this 
study, it seems that equation (8) does not hold in our quasi-experiment of urban 
regeneration. Nonetheless, the results, especially if replicated on larger samples and in 
other areas, have major implications for welfare economics and cost-benefit analysis. 
Within our urban regeneration context, if we assume that all the benefits from 
regeneration are captured by the WTP values from house prices, we could argue that 
this intervention, at least in the short to medium term, has no affect on well-being and 
is therefore an inefficient allocation of resources. If we assume that all the benefits 
from regeneration are captured by the stated WTP responses, the total benefit of urban 
regeneration for the households in the Hafod area would be £240,000. Given that the 
scheme to date has cost £10 million, this scheme has been a net cost and has not been 
an efficient allocation of resources.  
 
Assuming that all the benefits are reflected in life satisfaction ICs (i.e. between £6,400 
and £19,000), the total benefit of urban regeneration for the households of the Hafod 
area would be between £6.1 million and £18.1million. However, if we included longer 
term tangible benefits, such as employment and increased investment in the area, 
urban regeneration might prove to be worthwhile in the Kaldor-Hicks sense. We need 
more large-scale studies to suggest whether urban regeneration is efficient. 
 
These results support those found by Metcalfe (forthcoming), who used another urban 
regeneration scheme in South Wales, where the intervention was randomised between 
home repairs (similar to this chapter) and house safety measures (such as more secure 
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doors and windows etc). Metcalfe found that the valuation of home repair through 
SWB is £8,100 (0.45 point increase in life satisfaction on an eleven point scale), and 
the valuation of home safety through SWB is £19,800 (0.74 point increase in life 
satisfaction). So the value of the safety measures was more than double of that from 
the home repair measures, but the safety measures cost about 30 times less. Our point 
estimates in this chapter are closer to the house repair marginal effect (it is slightly 
higher) than the house safety marginal effect. This makes sense as our intervention 
here is similar to the house repairs apart from the fact that more is spent on the 
exterior, e.g. roads and pavements, so the marginal effect should be higher. 
 
To sum up, by using an urban regeneration intervention in a quasi-experiment context, 
we find that (revealed and stated) preferences and SWB do not equal one another. 
Stigma in revealed preferences, loss aversion the presence of mental accounting in 
stated preferences, and unspecified or unknown time duration in life satisfaction 
might explain some of the difference. We need much more research into the extent 
and the sources of the differences between these valuation methods and in different 
contexts. 
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Table 1: Percentage of resident population in our sample and that obtained from the 
2001 National Statistics Census 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Hafod  Landore  Swansea 
 Sample Census Sample Census Census 
Regenerated area 61 62 39 38 N/A 
Aged over 65 26 20 16 16 23 
Employed full-time 33 31 39 41 35 
Employed part-time 19 13 16 13 12 
Self-employed 2 5 6 4 4 
Unemployed – looking for work 6 5 4 4 4 
Unemployed – not looking for work 13 11 10 12 10 
Student 3 6 4 4 3 
Retired 30 29 22 22 15 
Single (including cohab) 30 30 33 32 30 
Married 43 46 44 47 50 
Separated 4 3 3 2 2 
Divorced 11 12 12 11 8 
Widowed 13 10 9 8 10 
Owner occupied house 78 70 82 76 69 
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Table 2: Baseline hedonic regressions 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: ***,**,* represents significance at the 1,5 and 10% levels respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 (1) House price (2) Ln(House price) 
 Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. 
Regenerated area 1470.95 1374.35 0.028 0.036 
Time trend 1033.08*** 34.77 0.018*** 0.001 
Semi-detached 9520.10*** 2374.70 0.122*** 0.045 
Freehold 3695.73 5412.58 0.042 0.103 
One way road 6413.72*** 2167.28 0.088** 0.039 
Over looking a park 14689.57*** 2366.37 0.215*** 0.045 
N 511  511  
Adjusted R2 0.67  0.63  
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Table 3: Robustness of hedonic regressions* 
 
Dependent: House prices Regenerated area    
Specification: Coeff. S.E. Adj. R2 N 
(1) Baseline  1470.95 1374.35 0.67 511 
(2) Pre regeneration -30.04 1865.68 0.02 139 
(3) 2002 -459.22 2046.64 0.05 116 
(4) 2003 4707.93 2869.97 0.28 92 
(5) 2004 4892.28 3253.02 0.27 97 
(6) 2005 -86.65 2939.96 0.31 82 
(7) 2006 & 2007 -1993.44 3083.54 0.12 124 
(8) Post regeneration -  Only comparing regenerated 
sales not areas 771.93 1890.71 0.67 511 
Notes: ***,**,* represents significance at the 1,5 and 10% levels respectively. Each regression has the same 
controls as Table 2. 
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Table 4: Mean willingness to pay values (per year) (n=126) 
 
Specification: Mean 95% CI 
WTPOLS £228 £192-£264 
WTPINT £245 £209-£281 
 
 
Table 5: Determinants of WTP values 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: ***,**,* represents significance at the 1,5 and 10% levels respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 (1)  (2)  
 OLS  Interval  
Dependent: WTP  Ln(WTP)  
 Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. 
Regenerated area -1.487 4.182 -0.203 0.242 
Ln(Household income) 4.771 3.987 0.473** 0.228 
Gender 4.685 4.288 0.80* 0.246 
Age 0.763 0.709 0.100** 0.042 
Age2 -0.010 0.008 -0.001*** 0.000 
Married -0.091 6.063 -0.289 0.347 
Cohabiting -12.701* 7.216 -0.505 0.408 
Divorced -11.384* 6.852 -0.807** 0.400 
Separated -15.817 9.705 -1.185** 0.572 
Widowed -4.056 8.509 -0.399 0.502 
Employed part-time -5.205 6.580 -0.077 0.375 
Self-employed 7.924 9.430 0.363 0.529 
Unemployed – looking for work -8.723 9.189 -0.188 0.529 
Unemployed – not looking for work -9.022 7.464 -0.591 0.434 
Student -6.046 13.866 -0.063 0.795 
Retired -7.206 7.951 -0.233 0.467 
Constant -31.538 43.340 -3.684 2.497 
Σ   1.187  
WTP £228  £245  
N 133  133  
LogL   -313.439  
Adjusted R2 0.16    
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Table 6: SWB regressions – whole sample 
 
Notes: ***,**,* represents significance at the 1,5 and 10% levels respectively. Reference groups are Single and 
Employed full-time. Regression (1) compares populations A (living on a regeneration road) and B (living in the 
regeneration area but not on a regeneration road) versus C (living in control area). Regression (2) compares 
population A versus B and C, and regression (3) compares population A versus C.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dependent: Life satisfaction  (1)  (2)  (3)  
 Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. 
Regeneration 0.477** 0.235 0.225 0.234 0.573** 0.243 
Ln(Household income) 0.142 0.253 0.073 0.251 0.217 0.273 
Gender 0.252 0.240 0.241 0.241 0.071 0.259 
Age -0.153*** 0.041 -0.138*** 0.040 -0.200*** 0.041 
Age2 0.002*** 0.000 0.001*** 0.000 0.002*** 0.001 
Married 1.190*** 0.336 1.192*** 0.338 0.895*** 0.346 
Cohabiting 0.791 0.480 0.768 0.484 -0.012 0.533 
Divorced 0.524 0.432 0.360 0.440 0.470 0.458 
Separated -1.604* 0.839 -1.503* 0.845 -2.783*** 0.981 
Widowed 0.025 0.513 0.378 0.502 -1.484*** 0.563 
Employed part-time -0.085 0.182 -0.093 0.183 -0.098 0.177 
Self-employed 0.527 0.690 0.698 0.663 1.767** 0.715 
Unemployed – looking for work -1.399** 0.610 -1.267** 0.588 -1.461** 0.643 
Unemployed – not looking for work -1.187*** 0.425 1.316*** 0.428 -0.680 0.450 
Student 0.783 0.724 0.759 0.730 1.139 0.700 
Retired 0.416 0.440 0.360 0.431 0.600 0.447 
Constant 7.550*** 2.690 8.072*** 2.663 8.057*** 2.876 
N 305  308  244  
Adjusted R2 0.18  0.18  0.25  
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Table 7: SWB regressions – working age 
 
Notes: ***,**,* represents significance at the 1,5 and 10% levels respectively. Reference groups are Single and 
Employed full-time. Regression (1) compares populations A (living on a regeneration road) and B (living in the 
regeneration area but not on a regeneration road) versus C (living in control area). Regression (2) compares 
population A versus B and C, and regression (3) compares population A versus C.  
 
Dependent: Life satisfaction  (1)  (2)  (3)  
       
 Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. 
Regeneration 0.558** 0.259 0.556** 0.254 0.646** 0.276 
Ln(Household income) 0.652** 0.276 0.841*** 0.279 0.928*** 0.307 
Gender 0.178 0.292 0.246 0.284 0.163 0.314 
Age -0.127* 0.075 -0.096 0.075 -0.148* 0.080 
Age2 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
Married 1.082*** 0.346 0.993*** 0.338 0.653* 0.371 
Cohabiting -0.139 0.480 0.108 0.477 -0.915* 0.546 
Divorced 0.941* 0.488 0.951** 0.476 0.640 0.518 
Separated -1.927** 0.759 -1.407* 0.783 -2.723*** 0.974 
Widowed -0.160 0.786 -0.431 0.817 -0.730 1.122 
Employed part-time -0.020 0.182 0.065 0.381 0.236 0.418 
Self-employed 1.906*** 0.710 1.449** 0.653 2.468*** 0.759 
Unemployed – looking for work -1.034* 0.612 -0.727 0.603 -0.773 0.667 
Unemployed – not looking for work -1.034** 0.446 -0.703 0.439 -0.243 0.483 
Student 1.231* 0.676 1.346** 0.667 1.122 0.700 
Retired 0.653 0.601 0.980 0.594 1.053 0.715 
Constant 2.291 3.194 -0.231 3.256 0.105 3.563 
N 229  225  187  
Adjusted R2 0.24  0.23  0.23  
Average household income £18,378  £18,578  £18,848  
IC for regeneration £24,900  £17,400  £19,000  
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Table 8: Robustness checks for the SWB equations 
 
Notes: ***,**,* represents significance at the 1,5 and 10% levels respectively. Reference groups are 
Single and Employed full-time. Robust standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the cell level 
for reference income in regression (3). 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dependent: Life satisfaction  (1)  (2)  (3)  
 Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. 
Regeneration 0.738*** 0.283 0.623** 0.283 0.652** 0.327 
Ln(Household income) 0.704** 0.305 0.629** 0.304 0.729*** 0.197 
Gender 0.036 0.318 0.073 0.313 0.271 0.273 
Age -0.150* 0.080 -0.140* 0.079 -0.116 0.083 
Age2 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
Married 0.609 0.383 0.602 0.377 0.571 0.214 
Cohabiting -0.776 0.568 -0.691 0.560 -0.764 0.514 
Divorced 0.128 0.499 -0.109 0.499 -0.118 0.641 
Separated -1.818 1.139 -1.361 1.134 -1.193 0.723 
Widowed -0.596 1.125 -0.503 1.107 -0.569 0.379 
Employed part-time 0.020 0.424 0.025 0.417 0.059 0.515 
Self-employed 2.651*** 0.720 2.291*** 0.720 2.289*** 0.466 
Unemployed – looking for work -1.314* 0.687 -1.394** 0.676 -1.415* 0.616 
Unemployed – not looking for work -0.182 0.491 -0.305 0.486 -0.246 0.572 
Student 0.916 0.682 0.877 0.671 0.991** 0.405 
Retired 0.334 0.707 0.492 0.697 0.579 0.425 
Speaking to family 0.126 0.197 0.157 0.196 0.165 0.218 
Speaking to friends 0.421** 0.196 0.447** 0.196 0.467** 0.184 
Speaking to neighbours 0.096 0.148 0.068 0.146 0.059 0.176 
Crime   -0.241* 0.132 -0.239*** 0.059 
Noise from neighbours   -0.210* 0.115 -0.219** 0.080 
Ln(Reference income)     -1.755 1.204 
Constant 0.169 3.625 1.160 3.593 16.904 11.182 
N 185  185  185  
Adjusted R2 0.33  0.36  0.37  
Average household income £18,986  £18,986  £18,986  
IC for regeneration £35,200  £32,100  £27,500  
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Table 9: Instrumented regressions 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dependent: Life satisfaction  (1)  (2)  
 Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. 
Regeneration 0.708** 0.290 0.811 0.531 
Ln(Household income) 2.449*** 0.891 2.418*** 0.839 
First stage F statistic 12.20  6.05  
First stage partial R2 0.13  0.10  
Over-identification test 0.707 (p=0.401) 0.444 (p=0.505) 
Average household income  £18,943  £18,986  
Income compensation £6,350  £7,600  
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Figure 1: Average house price every six months by area 
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Figure 2: Distribution of WTP values 
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Figure 3: Distribution of general satisfaction by area 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   92 
4. BLOWIN’ IN THE WIND:  
THE VALUE OF A WIND FARM    
4.1 Introduction 
 
The previous chapter has shown that WTP and SWB might give different results 
in an urban setting although we require further research. That chapter was an ex 
post study only, so it assumes that the SWB levels pre-regeneration are the 
same. In order to develop that chapter further, we need to examine SWB levels 
before and after an exogenous shock. In addition, the previous chapter was based 
on an urban intervention, so examining a rural intervention would be 
complementary to the analysis. In this chapter, we examine the well-being 
consequences of a wind farm, by comparing preferences and experiences, where 
the experiences include both ex ante and ex post. 
 
Wind farms have been recognised as having a major role to play in reducing 
greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions (IPCC, 2006), but the take up of wind power 
across the developed world has not been widespread. The majority of planning 
proposals for on-shore wind farms receive much opposition from local residents 
and lobby groups, which has been categorised as NIMBYism (Mitchell and 
Carson, 1986; Portney, 1991; Hamilton, 1993; O’Sullivan, 1993). In this 
context, the definition of NIMBYs are those individuals who are in favour of 
wind energy in general but do not want wind energy development in their local 
area. The NIMBYism is attributed to the fact that wind farms might cause local 
negative externalities, in that individuals living near wind turbines report 
negative visual aspect (Warren et al, 2005). NIMBYism is perceived to be 
rational since most people are homeowners, and individuals cannot insure assets 
like their homes against devaluation by the local development (Fischel, 2001).  
 
The NIMBYism syndrome however leads to an inefficient allocation of 
resources unless those that receive the benefits (i.e. society) could compensate 
the neighbourhood around the wind farm site for bearing the external costs 
(Kunreuther et al, 1987). The problem here however is determining the correct 
level of compensation required by local residents to return their utility levels 
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back to the same level as before the introduction of the wind farm. SP studies 
have found that people do not want wind farm developments near their local 
area (e.g. Alvarez-Farizo and Hanley, 2002; Groothuis et al, 2008). Alvarez-
Farizo and Hanley (2002) found that Spanish individuals are willing to pay 
between £15 and £35 not to have an onshore wind farm near their home and 
Bergmann et al (2006) found a willingness to pay of £19 amongst Scottish 
residents not to have an on-shore wind farm in the area (see also Ladenberg and 
Dubgaard, 2007, for Danish preferences).  
 
The message from these studies is that people do not want wind turbines sited 
near their home, so they are not prepared to sacrifice their self-interest for the 
social good (assuming that wind farms are a social good). To follow on from the 
last chapter, we want to determine whether the value of this non-market good is 
the same when measured using a WTP measure and an IC measure derived from 
SWB. So our hypothesis will be: 
 
 WTPRP = WTPSP = ICSWB        (1) 
 
4.2 Methodology 
 
4.2.1 The non-market good 
 
The non-market good we value is a local wind farm in the UK, named Scout 
Moor.  The Scout Moor wind farm site is located in North West England, 
approximately 15 kilometers north of Manchester, on land between Edenfield 
and Whitworth, near Rochdale – see Map 1 below. The elevated moorland site is 
located in the Edenfield area, approximately 1.5km to the east of Edenfield and 
East Ramsbottom, 5.5 kilometers to the west of Whitworth, 3 kilometers to the 
south of Rossendale, and 11.5 kilometers to the north west of Rochdale. The 
wind farm can be seen from at most 35 kilometers away.  
 
Map 1: The wind farm area 
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The Scout Moor wind farm consists of twenty-six wind turbines, each with a 
generating capacity of 2.5 Mega Watts (MW). The wind farm therefore has a 
total capacity of 65MW of electricity, which is equivalent to supplying energy to 
40,000 households annually. This is equivalent to saving 160,000 tonnes of 
carbon dioxide emissions per year into the atmosphere. Each turbine tower is 60 
meters high, and the blade length is 40 meters, therefore the total height is 100 
meters. The wind turbines are distributed over a 545 hectare site, although the 
wind farm actually takes up 8.3 hectares of land within the area.11 The local 
residents were fully informed by the private company of the exact details of the 
wind farm, and the information was freely available on the wind farm website 
and on the submitted planning proposal. As a result, there was little or no 
ambiguity about the provision of the good. 
 
4.2.2 Identification 
 
The identification of wind farms is not straightforward since it is difficult to 
randomise such goods across different places and people. Once a private firm 
                                                 
11 More about the wind farm development can be found at www.scoutmoorwindfarm.co.uk/ and 
a short news documentary at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/england/7636696.stm  
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proposes a wind farm plan in the UK, the local planning authority/inspectorate 
has to either reject or accept the plan and then the Secretary of State for Energy 
has to make a decision based upon the planning authority’s decision. So wind 
farm locations are chosen by private firms to increase the possibility of having 
their plan accepted, which effectively means that they aim to maximise potential 
energy captured (based on topography and wind speed) and therefore profit and 
minimise negative externalities. So wind farms might be allocated on where 
there is less local resistance to the wind farm, although there is no current 
evidence to support this claim. For Scout Moor wind farm, it is important to 
acknowledge that from the outset that the three local councils adjacent to the 
wind farm (i.e. Lancashire County Council, Rochdale Country Council and 
Rossendale County Council) did not accept the plan and were opposed to the 
wind farm being built. Given that these bodies represent the views of the local 
people, and because a local group set-up in opposition to the wind farm, we 
would argue that the majority of local residents were also against the proposal.   
 
Since wind farm plans are assessed by local planning authorities, they cannot be 
randomized. But it is possible to say what localities nearby would have been 
likely candidates for a wind farm based on a certain criteria, thereby providing a 
matched ‘control’ area. Having a control group, which is similar to the treatment 
group apart from the fact that it does not have the treatment, allows us to have a 
quasi-experiment. The control group was selected based on the following 
factors: (i) it was more than 35 kilometers away so that the wind farm cannot be 
seen from the control area; (ii) it was in the same region and was a similar size 
town so to control for regional or locational effects; (iii) it was not in the vicinity 
of an existing wind farm so individuals were not affected by such an existing 
policy; (iv) it had the same topography so the hypothetical wind farm is a 
realistic proposal; and (v) it had the same wind speed so again the hypothetical 
wind farm was a realistic proposal. Based on these five criteria, we chose Kirkby 
Lonsdale as the matched control area, since there were not many areas in the 
North-West of England that satisfy even two or three of these criteria. Kirkby 
Lonsdale however satisfied all five criteria. Map 2 below shows the location of 
the two study areas. So to summarize, we have Edenfield as the intervention 
group and Kirkby Lonsdale as the control group. We also have a quasi-
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intervention group, which is Rossendale (Rawtenstall) and Whitworth – this 
group cannot see the wind farm from their area due to the local topography, but 
they live very close to the wind farm and will be able to see it when travelling on 
main roads around the wind farm – see Map 1.  
 
Map 2: North-West England and the two areas (intervention = Edenfield; control 
= Kirkby Lonsdale)  
 
 
                             = hypothetical wind farm – Kirkby Lonsdale. 
                             = actual wind farm - Scout Moor. 
 
 
The timeline of the Scout Moor wind farm is as follows. The initial proposal by 
the private electric company was submitted mid-2003.  Following a public 
inquiry held in 2004, planning consent was granted by the Secretary of State for 
Energy on the 25th May 2005 for the Scout Moor wind farm (BERR, 2006). 
Consent from the Secretary of State was required since to build and operate 
power stations with a capacity greater than 50 MW, private firms need consent 
under Section 36 of the Electricity Act 1989. The first turbine was delivered in 
November 2007, and all turbines were erected by June 2008. Full turbine 
generation started by September 2008. 
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To identify the well-being effects of wind farms, we need to identify the 
difference-in-difference (D-i-D) econometric specification for revealed 
preferences and SWB. Stated preferences do not need such a specification since 
the values are elicited ex ante before the wind farm has been experienced – this 
is one of the reasons why many non-market economists use such preferences 
(Mitchell and Carson, 1989). So for revealed preferences, we use OLS: 
 
   (2) 
 
where ln(Pi) is the natural logarithm of house prices, Ii is the intervention group, 
Ti is the intervention time period, (Ii x Ti) is the D-i-D estimator, and xi is a 
vector of variables that are related to house prices, such as size of property, type 
of contract etc. If the wind farm has a detrimental effect on house prices, then 
β3<0. For SWB, we have a two period model, so again we will have an OLS 
specification: 
 
   (3) 
 
Given the panel data structure of (3), we can also estimate it by using a random 
effects model. 
 
4.2.3 Measures of preferences and experiences 
 
Given the strength of the opposition to the proposed wind farm, we assume that 
the wind farm will represent a negative change in utility. This is consistent with 
the previous research that suggests that people place significant positive WTP 
not to have a wind farm. Although some people maybe willing to pay to have the 
wind farm in their local area (and such values might be important for cost-
benefit analysis – see Clinch and Murphy, 2001), the evidence suggests that it is 
mostly a negative externality in the local area. As in the last chapter, we ask a 
WTP measure based on equivalent variation. Initially, in both areas, individuals 
do not have property rights over the land and there is the possibility of a 
reduction in the quality of the local area. Individuals start off with private 
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consumption y0 and w1 of the public good, so we can ask them what loss of 
private consumption would be just as preferable as a decrease in the quality of 
the public good to w2 (where w1 > w2).  
 
Consistent with the last chapter and chapter 2, we used the payment card (PC) 
method for stated preferences. Respondents were asked to circle one value from 
a possible sixteen values, ranging from zero to one hundred pounds sterling. The 
question was: “What is the maximum you would be willing to pay in increased 
electricity bills per year for 3 years for the Scout Moor wind farm not to be 
built?”. The context was obviously changed for the control group but the exact 
same question and values were used in this group. 
 
For SWB, we asked individuals the following in both groups and in both time 
periods: “Thinking about your own life and personal circumstances, how 
satisfied are you with your life as a whole?”, ranging from zero (completely 
dissatisfied) to ten (completely satisfied). This is consistent with the question 
used in the last chapter and of course consistent with the recent research in the 
area (Dolan and Kahneman, 2008; Luechinger, 2009), which was summarised in 
chapter 2. As with the last chapter, focussing effects were avoided by not asking 
any questions about wind energy. While there may be some framing issues with 
using SWB (Schwarz and Strack, 1999), it is certainly possible to reduce such 
framing by asking the SWB question first in the survey – again this 
methodology is consistent with that used in the previous chapter. We also asked 
a local area domain satisfaction question after the life satisfaction question. We 
conducted the first mail survey in September 2007 and the second mail survey in 
October 2008.  
 
For revealed preferences, we use house price data obtained from market 
transactions. House price data are available online from the UK Land Registry 
(i.e. www.houseprices.co.uk), which also contains data on the type of house 
(flat, terraced, semi-detached or detached) as well as whether it is leasehold or 
freehold. We do not have data available on floor area (both internally and 
externally) and the number of rooms or bedrooms each house has. But both areas 
have very similar housing markets so there is a great deal of homogeneity 
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between the houses. Due to the fact that this is a quasi-experimental approach, 
we do not expect, a priori, a certain type of house size to be correlated with the 
sale of a property after the wind farm is constructed.    
 
4.3 Results 
 
4.3.1 Revealed preferences 
 
In the time period from January 2000 to January 2009, there were 797 dwellings 
sold in the areas we sampled. Figure 1 shows the bi-annual average house price 
for each group. We can clearly see that the trend of each group is similar 
whether we examine the post-acceptance time period or the post-construction 
time period. 
 
Table 1 presents the hedonic regressions using OLS. Regressions (I) and (II) 
assume that the time of intervention is when the wind farm proposal was initially 
accepted – i.e. June 2005. Regression (I) only includes the intervention group 
and the control group, whereas regression (II) also includes the quasi-
intervention group into the intervention group. It is clear from these two 
regressions that the wind farm has no significant effect on house prices. 
Regressions (III) and (IV) follow the same format as (I) and (II), but here we 
change the intervention date to be when the wind turbines were erected – i.e. 
December 2007. Again, there is no effect of the wind farm on house prices. 
Regressions (V) and (VI) keep the same format as (III) and (IV) but here we 
reduce the time period, so we do not include any observations before it is known 
that the wind farm was accepted in the local area – i.e. before June 2005. Again, 
there are no significant effects, but these regressions provide us with a larger 
positive coefficient and a better determined standard error, although the t-
statistic is around one. 
 
Table 2 follows the same samples and specifications as Table 1, but here we 
include property characteristics in each regression. It is clear that by doing this, 
the D-i-D coefficients in each regressions are smaller, but we still end up with a 
t-statistic on our final sample of around one. It is clear however from both of 
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these tables is that the wind farm does not have a significant detrimental effect 
on house prices.  
 
4.3.2 Stated preferences 
 
In the first wave of surveys, we obtained 580 responses out of a possible 1600 
individuals (36% response rate). The payment card for the annual WTP not to 
have the wind farm ranged from £0 to £100 per quarter. Table 3 shows the non-
parametric WTP values, which only includes zeros that are genuine. The non-
genuine zeros are those who stated a zero because of reasons beyond support 
and income, such as protest zeros like “the local council should pay” or “I pay 
enough electricity bills at the moment”. For instance, there were 8% non-
genuine zeros in the first wave.  
 
For this analysis, we used annual WTP. Before the wind farm was constructed, 
the respondents in the wind farm area were willing to pay slightly less than the 
control group. Both of these areas were willing to pay more than the quasi-
intervention respondents. So the range of WTP values were between £12 and 
£55, depending on what type of sample were asked. The intervention group 
consist of those who should be compensated in the traditional project appraisal 
sense, so their stated preference of £29 would be what is used for cost-benefit 
analysis. These values are similar to those already found in the literature. The 
parametric values provide very similar results to the non-parametric values 
stated here, and are available upon request.  
 
4.3.3 Subjective well-being 
 
While the first wave response rate was 36%, the response rates varied by area, 
with the intervention area obtaining a 39% response rate, the quasi-intervention 
area obtaining a 29% response rate and the control group obtaining a 44% 
response rate. Of these 580 who responded in the first wave, 416 responded in 
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the second wave (i.e. 72%) – which results in a panel sample of 26% of the 
possible 1600 residents – see Table 4.12  
 
Table 5 provides the basic SWB regressions for the balanced panel. Regression 
(I) states the basic specification and shows that the wind farm does not impact 
on life satisfaction. Regressions (II) and (III) control for household income and 
age respectively, which increase the D-i-D coefficient although the standard 
error is not that well determined. Regressions (IV) and (V) control for 
employment status and marital status respectively, and these again have little 
effect on the D-i-D estimate. Regression (VI) is estimated by a random effects 
model that reduces the D-i-D coefficient. We also check these regressions by 
using fixed effects (except for regression (VI)) and the results do not change 
(and is supported by Hausman tests), suggesting that the unobservable variables 
are uncorrelated with the explanatory variables.  These results are available upon 
request. 
 
We next examine those individuals who were against the wind farm at the 
outset. Table 6 only includes those individuals who, in the first wave, stated that 
they were against the wind farm being built. Regressions (I) to (IV) examine the 
intervention group and control group only, whereas regressions (V) to (VIII) 
examine the intervention group and quasi-intervention group together against the 
control group. In seven out of eight regressions, the D-i-D coefficient is positive. 
Regression (I) is the only specification to show a negative coefficient, although 
it is not significant at the ten per cent level.  
 
Even though the results suggest that the wind farm does not reduce life 
satisfaction, it is possible that it impacts on local area satisfaction. So we asked 
an area domain satisfaction in our survey after the life satisfaction question. 
Using the same scale, we asked how satisfied they are with their local area from 
zero to ten. Table 7 presents these regressions. As with the previous table, 
regressions (I) to (IV) examine just the intervention area and regressions (V) and 
(VIII) examine the intervention and quasi-intervention groups together. In each 
                                                 
12 To note, there are no significant differences between those who did and did not respond to the 
second wave survey. 
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regression, the D-i-D coefficient is positive. In regression (IV) where we use 
random effects, the coefficient is positive and significant at the five per cent 
level.  
 
We also asked and analysed psychological measures of well-being, such as 
autonomy, and more affective measures of well-being, such as worry. We found 
that the D-i-D estimate is positive yet insignificant. We also obtained behaviour 
of walking over the moor, to determine whether the wind farm affected the 
number of times people walked over the moor. Again, we find the exact same 
result as above in that the coefficient is positive although not significant at the 
ten per cent level, and these regressions are available upon request.  
 
4.4 Discussion 
 
This chapter illustrates that what individuals want through their revealed 
preferences and what they enjoy through their experiences are similar. It seems 
that wind farms do not have a negative value through the housing market or 
through people’s life satisfaction. These results contradict what is found through 
people’s stated preferences, where a significant negative value of a wind farm is 
found.  
 
Therefore, on the one hand we have no effect of the wind farm through revealed 
preferences and life satisfaction, and on the other hand, we have a negative 
effect of the wind farm through stated preferences. These two differing values 
might have something to do with having two differing types of elicitation 
methods. The effect of the non-market good on revealed preferences and life 
satisfaction is found indirectly through regression analysis. For stated 
preferences however, the values are elicited directly, in that the residents are 
asked to think about the good independently (in contingent valuation). So their 
full attention is drawn to the good (and its relevant attributes) at that point in the 
survey. This attention towards the non-market good is not the same type of 
attention as when someone chooses to buy a house or when they evaluate their 
life.  
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It must also be noted here that revealed preferences require some sort of market 
experience and life satisfaction is clearly based on experience.  Ex ante stated 
preferences however do not require any type of experience. For instance, the 
HM Treasury (2003) Greenbook makes no explicit reference to ex ante or ex 
post preferences, only WTP versus WTA. It is possible that there could be some 
differences to stated preferences over time, i.e. when the experience of a good 
directly impacts upon the value of the good. This is something that further 
research should focus on. For instance, if individuals were given the contingent 
valuation survey after the wind farm was built, would their stated preferences be 
updated by the experience of the exposure to the good? Is the experience 
somehow different to the standard information given in the description to the 
non-market good?  
 
Beyond pursuing this further research, there are clear limitations to this research 
that require further investigation. For instance, the usual problems associated 
with RPs might be biasing our estimates, e.g. segmentation, in that it could be 
argued that these two areas are too far apart to be in the same housing market, 
which will therefore not allow us to gather good estimates on house prices. In 
addition, if the life satisfaction question was asked on the day that the first 
turbine was erected, would the results remain intact? Furthermore, would a more 
moment-to-moment measure of experienced utility provide any different result? 
These questions are of importance to future research in this area but are beyond 
the scope of this thesis. 
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Table 1: Hedonic regressions 
 (I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) (VI) 
Dependent variable: Ln(House prices)        
Intervention group -0.377*** -0.582*** -0.358*** -0.517*** -0.487*** -0.566*** 
 (0.055) (0.057) (0.051) (0.054) (0.070) (0.076) 
T2 0.560*** 0.560*** 0.357** 0.357** -0.084 -0.084 
 (0.079) (0.091) (0.153) (0.177) (0.119) (0.139) 
Intervention group x T2 -0.076 0.046 0.019 0.083 0.149 0.132 
 (0.096) (0.102) (0.186) (0.199) (0.144) (0.156) 
Quasi-intervention group 
included No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Intervention date – June 
2005 Yes Yes No No No No 
Intervention date – 
November 2007 No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time period 2000-2009 2000-2009 2000-2009 2000-2009 2005-2009 2005-2009 
Household variables No No No No No No 
R2 0.28 0.29 0.12 0.13 0.24 0.18 
N 498 797 498 797 178 297 
Notes: Standard errors in brackets. ***, ** and * represent 1, 5 and 10% significance levels respectively. 
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Table 2: Hedonic regressions with household variables included 
 (I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) (VI) 
Dependent variable: Ln(House prices)        
Intervention group -0.365*** -0.603*** -0.328*** -0.552*** -0.478*** -0.667*** 
 (0.048) (0.049) (0.049) (0.049) (0.061) (0.065) 
T2 0.583*** 0.593*** 0.428*** 0.440*** -0.024 -0.023 
 (0.065) (0.076) (0.133) (0.153) (0.093) (0.112) 
Intervention group x T2 -0.042 0.005 -0.030 0.048 0.082 0.122 
 (0.079) (0.086) (0.162) (0.172) (0.113) (0.125) 
Quasi-intervention 
group included No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Intervention date – June 
2005 Yes Yes No No No No 
Intervention date – 
November 2007 No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time period 2000-2009 2000-2009 2000-2009 2000-2009 2005-2009 2005-2009 
Household variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.52 0.51 0.34 0.36 0.56 0.49 
N 498 797 498 797 178 297 
Notes: Standard errors in brackets. ***, ** and * represent 1, 5 and 10% significance levels respectively. 
Household characteristics are: terrace, semi-detached, flat (the reference group being detached); freehold; 
and new build.  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Table 3: Average WTP in each group 
  WTP 
Intervention group Mean £28.73 
 s.e. (5.13) 
 95% CI (18.60 – 38.86) 
 N 187 
Quasi-intervention group Mean £12.42 
 s.e. (3.14) 
 95% CI (6.22 – 18.61) 
 N 183 
Control group Mean £54.87 
 s.e. (8.26) 
 95% CI (43.55 – 76.19) 
 N 158  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Table 4: Response rates by group 
 Pre-construction Post-construction Panel sample 
Intervention group 39% 74% 29% 
Quasi-intervention group 29% 64% 35% 
Control group 44% 80% 19% 
Overall 36% 72% 26%  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Table 5: OLS life satisfaction regressions 
 (I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) (VI) (VII) 
Dependent variable: Life satisfaction (0-10)        
Intervention group -0.478** -0.522** -0.359* -0.270 -0.240 -0.224 -0.383* 
 (0.214) (0.222) (0.212) (0.212) (0.212) (0.214) (0.202) 
T2 -0.024 -0.061 -0.100 -0.106 -0.094 -0.101 -0.103 
 (0.222) (0.232) (0.218) (0.217) (0.216) (0.131) (0.233) 
Intervention group x T2 0.068 0.106 0.116 0.108 0.092 0.046 0.121 
 (0.304) (0.315) (0.298) (0.295) (0.294) (0.179) (0.279) 
Ln(household income)  0.144 0.426*** 0.501*** 0.340** 0.326* 0.487*** 
  (0.117) (0.128) (0.136) (0.152) (0.172) (0.132) 
Age   -0.068* -0.076** -0.091** -0.069 -0.046 
   (0.038) (0.039) (0.0402) (0.050) (0.028) 
Age2   0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001* 0.001** 
   (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Balanced panel Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Employment status No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Marital status No No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Quasi-interv group No No No No No No Yes 
Random effects No No No No No Yes No 
R2 0.02 0.02 0.08 0.12 0.14 0.13 0.20 
N 544 518 514 512 512 512 780 Notes:  Standard  errors  in  brackets.  ***,  **  and  *  represent  1,  5  and  10%  significance  levels respectively. 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Table 6: OLS life satisfaction regressions – only including those who were against it at the outset 
 
 (I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) (VI) (VII) (VIII) 
Dependent variable: Life satisfaction (0-10)         
Intervention group x T2 -0.064 0.042 0.036 0.039 0.035 0.165 0.158 0.149 
 (0.361) (0.350) (0.349) (0.349) (0.313) (0.324) (0.320) (0.320) 
Balanced panel Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Income, age and age2 No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
Employment status No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes 
Marital status No No No Yes No No No Yes 
Quasi-interv group incl. No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.05 0.14 0.16 0.17 0.05 0.16 0.20 0.21 
N 408 384 382 382 655 520 518 518 
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Table 7: OLS local area satisfaction regressions 
 (I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) (VI) (VII) (VIII) 
Dependent variable: Area satisfaction (0-10)         
Intervention group x T2 0.271 0.286 0.297 0.313** 0.132 0.110 0.132 0.135 
 (0.246) (0.239) (0.241) (0.156) (0.271) (0.261) (0.262) (0.165) 
Balanced panel Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Income, age & age2 Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
Employment status No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes 
Marital status No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes 
Random effects No No No Yes No No No Yes 
Quasi-interv group incl. No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.06 0.13 0.15 0.17 0.09 0.19 0.20 0.23 
N 545 515 513 513 827 784 782 512 The full regressions are available upon request. 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Figure 1: Natural logarithm of house prices by area (x‐axis is bi‐annual time period)  
      
Formal consent Start building 
Finished 
building 
Ln(House prices) 
   112 
5. Does experience matter for non-market preferences?  
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
As was discussed in the last chapter, little is known about how stated preferences 
are affected by experiences over time. While there are many problems of using 
preferences (as presented in chapter two), such as inconsistency and framing 
issues, it could be that many of these problems result from the lack of 
experiencing the good.  
 
List (2001) has found that market experience can reduce, but not totally 
diminish, the hypothetical bias of stated preferences, which suggests that 
experienced preferences should be used for welfare appraisal. This argument 
seems persuasive and would possibly have an impact on non-market 
preferences. The studies examining experiences to date however are usually 
cross-sectional and unable to show causality due to their between-individual 
approach (see Hoeffler and Ariely, 1999; Jansen et al, 2001; and Salkeld et al, 
2000). So it might be that differences in experience might actually be underlying 
selection effects, in that those who are more likely to experience the good are 
those who are more likely to value the good in a particular way. So there could 
be some genetic or personality reasons for valuing a good (Roe and Haab, 2007). 
Essentially, experience is usually not exogenous, but endogenous.  
 
While the non-market good literature is large, we are unaware of any studies that 
attempt to examine people’s WTP for the same good before and after 
exogenously experiencing the non-market good. This is surprising given the 
amount of research on SPs. There is some evidence of combining stated 
preferences with revealed preferences to produce a panel dataset (Englin and 
Cameron, 1996), but this does not show whether WTP is affected a change in the 
experience of the non-market good. There is some evidence examining WTP 
versus willingness to accept (WTA) for the same good (Shogren et al, 1994; 
Morrison, 1997; and see chapter 2), but it is usually not based on how 
experience changes the value. It is more about how the endowment effect (i.e. 
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the reference point) affects preferences. The mere experience of the good in its 
exposure is distinct from reference points and endowment theory.  
 
It has already been argued by List (2002) that more attention should be paid to 
the development of consistent approaches for estimating non-market goods, and 
if preferences are constructed during the elicitation process, then this might call 
for a re-evaluation of the fundamental building blocks of utility theory. A natural 
pre-cursor to this however is to determine how the experience of the good 
affects preferences. This is crucially important because policy-makers use such 
values for resource allocation decisions (e.g. HM Treasury, 2003) and assume 
these values to be valid and consistent. In this chapter we use the same non-
market good as the previous chapter (i.e. the wind farm) to examine the role of 
experiences on preferences. 
 
5.2 Background  
 
Going back to the seminal piece by Arrow et al (1993), hypothetical choices in 
contingent valuation surveys must provide useful information about exactly 
what they are being asked to value if stated WTP is to mean anything. 
Familiarity with the non-market good may lead to less biased stated preference 
values (Cameron and Englin, 1997) although it does not eliminate the 
hypothetical bias (List and Shogren, 1998). It is important to note that in many 
applications individuals will have little experience of the good, suggesting the 
possibility that data from unfamiliar goods will always have significant noise. It 
has been found that information provision can influence WTP estimates (Hoehn 
and Randall, 2002), and information given in stated preference surveys may be 
significantly different to information that is given in real market transactions. 
For instance, when valuing clean air through SP surveys, respondents are usually 
given information about the effect that poor air quality will have on their health 
and the local environment. When purchasing a house or working in a building  
(i.e. RPs) with poor air quality, the agent is not informed of the effects of the 
poor air quality on their health or the environment. So the type of information 
that an agent has in ex ante SPs and ex post RPs would be different. 
 
   114 
There have already been attempts to determine how ex post factors can shape 
choices. One such approach is that of regret theory (Loomes and Sugden, 1982; 
1985), which postulates that individuals take into account the chance of 
experiencing disappointment and regret when making choices, so the 
imagination of the future experience of the good or decision might affect elicited 
ex ante values. So if SP values change over time as a result of experience, the 
expected regret is not borne out and as a result regret is distinct to experience. 
This regret theory is therefore different to pure experience since the latter 
determines the role of experiencing the good on valuation, whereas the former 
determines the ex ante imagination and expectation of the experience.  
 
Another similar approach to experience is that of learning. Standard theory 
would suggest that a WTP value will reflect the consumption value and the 
information value of learning how the good can be incorporated into her 
preference set (Grossman et al, 1977). Experience is however distinct from 
preference learning since here individuals are not repeatedly bidding on a good 
to determine how much of this value is due to novelty or market experience. 
Shogren et al (2000) showed how individuals learn about buying the novel 
goods at multiple time periods, which affects their WTP values. Learning is 
something that does not necessarily arise with experience of the good. Learning 
can take place ex ante with more descriptive information about the good, and 
assumes that we cognitively process the information. The role of exogenous 
experience on the good does not make such an assumption and is different to 
that of the discovered preference hypothesis suggested by Plott (1996), where 
individuals play rounds of bids and through trial and error they discover what 
their preferences are. This is the role of market experience and not the role of 
exposure from direct experience of the good. 
 
The effect of experience has empirical similarities with the test-retest literature, 
in that individuals are asked the same WTP question over a number of time 
periods. For instance, Brouwer and Bateman (2005) examine WTP over a five-
year interval and find that there are significant differences between WTP values 
obtained at both time periods (as well as different determinants of WTP). There 
is no experience of the good however that could have affected these values. 
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It might be that experience has something to do with the hypothetical bias found 
in many stated preference studies (see Bishop and Heberlin, 1979; Carson et al, 
1996; List, 2001), where the bias is upward in that it significantly inflates the 
WTP values. Due to the overall evidence in favour of the hypothetical bias, the 
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration’s (NOAA) blue-ribbon panel 
recommend that hypothetical SP values should be deflated using a ‘divide by 
two’ rule (i.e. divide the WTP estimate by two) unless the hypothetical values 
bear some resemblance to values elicited from revealed preferences (NOAA, 
1996).  
 
More generally, lack of experience might be a reason as to why individuals 
might not have pre-existing preferences for such goods (Diamond and Hausman, 
1994; DellaVigna, 2009). The possibility of the lack of consistent or experienced 
preferences may make individuals ‘mis-want’ non-market goods. It has been 
shown in chapter 2 that humans are not that good at predicting how future events 
or goods will affect their utility in the future (Gilbert et al, 1998; Gilbert and 
Wilson, 2007), so humans instinctively mis-want goods. Camerer and 
Loewenstein (2003), Kahneman and Sugden (2005) and Dolan and Kahneman 
(2008) have argued that revealed or stated preferences might not necessarily 
increase happiness and that systematic forecasting errors show that people often 
make mistakes in trying to predict how various actions will make them feel, and 
moreover these mistakes lead people to take the wrong actions (Loewenstein et 
al, 2003; Fudenberg, 2006). This affective forecasting is empirically tested in the 
chapters 6 and 7 of this thesis. 
 
While the importance of experience has been stressed, most research in this area 
is cross-sectional which doe not always allow causality to be determined. This 
might lead to the possibility that a third factor might be driving an association 
between experience and value, such as genetics or personality. There will always 
be self-selection into preferred treatments as demonstrated by Roy (1951), and 
the exogenous role of experience on preferences is an area that has rarely been 
discussed. The seminal work of List (2003) has showed how market experience 
can reduce the hypothetical bias, but this work does not show how simply 
   116 
experiencing the good affects individuals’ WTP. In fact, there is a lack of 
research examining the within-individual effect of a non-market good on utility 
and a lack of research on the role of experience and learning in micro-level panel 
data (Agarwal et al, 2008). 
 
Due to the possibility of a lack of experienced preferences and therefore mis-
wanting (i.e. we want goods that do not increase our SWB), List (2002) has 
argued that much more attention should be paid to the development of consistent 
approaches for estimating the non-market benefits and costs of public programs. 
It would be first important to examine how experiences can shape stated 
preferences to establish whether experience should be taken into account for 
non-market valuation.  
 
5.3 Methodology  
 
5.3.1. Hypothesis 
 
The non-market good we value is a wind farm (as described in the previous 
chapter). There are two time periods, t1, before the wind farm is built, and t2, 
after the wind farm is built. The first time period is a state of the world where 
residents have not experienced living near a wind farm. Hence their information 
set  is a function of a, which is a vector of the elements that determine 
how individuals gather information regarding the wind farm (such as attitudes, 
information shared by peers, risk perceptions etc.) and e1, which is their actual 
experience of living near a wind farm.   
 
The second time period is a state of the world where residents have experienced 
living near a wind farm, so their information set becomes , where e2 is 
their actual experience of living near a wind farm. In this state of the world, 
everyone in the intervention area has experienced living near a wind farm. So 
essentially, we are assuming here that a change in the experience corresponds to 
a change in the information set (and further assume that a and e are orthogonal). 
Individuals’ WTP not to have w, the wind farm, in stated preferences, will be 
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conditional on the information set. Therefore individuals’ WTP, through their 
stated preferences in the first time period, , would be different to their 
WTP through stated preferences in the second time period , with the 
change in the information set.  
 
So we would like to test our null hypothesis that: H1: 
€ 
WTPt1 ≠WTPt2 , i.e. WTP in 
both time periods are significantly different given the new information. This 
hypothesis has not been tested previously. Clearly, for our hypothesis and in 
accordance with the identification strategy, we will use a difference-in-
difference (D-i-D) econometric approach. So to test our hypothesis, we would 
require the D-i-D estimator: 
 
    (1) 
 
From equation (1), the estimated coefficient  will enable us to test our 
hypothesis. If  = 0, then we can reject our null hypothesis.  
 
5.3.2 Measure of preference 
 
As already demonstrated in the previous chapter, we use the PC method, asking 
individuals in the first wave: “What is the maximum you would be willing to pay 
in increased electricity bills per year for 3 years for the Scout Moor wind farm 
not to be built?”. As before, the context was changed for the control group but 
the exact same question and values were used in this group. 
 
In the second wave, the intervention area had the reduction in the public good 
without property rights over the land (that is w2), but the control group did not 
have the same reduction in the public good. So the control area continued to be 
asked their WTP in the equivalent loss sense. So the WTP for the change in 
quality for the intervention group represents the compensating variation, since 
the loss in private consumption exactly compensates for that increase in quality. 
For this time period, the contingent question was: “As you might be aware, the 
Scout Moor wind farm has been fully built. However, what is the maximum you 
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would be willing to pay in increased electricity bills per quarter for 3 years for 
the Scout Moor wind farm to be removed?”. Using WTP from equivalent 
variation and compensating variation should give very similar values (Willing, 
1976). The exact same values in the payment card were used as in the first time 
period. We conducted the first mail survey in September 2007 and the second 
mail survey in October 2008.  
 
5.4 Results 
 
The sample is the same as that used in the previous chapter – highlighted in 
Table 1. The payment card for the annual WTP not to have the wind farm ranged 
from £0 to £400 per year (but this was asked quarterly). Table 2 shows the non-
parametric WTP values for the unbalanced panel, which only includes genuine 
zeros. Before the wind farm was constructed, the respondents in the wind farm 
area were willing to pay slightly less than the control group. Both of these areas 
were willing to pay more than the quasi-intervention respondents. So the range 
of WTP values are between £12 and £60, depending on what type of sample are 
asked in period 1. The intervention group would be those who should be 
compensated in the traditional project appraisal sense, so their stated preference 
of £29 would be what is used for cost-benefit analysis.  
 
In the second time period, on average all areas were willing to pay less to not 
have the wind farm than in this first time period. The differences here are non-
parametrically insignificant. The parametric approach will rarely give 
significantly different values to the non-parametric values for the PC method – 
and indeed we find similar values for the parametric method (these results are 
not reported here although they are available on request). In order to determine 
whether the values from stated preferences change, we would like to use the 
balanced panel (i.e. those who responded to the survey before and after the 
building of the wind farm), and control for the factors that change over time that 
are related to the WTP responses. Table 3 does just this examining whether the 
natural logarithm of WTP (and keeping the legitimate zeros as zero and not as 
missing values) changes after the construction of the wind farm, i.e. the D-i-D 
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estimator (wit × T2). In every specification and sample, the D-i-D coefficient is 
negative but insignificant.  
 
The problem here is that there are a great deal of zeros which will bias the OLS 
estimation – some of which are individuals who were in support of the wind 
farm. So there might have been a change in stated preferences at the top end of 
the distribution but because of the frequency of individuals at the lower bound of 
zero, we do not observe a true effect of a changing SP value. We can address 
this in two ways. Firstly, through splitting our sample by concentrating only on 
those who were against the wind farm at the outset. This will exclude many 
zeros and focus our attention on those who had a strong preference not to have 
the wind farm. Secondly, through using a Tobit regression. We do both starting 
with the sample segmentation.  
 
Table 4 analyses those who did not want the wind farm as represented by those 
who stated that they did not want it in their local area – a non-monetary 
preference. We use the exact same specifications and samples as that of Table 3. 
Once we control for income and age, WTP does change in the intervention (and 
quasi-intervention area) after the wind farm is built. So how much does their 
WTP change as a result of the experience? This depends on the actual 
specification that is used. Using only the control group and the full specification 
– i.e. regression (III) – we observe a decrease in WTP of around £48. This is 
found by multiplying the D-i-D coefficient by the average WTP in this sample 
(i.e. £60). Using the intervention and quasi-intervention groups together and 
using the full specification – i.e. regression (VII) – we observe a change in 
average WTP by around £38. So including the quasi-intervention group into the 
intervention group reduced the stated preference change but the result still 
remained significant. We also check all these regressions, as in the previous 
chapter, by using fixed effects (except for regression (VI)) and results do not 
change, and these results are available upon request. 
 
These results however might still be biased by too many zeros, i.e. those who 
say they are against the wind farm but are not willing to pay anything for the 
change – so this might be just ‘cheap talk’. We can further segment the sample 
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into those who were willing to pay something not to have a wind farm in the first 
wave – Table 5. The effect of preference change is even stronger here with WTP 
change being in the region of £89-£96.   
 
We next examine the Tobit model, which allows us to control for the corner 
solution of zero in our data. The Tobit regressions are shown in Table 6, which 
include the whole sample, i.e. those for and against the wind farm. The D-i-D 
estimate for the intervention group only are negative but not significant at the 
ten per cent level. We found however that by including the quasi-intervention 
group, respondents’ WTP decreases by between £42 and £60. Table 7 presents 
the Tobit regressions for those who stated a preference not to have the wind 
farm. It is clear that the D-i-D coefficients increase substantially here, which 
ultimately means that the WTP decrease will be greater. In every specification, 
the D-i-D estimate is significant at the ten per cent level at the very least. The 
decrease in WTP from these regressions ranges from £82 to £122.  
 
Table 8 summarizes the changes of stated preference values. The OLS 
regressions seem to give lower values than that of Tobit regressions. It is also 
clear that when the intervention group is compared to the control group, i.e. 
omitting the quasi-intervention group, the value of change is higher. The 
intervention and quasi-intervention areas both reduced their WTP values, 
although the intervention group changed their values to a much greater extent. 
Clearly, our  coefficient from equation (1) is not equal to zero, so we cannot 
reject our null hypothesis and conclude that experience does matter to non-
market valuation. 
 
5.5 Discussion 
 
The main result from this chapter is that stated preferences change after 
experiencing the good. We show that this is a robust result for different 
specifications and samples. This result is extremely important to economics and 
public policy since many governments use such preferences for public policy 
and believe that, to use Diamond and Hausman’s (1993) title, ‘some number is 
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better than no number at all’. The problem here is that the initial SP number is 
different to the SP number elicited after experiencing the good.  
 
It has been recognised that projects or policies are capable of changing people’s 
preferences in an endogenous sense (Elster, 1983; Sunstein, 1993; Bowles, 
1998). A great deal of preference endogeniety is due to adaptive preferences, i.e. 
people adapt to the status quo. Clearly adaptation is a big part of behaviour, 
especially in the realm of behavioural economics (Madrian and Shea, 2001; Dar 
et al, 2004). Adaptive preferences raise thorny issues about whose preferences 
count and when do they count (Dolan et al, 2003). The research area of how 
perspective shapes individual WTP has gained little attention previously. If 
those who have experienced the good however, give a significantly different 
value to those who have not experienced the good, then this should clearly affect 
the allocation of resources. In the traditional sense, the experience of the non-
market good is extra information that individuals would need to update their 
preferences in the Bayesian sense, so it would make sense to use ex post 
preferences in conjunction with ex ante preferences at the very least. 
 
The problem with treating experience as information in the non-market sense is 
that this information can only be retrieved and used once the good is 
experienced on a day-to-day basis. One can provide individuals with as much 
information as possible, but it still might be insufficient due to the lack of day-
to-day exposure. This is consistent with the recent research from psychologists, 
such as Barron and Erev (2003), Hertwig et al (2004) and Hau et al (2008), who 
argue that there is an increasing amount of research that suggests that cognitive 
processes and behaviour depend on whether information is acquired through 
personal experience or by descriptive summaries of events. The reasons range 
from notions of psychological distance (Trope and Liberman, 2003) to the fact 
that experienced information evokes the explicit learning system, as opposed to 
the implicit learning system (Koehler, 1996). Whatever the exact reasons, the 
role of experience on decision not only has large implications to the findings of 
prospect theory (as individuals tend to underweight low-probability events – see 
Hertwig et al, 2004), but also to the role of information provision in preferences 
for welfare appraisal. As a result, experience is a type of information that is 
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distinct to descriptive information, and it can only be found from ex post welfare 
measures.  
 
The effect of experience here might be confused with hypothetical bias (Murphy 
et al, 2005), which may have arisen for strategic reasons. For instance, ex ante, 
people may state a large WTP so as to make a strategic move to make sure that 
the wind farm is not built (Throsby and Withers, 1986). This strategic bias is 
different to their monetary value from their underlying preferences of the wind 
farm. What is interesting in our example is that in the treatment area, the 
residents knew the wind farm was going to be built, so there would be little 
strategic reasons for stating a higher value. The control group however did not 
have the expectation of the wind farm, so this might be a major reason as to why 
their ex ante WTP was so much higher than the treatment area (see Table 2). The 
strategic bias however would not predict a difference in the WTP for the 
treatment group here since the residents knew the wind farm was taking place. 
 
The current view in public policy is that ex ante SPs are placed on a pedestal to 
value non-market goods. From our research, however, this might not be the most 
efficient estimator of the value of the non-market good in question. Given the 
problems of valuing unfamiliar goods with preferences, trying to establish the 
effect of the non-market good on experiences to complement preferences seems 
a sensible avenue for academic research and public policy. It may also be 
important to determine whether asking the same question twice to the same 
individual over a period of time impacts upon their responses in the second time 
wave. For instance, in our example, if we asked individuals their preferences or 
experiences ex post without being exposed to the ex ante survey, would their 
answers remain unbiased? Do individuals remember the last time they 
completed a survey and anchor their response from that survey? Or does the 
mere act of remembering what the survey was regarding impact upon their stated 
preference or other such subjective data? These questions would be fruitful areas 
of research.  
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Table 1: Response rates by group 
 Pre-construction Post-construction Panel sample 
Intervention group 39% 74% 29% 
Quasi-intervention group 29% 64% 35% 
Control group 44% 80% 19% 
Overall 36% 72% 26% 
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Table 2: Annual WTP not to have the wind farm: non-parametric 
 
  Pre-construction Post-construction Difference 
Intervention group Mean £28.73 £22.53 -£6.20 
 s.e. (5.13) (5.91) (7.88) 
 95% CI (18.60 – 38.86) (10.84 – 34.22) (-9.30 – 21.70) 
 N 187 131  
Quasi-intervention group Mean £12.42 £8.86 -£3.56 
 s.e. (3.14) (3.64) (4.81) 
 95% CI (6.22 – 18.61) (1.65 – 16.09) (-5.91-13.03) 
 N 183 135  
Control group Mean £59.87 £61.31 £1.45 
 s.e. (8.26) (9.70) (6.28) 
 95% CI (43.55 – 76.19) (42.10 – 80.54) (-26.59 – 23.69) 
 N 158 112  
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Table 3: OLS WTP regressions 
 (I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) (VI) (VII) (VIII) 
 Ln(WTP) Ln(WTP) Ln(WTP) Ln(WTP) Ln(WTP) Ln(WTP) Ln(WTP) Ln(WTP) 
Intervention group -1.103*** -0.951*** -1.102*** -1.033*** -1.315*** -1.116*** -1.153*** -1.147*** 
 (0.263) (0.266) (0.269) (0.269) (0.208) (0.211) (0.215) (0.216) 
T2 -0.098 -0.114 -0.150 -0.119 -0.117 -0.111 -0.135 -0.110 
 (0.276) (0.279) (0.278) (0.180) (0.247) (0.248) (0.249) (0.163) 
Intervention group x T2 -0.318 -0.366 -0.249 -0.206 -0.279 -0.337 -0.281 -0.283 
 (0.374) (0.376) (0.375) (0.243) (0.294) (0.295) (0.296) (0.192) 
Balanced panel Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Income, age and age2 No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
Employment and marital 
status No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes 
Random effects No No No Yes No No No Yes 
Quasi-interv group incl. No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.09 0.15 0.19 0.18 0.12 0.18 0.20 0.20 
N 493 465 463 463 757 717 715 715 
Notes: Standard errors in brackets. ***, ** and * represent 1, 5 and 10% significance levels respectively. 
This sample excludes non-genuine zeros. 
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Table 4: OLS WTP regressions 
 (I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) (VI) (VII) (VIII) 
 Ln(WTP) Ln(WTP) Ln(WTP) Ln(WTP) Ln(WTP) Ln(WTP) Ln(WTP) Ln(WTP) 
Intervention group 0.074 0.358 0.277 0.187 -0.335 -0.029 -0.075 -0.107 
 (0.347) (0.345) (0.345) (0.343) (0.276) (0.276) (0.280) (0.278) 
T2 -0.098 -0.117 -0.175 -0.150 -0.098 -0.110 -0.152 -0.133 
 (0.303) (0.299) (0.295) (0.209) (0.287) (0.282) (0.282) (0.199) 
Intervention group x T2 -0.802 -0.924* -0.792* -0.681** -0.759* -0.860** -0.773** -0.753*** 
 (0.496) (0.487) (0.480) (0.341) (0.391) (0.384) (0.382) (0.271) 
Balanced panel Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Income, age and age2 No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
Employment and marital 
status No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes 
Random effects No No No Yes No No No Yes 
Quasi-interv group incl. No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.02 0.12 0.18 0.18 0.05 0.14 0.18 0.18 
N 357 335 333 333 485 456 454 454 
Average WTP in t1 & t2 £58.75 £59.92 £60.28 £60.28 £48.26 £48.78 £49 £49 
(95% CI) (£48-£69) (£49-£71) (£49-£71) (£49-£71) (£40-£56) (£40-£57) (£40-£57) (£40-£57) 
ΔWTP  £55.37 £47.74 £41.05 £36.63 £41.95 £37.88  £36.90 
Notes: Standard errors in brackets. ***, ** and * represent 1, 5 and 10% significance levels respectively. 
This sample excludes non-genuine zeros. Those who did not want it are those in the intervention area that 
stated that they did not want the wind farm built in their area – it is a stated preference not based on stating 
a monetary value.  
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Table 5: OLS WTP regressions 
 (I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) (VI) (VII) (VIII) 
 Ln(WTP) Ln(WTP) Ln(WTP) Ln(WTP) Ln(WTP) Ln(WTP) Ln(WTP) Ln(WTP) 
Intervention group 1.756*** 1.767*** 1.626*** 1.637*** 1.193*** 1.317*** 1.216*** 1.249*** 
 (0.416) (0.407) (0.406) (0.409) (0.330) (0.324) (0.326) (0.324) 
T2 -0.098 -0.123 -0.177 -0.144 -0.098 -0.116 -0.161 -0.135 
 (0.296) (0.292) (0.287) (0.205) (0.289) (0.284) (0.283) (0.203) 
Intervention group x T2 -1.339** -1.359** -1.248** -1.278*** -1.445*** -1.506*** -1.411*** -1.478*** 
 (0.612) (0.591) (0.582) (0.414) (0.475) (0.460) (0.458) (0.328) 
Balanced panel Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Income, age and age2 No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
Employment and marital 
status No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes 
Random effects No No No Yes No No No Yes 
Quasi-interv group incl. No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.07 0.16 0.23 0.23 0.06 0.15 0.20 0.20 
N 293 277 275 275 357 338 337 337 
Average WTP in t1 & t2 £70.08 £70.87 £71.39 £71.39 £61.18 £63.91 £64.28 £64.28 
(95% CI) (£58-£82) (£58-£83) (£59-£84) (£59-£84) (£54-£75) (£53-£75) (£53-£75) (£53-£75) 
ΔWTP £93.84 £96.31 £89.09 £91.24 £92.74 £96.25 £90.70  £95.01 
Notes: Standard errors in brackets. ***, ** and * represent 1, 5 and 10% significance levels respectively. 
This sample excludes non-genuine zeros. Only included are those who stated a positive value in the first 
wave (i.e. pre-construction) not to have the wind farm built in their area – it is a stated preference based on 
stating a monetary value.  
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Table 6: Tobit WTP regressions 
 (I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) (VI) (VII) (VIII) 
 Ln(WTP) Ln(WTP) Ln(WTP) Ln(WTP) Ln(WTP) Ln(WTP) Ln(WTP) Ln(WTP) 
Intervention group -2.689*** -2.182*** -2.217*** -1.813*** -3.249*** -2.511 *** -2.504*** -1.988*** 
 (0.704) (0.688) (0.680) (0.493) (0.641) (0.629) (0.629) (0.442) 
T2 -0.195 -0.259 -0.356 -0.252 -0.198 -0.273 -0.330 -0.250 
 (0.694) (0.679) (0.661) (0.377) (0.716) (0.699) (0.689) (0.402) 
Intervention group x T2 -1.470 -1.472 -1.229 -0.837 -1.884** -1.914** -1.793** -1.337** 
 (1.027) (0.996) (0.971) (0.566) (0.927) (0.902) (0.891) (0.539) 
Balanced panel Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Income, age and age2 No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
Employment and marital 
status No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes 
Random effects No No No Yes No No No Yes 
Quasi-interv group incl. No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Log likelihood -698.691 -656.908 -642.305 -622.533 -908.819 -850.793 -839.841 -825.966 
N 493 465 463 463 756 717 715 715 
Average WTP in t1 & t2 £42.76 £43.40 £43.59 £43.59 £31.16 £31.24 £31.33 £31.33 
(95% CI) (£35-£51) (£35-£52) (£35-£52) (£35-£52) (£26-£37) (£26-£37) (£26-£37) (£26-£37) 
ΔWTP     £58.71 £59.79 £56.17  £41.89 
Notes: Standard errors in brackets. ***, ** and * represent 1, 5 and 10% significance levels respectively. 
This sample excludes non-genuine zeros. 
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Table 7: Tobit WTP regressions 
 (I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) (VI) (VII) (VIII) 
 Ln(WTP) Ln(WTP) Ln(WTP) Ln(WTP) Ln(WTP) Ln(WTP) Ln(WTP) Ln(WTP) 
Intervention group 0.300 0.814 0.741 0.600 -0.321 0.293 0.259 0.221 
 (0.682) (0.655) (0.639) (0.549) (0.586) (0.568) (0.561) (0.470) 
T2 -0.181 -0.233 -0.332 -0.275 -0.182 -0.228 -0.299 -0.256 
 (0.603) (0.574) (0.552) (0.368) (0.609) (0.580) (0.566) (0.379) 
Intervention group x T2 -1.978* -2.037** -1.358* -1.358** -2.355*** -2.434*** -2.282*** -1.894*** 
 (1.013) (0.956) (0.919) (0.971) (0.866) (0.902) (0.803) (0.539) 
Balanced panel Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Income, age and age2 No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
Employment and marital 
status No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes 
Random effects No No No Yes No No No Yes 
Quasi-interv group incl. No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Log likelihood -629.384 -583.645 -567.544 -549.735 -795.161 -735.580 -720.970 -702.296 
N 357 335 333 333 485 456 454 454 
Average WTP in t1 & t2 £58.75 £59.92 £60.28 £60.28 £48.26 £48.78 £49.00 £49.00 
(95% CI) (£48-£69) (£49-£71) (£49-£71) (£49-£71) (£40-£56) (£40-£57) (£40-£57) (£40-£57) 
ΔWTP £116.21 £122.06 £81.86 £81.86 £113.65 £118.73 £111.82  £92.81 
Notes: Standard errors in brackets. ***, ** and * represent 1, 5 and 10% significance levels respectively. 
This sample excludes non-genuine zeros. Those who did not want it are those in the intervention area that 
stated that they did not want the wind farm built in their area – it is a stated preference not based on stating 
a monetary value.  
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Table 8: Summary of preference change values 
 Overall sample  Do not want it in t1  
Willing to pay something not to have it 
in t1  
 
Intervention 
group 
Intervention & quasi-
intervention group Intervention group 
Intervention & quasi-
intervention group Intervention group 
Intervention & quasi-
intervention group 
OLS N/A N/A £41-£55 £36-£42 £89-£96 £91-£96 
Tobit N/A 
 
£42-£60 £82-£122 £93-£119 N/A N/A 
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6. ‘OOPS…I DID IT AGAIN’: THE PERVASIVENESS 
OF THE FOCUSSING EFFECT IN WELL-BEING 
REPORTS AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR 
LONGITUDINAL STUDIES 
 
 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
The previous chapter has shown that individuals’ ex post preferences differ to 
their ex ante preferences in light of their experiences. We found this result using 
the same individuals over time, so they are exposed to two identical surveys. 
The problem here is that we do not know if the first survey may have shaped 
their ex post preferences, in that if they were only given the question ex post, 
would their WTP values be the same? This is something that has not been 
examined before, for either preferences or experiences. We try to show whether 
a second survey induces a focussing effect from the first survey, and we use the 
context of projection bias to determine this effect.  
 
Chapter 2 has already shown the problem of projection bias resulting from 
incorrect beliefs for the usual economic model. That chapter demonstrated that 
contrary to what much of standard economic theory has to say, psychologists 
have shown that we are generally not very good at affective forecasting, which 
might more accurately be labeled defective forecasting. A number of studies 
have documented this well known result – ranging from kidney dialysis (Riis et 
al, 2005) to housing assignments (Dunn et al, 2003). 
 
Much of the research on affective forecasting has used the same respondents 
over time. This allows us to control for individual heterogeneity but it does mean 
that respondents might use their first response as an anchor for their second 
response, either because they recall what they were asked to think about 
previously or because they simply recall their previous response.  
 
To our knowledge, however, there have been no studies that have tested the 
degree to which having been asked about something before an event affects the 
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assessments of well-being after the event. To do this, we need an experiment in 
which respondents are randomised to the standard ‘before and after’ condition or 
to an ‘after only’ condition, thus allowing the ‘after’ responses of the two groups 
to be compared with one another. In this chapter, we report on two experiments 
that were designed to test the well-being forecasts of the impact of two major 
football games, the actual impact of the games and, crucially, whether having 
previously been asked about the games affects later well-being reports.  
 
Whilst the context may appear somewhat specific, the implications of the results 
are important and much more general. If there is a difference in well-being 
between those who were asked twice and those who were asked only once, then 
continually asking people to state their well-being may induce focusing effects 
which renders well-being reports biased. This has major ramifications for not 
only clinical trials, but also panel data and non-market valuation. If respondents 
remember the topic of the survey they completed last year or remember what 
value they gave previously, a survey this year could bias those well-being 
reports. If this is found to be true, then a great deal of analysis on the British 
Household Panel Survey or the German Socio-Economic Panel datasets could be 
compromised. 
 
Formally, we can define a person’s predicted utility by: 
        (1) 
where Ui is the predicted happiness of individual i, gi is the outcome of the 
football game, and zi is the other background variables which have an effect on 
happiness. If people place too much of a weight (i.e. focus heavily) on the 
outcome of the game in the prediction, and less on other things that happen in 
life (i.e. zi), then we would have the following utility function: 
      (2) 
where the weight α1 determines the magnitude of the first focusing effect in the 
prediction.  
 
At a later time period, we can observe the relationships of this utility function, 
which will be: 
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       (3) 
where α2 determines the weight placed on the outcome of the game on the 
happiness of people seven days later. The affective forecasting literature would 
suggest that α2 would be zero and there would be no weight given to the 
outcome of the game, so that α1>α2=0. If the first survey has an effect on the 
happiness rating at a later time period, then we might find that α2>0 for group A 
only, i.e. a second pervasive focusing effect. Therefore, if the first focusing 
effect (affective forecasting) makes people mis-predict their utility, then α1>α2, 
and if the second focusing effect (pervasive focussing) provides a subtle cue for 
individuals’ answers, then α2>0 for group A but α2=0 for group B. 
 
6.2 Experiment 1 
 
Methods 
 
We used the 2008 UEFA Champions League Final as our event, and supporters 
of the teams in the final as respondents. The context is important because 
football supporters are familiar with football games so they should be in a good 
position to predict how they would feel after the game. The Champions League 
is a competition involving the top football teams from all the domestic leagues 
around Europe. It is the biggest annual football tournament in the world and the 
2008 final was the first final to be contested by two English teams, Chelsea and 
Manchester United football clubs. The final took place in Moscow on May 21 
and was won by Manchester United on penalties.  
 
To obtain a sample of Chelsea and Manchester United supporters, we conducted 
a randomised experiment on the social networking site Facebook 
(www.facebook.com). Using Facebook for our study meant that we could easily 
identify and select football supporters of both teams. Being an internet-based 
survey allowed us to could control the presentation of the questions to 
respondents (e.g. they could not ‘flick through’ the questions so they would not 
know what the survey is about). Only one internet protocol address was allowed 
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onto the survey and the survey could only be accessed from the link on the 
Facebook message meaning that individuals could only complete it once. 
 
The process of randomisation was crucial for this study. On the Facebook 
website, there are various group pages that individuals can join so that they can 
signal to their peers that they support that group. So there are dozens of both 
Chelsea and Manchester United groups. We used the five most popular group 
pages for each team, and then randomly assigned individuals to be in either 
group A (where they completed the ‘before’ and ‘after’ survey) or group B 
(where they completed the ‘after’ only survey).    
 
The difference between group A’s predicted well-being and actual well-being 
after the event reflects any affective forecasting errors. The difference between 
group A’s well-being before and after the event, and between group A’s well-
being before and group B’s well-being after the event, shows whether the 
outcome of the event has an effect on well-being, i.e. a double focussing effect. 
So, the difference between group A’s and B’s well-being after the event shows 
the degree to which having previously been asked about something may affect 
later well-being reports.  
 
Before the event we asked supporters, ‘overall, how happy do you feel today?’ 
on a zero (not happy at all) to ten (very happy) scale. We then asked them to 
predict their well-being seven days after the final if their team had won and if 
they had lost. Given that it has been shown that the mis-prediction can be 
corrected to a certain extent by asking people to think carefully about the many 
other events that demand their attention in the future (Wilson et al, 2000), we 
further stated that “It is very important to note that we are asking you how you 
will feel overall seven days after the final, rather than when you are specifically 
thinking about the result”. 
 
We randomly selected 1400 supporters (50% from each team) and randomly 
assigned them to group A and group B. Group A were assigned 60% supporters, 
since we wanted to control for any attrition in this group, and consequently 
group B were assigned 40% supporters. For group A, from a possible 840 
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respondents on Facebook, we received 344 responses (159 Chelsea supporters). 
This represents a 41 per cent response rate, which is high for an internet survey 
(Sheehan, 2001). Of those 344 respondents, 240 stated their email address 
enabling us to contact them again for the follow up. Of those 240 who left their 
email addresses, we received 104 completed responses seven days after the final, 
and these 104 respondents (51 Chelsea supporters) therefore made up Group A. 
The timeline for this experiment is illustrated in Figure 1. 
 
Results 
 
From Graph 1, we can observe that Manchester United fans were happier on 
average than Chelsea fans before the final, although the difference is not 
significant. This is true of both the initial overall sample and our Group A 
sample (i.e. the 344 responses altogether). As a result, we will focus on the 
results of Group A as it is not statistically different to the overall sample and 
therefore eases description. 
 
The predictions for a Manchester United win (which is what eventually 
happened) are also shown in Graph 1 for both Chelsea and Manchester United 
supporters. It is clear that Chelsea supporters predicted that if Manchester United 
won, their happiness would fall from 6.86 to 2.73, and Manchester United 
supporters predicted that if their team won, their happiness would rise from 7.09 
to 8.68. Both happiness predictions are significantly different to the happiness 
ratings before the final at the one per cent level. 
 
Seven days later we contacted the respondents again to take part in a general 
survey conducted by the University – there was no mention of football per se in 
the survey (so limiting any obvious focussing effects), only that they took part in 
a survey by the University seven days ago. We only elicited their happiness 
score, which for Chelsea supporters was 5.53 and for Manchester United 
supporters was 6.77. The ratings for each set of supporters had fallen from seven 
days ago, although the decrease for Manchester United supporters is not 
significant. This slight decrease may be a result of a great deal of anticipatory 
utility before the game, and then the loss of expectation after the game 
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(Loewenstein, 1987). The Chelsea difference of 1.33 is significant however at 
the one per cent level. So losing in the Champions league final seemed to have a 
detrimental affect on the happiness of Chelsea supporters seven days later.  
 
Given these happiness ratings seven days later, we can clearly observe the 
affective forecasting result that many researchers have already shown. The 
difference between the predicted happiness and actual happiness seven days later 
for both sets of supporters was large and significantly different at the one per 
cent level. The difference for Manchester United supporters was around two 
happiness points and for Chelsea supporters it was just less than three happiness 
points (both on an eleven point scale). 
 
While affective forecasting has been shown in many contexts, although not for 
football in Europe, no study has shown whether priming people about the study 
in the first instance affects the second rating. Group B (i.e. ‘after new sample’ in 
Graph 1) is our randomised control group who did not get exposed to or primed 
from the first survey, which allows us to test this hypothesis. We sent out 550 
Facebook emails seven days after the final to group B and obtained 219 
completed responses (108 Chelsea supporters) (i.e. a 40 per cent response rate). 
 
As we can see from the last column of Graph 1, Group B Chelsea supporters 
gave a 6.67 happiness rating and Manchester United supporters gave a 7.00 
happiness rating. Group B’s happiness rating is not statistically different to that 
of Group A’s ratings both before the final and seven days later. The happiness of 
Chelsea supporters in Group B was no different to that of Chelsea supporters in 
Group A before the final. The happiness between Chelsea supporters in Group A 
and Group B seven days later however was significantly different at the one per 
cent level. If there was no priming effect, given randomisation, then we would 
not expect a difference. This is not the case, and it seems that Chelsea fans in 
Group A systematically lowered their happiness ratings, more so than what 
would have otherwise occurred.  
 
Overall, we found that both Chelsea and Manchester United supporters mis-
predict their affective state seven days after the final, but that Chelsea 
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supporters’ affective state did decrease seven days later – there was not complete 
adaptation. We found that the second group who had not been asked their 
affective state previously however had a different rating for their happiness. This 
suggests that people in the first group, who answered the survey twice, 
remembered what the survey was about first time around and focused their 
attention on this event. As a result, supporters did not only succumb to the 
focusing illusion at the prediction stage, but they also focused on the game seven 
days after by the subtle cue of re-taking the survey – i.e. a double focusing 
effect.   
 
6.3 Experiment 2 
 
Methods 
 
The second experiment used the 2009 UEFA Champions League final between 
Manchester United and Barcelona on the 27th May 2009. Barcelona beat 
Manchester United two nil. For this experiment we analysed data from 
Manchester United supporters only. This experiment differs from experiment 1 
by: (i) increasing the time when we provided the second survey; and (ii) 
controlling for any background variables that may be correlated with 
randomisation. For group A, we asked respondents their ‘happiness today’, 
which was one week before the Champions League final. Two weeks after the 
final, we asked respondents their ‘happiness today’, and then asked them to 
remember their happiness a week before the final took place. The survey then 
elicited respondents’ gender, age, employment status and location, so as to 
control for any spurious differences in the background variables that resulted 
from randomisation that might drive such a difference found in experiment 1. 
 
600 respondents were allocated into Group A (i.e. asked before and after) 
whereas 300 were allocated into Group B (i.e. after only).  From Group A, we 
received 276 completed surveys, of which 224 left an email address so we could 
contact them again. Once we emailed them again to take part in a follow-up 
study, 105 from the 224 responded. From Group B, we received 103 completed 
responses.  
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Results 
 
Table 1 presents the regressions for happiness two weeks after the Champions 
League final. The variable ‘Group A’ is whether the respondent was asked the 
survey before the final took place (i.e. before and after). The other variables are 
self-explanatory. It seems from regression (I) that being in the panel sample had 
no direct effect on happiness. Regressions (II) and (III) include the background 
variables of male age and age2 and employment status respectively. Including 
these variables increases the size of the coefficient of the panel sample but does 
not significantly change the standard error. In these regressions age and 
unemployment explain a great deal of variance in happiness, as expected from 
the previous literature (van Praag and Ferrer-i-Carbonell, 2005; Dolan et al, 
2008). Regression (IV) introduces regional variables and in doing so, the 
coefficient of the panel sample variable increases and is significant at the five 
per cent level. So by controlling for regional effects, along with other personal 
variables, we can show causally that those who were asked the happiness 
question previously were 0.66 points less happy than those who did not take the 
initial survey.   
 
Table 2 is in the same format as Table 1 but here the dependent variable is 
remembered happiness one week before the final of the Champions League. 
Similar to the previous results in Table 1, the respondents who are unemployed, 
young and from Wales remember themselves as being less happy than those who 
are employed, older and from England. What is crucial here is the fact that the 
‘Group A’ variable in every regression is significant. If we take regression (IV) 
as our best estimate of remembered happiness, we can causally show that those 
who were in the panel sample remember themselves as being less happy by 
0.850 points than those who have not taken the survey previously. This 
coefficient is larger than that of the first table and it demonstrates that the double 
focussing effect is very prevalent when individuals are asked to think about a 
time period in which a negative event (i.e. losing the Champions League final) 
took place.  
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6.4 Discussion 
 
In two randomized experiments, this chapter has clearly demonstrated that 
affective forecasting is prevalent in experienced situations (i.e. football matches) 
and that being exposed to an ex ante survey can shape ex post experiences.  On 
the first finding, football supporters innately focused on and attended to the 
outcome of the game and did not think about the other things which might have 
been important in their life seven days later. The role of attention is crucial in 
this process (Kahneman et al, 2006). It helps to explain why many people 
believe the result will be important in their life after the final and why the 
longer-term effect of the Champions League final become relatively small (i.e. 
because attention eventually shifts away to other (more) important aspects of 
life). It has already been argued that finding ways to increase the accuracy of 
affective forecasts would be a valuable although complex task (Ubel et al, 2001). 
The results show that it is not enough to directly tell people not to think about an 
event when predicting their happiness scores. This study has shown that people 
still think about the game – it seems very difficult for them not to do so.  
 
The second result clearly shows that being exposed to the initial survey biased 
the affective responses seven days later – this is the second focusing effect. 
Respondents who answered the survey twice (even though the second survey did 
not mention the Champions League final or even football) seemed to remember 
what the first survey was about and then base their second rating on this. Hence, 
they focused their attention on the first survey and responded accordingly to the 
subtle cue. This happened for the supporters of the losing team and not the 
winning team. So it might be that the losing team supporters are more likely to 
be affected by subtle cues or perhaps losing is more salient in the memory than 
winning (based on loss aversion – Kahneman and Tversky, 1979).  
 
This is especially interesting since while loss aversion and the characteristics of 
the value function have been tested extensively for preferences and 
psychological perceptions (see Köbberling and Wakker, 2005; for an overview), 
“the extent to which loss aversion is also found in experience is not yet known” 
(Kahneman, 1999: 19). It might be that losses remain in the brain (or in the 
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subconscious) even after two weeks and the survey instrument primes the 
individual to think about the loss causing it to become salient again. On the other 
hand, it might be the case that gains do not remain in the brain since this higher 
level of SWB becomes a new reference point (or a very quick reference point). 
Perhaps priming individuals about the gain does not make the gain more salient 
and it might be that focusing attention on it may not matter. 
 
If such a double focusing effect is replicated elsewhere, it is important that 
research on affective forecasting becomes more innovative in order to mitigate 
against the double focusing. Using different scales might not necessarily 
overcome this problem since it is not that respondents remember what they have 
given seven days ago and respond accordingly, but that people attend to the 
event seven days later and feel unhappy as a result. While the theory behind 
affective forecasting is clearly important, one cannot escape the fact that the 
methodology of deriving the answers to test the theory is just as important. By 
using two randomized experiments, we have shown that affective forecasting is 
more important than would have been the case without the randomization.  
 
This research supports the evidence that subtle cues can have an affect on 
subjective assessments of life (Schwarz et al, 1987), and throws up interesting 
questions which merit further consideration and investigation. For instance, we 
have shown that the second focusing effect lasts seven days, but does it last 
longer? Do people focus on a survey that they responded to as long as one year 
ago and bias their current subjective well-being rating? Indeed, are life 
satisfaction ratings prone to long-term focusing effects in the same way as 
affective ratings might be? Finally, does the pervasiveness of focusing effects 
help to explain why people adapt to some life events and not to others?  
 
This chapter has shown that the focussing illusion is important for prediction, 
but that a backward focusing effect is also present which further supports the 
affective forecasting findings. As a result, this chapter is the first to show a 
double focusing effect which has implications for those conducting research on 
subjective well-being and self-reporting more generally. More research is 
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needed on both of these focussing effects in economics in order for us to 
understand economic behaviour to a greater extent. 
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Figure 1: Our methodology & timeline for experiment 1 (picture courtesy of 
guardian.co.uk)  
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Graph 1: Happiness before final, happiness predicted seven days after final, and 
happiness after final 
 
 
Notes: Each individual error line represents the 95% confidence interval. The ‘Before,’ ‘Prediction’ and 
‘After within’ groups contain the same 104 respondents – i.e. Group A. The ‘After new sample’ group – i.e. 
Group B – contains 172 randomized respondents. 
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Table 1: OLS happiness regressions   (I)  (II)  (III)  (IV)   Happiness ‐ two weeks after final  Happiness ‐ two weeks after final  Happiness ‐ two weeks after final  Happiness ‐ two weeks after final Group A  ‐0.298  ‐0.448  ‐0.494  ‐0.657**   [0.303]  [0.313]  [0.307]  [0.327] Male    0.043  ‐0.196  ‐0.262     [0.397]  [0.391]  [0.390] Age    ‐0.160**  ‐0.157**  ‐0.143**     [0.072]  [0.071]  [0.072] Age2    0.002***  0.002**  0.002**     [0.001]  [0.001]  [0.001] Unemployed      ‐2.086***  ‐2.084***       [0.524]  [0.523] Student      ‐0.360  ‐0.392       [0.403]  [0.403] Retired      0.251  0.370       [1.315]  [1.310] Wales        ‐2.148*         [1.223] Scotland        0.859         [0.684] Ireland        0.567         [0.639] Other        0.431         [0.349] Obs  208  208  208  208 R2  0.01  0.05  0.12  0.15 
Notes: Standard errors in brackets. ***, ** and * represent 1, 5 and 10% significance levels respectively. 
Happiness is an eleven-point happiness today scale. Reference groups are ‘Employed’ and ‘England’. Other 
refers to countries outside of the UK and Ireland. 
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Table 2: OLS remembered happiness regressions   (I)  (II)  (II)  (II) 
  Remembered happiness a week before the final  Remembered happiness a week before the final  Remembered happiness a week before the final  Remembered happiness a week before the final Group A  ‐0.677*  ‐0.871**  ‐1.006***  ‐0.850**   [0.344]  [0.358]  [0.353]  [0.373] Male    ‐0.128  ‐0.307  ‐0.358     [0.452]  [0.448]  [0.445] Age    ‐0.122*  ‐0.115  ‐0.127     [0.074]  [0.081]  [0.082] Age2    0.002**  0.002*  0.002**     [0.001]  [0.001]  [0.001] Unemployed      ‐1.862***  ‐2.000***       [0.600]  [0.597] Student      0.185  0.105       [0.463]  [0.460] Retired      ‐2.447  ‐2.583       [1.509]  [1.494] Wales        ‐3.845***         [1.395] Scotland        ‐0.16         [0.780] Ireland        ‐0.027         [0.728] Other        ‐0.532         [0.400] Obs  207  207  207  207 R2  0.02  0.05  0.11  0.15 
Notes: Standard errors in brackets. ***, ** and * represent 1, 5 and 10% significance levels respectively. 
Happiness is an eleven-point happiness today scale. Reference groups are ‘Employed’ and ‘England’. Other 
refers to countries outside of the UK and Ireland. 
 
   146 
7. ELECTING HAPPINESS: DOES HAPPINESS AFFECT 
VOTING AND DO ELECTIONS AFFECT HAPPINESS? 
 
7.1 Introduction 
 
The previous chapters of this thesis have illustrated a degree of mis-wanting in 
non-market valuation. We take this context of comparing preferences and 
experiences to that of voting behaviour to see if voting preferences are consistent 
with their experiences of the outcome of the elections. Issues such as affective 
forecasting are usually found in small-scale experiments, so addressing some of 
these issues in public choice issues seems a very important area of research.  
 
Voting in elections has long have been an area of research for political scientists 
and economists. Since Downs (1957), most models of why people vote – and 
what they get out of voting – are based on the assumption of economic agents 
that are rational according to an underlying set of preferences. Despite a great 
deal of work that builds on such models, voting and its consequences for 
individual welfare are still not very well understood (Green and Shapiro, 1994; 
Levine and Palfrey, 2007). Whilst the relationship between SWB and voting 
does not form a major part of existing formal models of voting, individual 
satisfaction is a significant part of the rational civic duty model of Riker and 
Ordeshook (1968). So its consideration represents one way to develop a greater 
understanding of voting and the impact of elections.  
 
This chapter attempts to identify the causal relationships between voting and 
SWB (for more on possible associations, see Di Tella and MacCulloch, 2005). 
We test whether the result of elections affect SWB by using a panel dataset 
running over the three most recent national elections in the United Kingdom 
(which were all won by the Labour Party). The dataset contains information on 
life satisfaction. 
 
7.2 Relevant literature and hypotheses  
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The Downs (1957) preference-based model of voting has stimulated a great deal 
of research, see Blais (2000) for a review. The model suggests that voting is 
costly to each individual, that no individual voter obtains direct utility from the 
act of voting itself, and that the benefits to society from the vote are discounted 
by the probability of casting a decisive vote. While it has been found that the 
potential decisiveness of the vote matters in large elections (Rosenthal and Sen, 
1973; Silberman and Durden, 1975) and experimental settings (Levine and 
Palfrey, 2007), this result is not unequivocal (Ashenfelter and Kelly, 1975).  
 
Importantly, the model significantly under-predicts the number of people that 
vote in elections. Myerson (2000) illustrates the problem of the decisiveness 
model using a Poisson distribution of random voters. He finds that the 
probability of voting pivotally for one candidate is so tiny that the benefit to a 
voter who prefers a candidate must be more than eight billion times greater than 
the cost to vote. If it costs $10 to vote in an election, then the expected benefits 
of electing one’s preferred candidate must be greater than $80 billion. 
Extensions to the Downs model suggest that people obtain direct consumption 
benefits from voting due to civic duty (Riker and Ordeshook, 1968; Opp, 2001), 
which may provide its own contagion effect to vote (Shachar and Nalebuff, 
1999). Social norms can increase voter turnout (Gerber and Green, 2000; Gerber 
et al, 2008) and the media can also play an important part (DellaVigna and 
Kaplan, 2007; Gerber et al, 2009).  
 
It is possible to fit a theory of SWB into existing theories of rational voting in 
the Riker and Ordeshook (1968) approach. Their approach specifically 
introduced civic duty into the rational model, but they believed that civic duty 
was made up of: satisfaction from performing the civic duty; satisfaction from 
affirming allegiance to the political system; satisfaction from affirming a 
partisan preference (i.e. stand up and be counted satisfaction); satisfaction of 
deciding and going to the polls (i.e. procedural utility); and satisfaction of 
affirming one’s efficacy in the political system.  
 
There is therefore a great deal of SWB in this model i.e. if someone did not vote, 
they might experience dissatisfaction from not performing their civic duty and/or 
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affirming their partisan preference etc. Before we can see whether voting affects 
people’s satisfaction, we should examine whether there are some differences in 
the satisfaction of those who intend to vote and those who do not. Therefore, the 
examination of how SWB affects voting intention is crucial for further insight 
into the Riker and Ordeshook model. 
 
The research examining the impacts of voting (or an election) has usually used 
economic outcomes. For instance, Alesina and Roubini (1992) find evidence that 
there are electoral cycles on the inflation rate for a range of countries. For the 
U.S., there are mixed results on the effect of elections on economic outcomes. 
Grogan (1994), Knight (2000), and Besley and Case (2003) find an impact of 
elections on fiscal outcomes, and Snowberg et al (2007) find an effect on 
monetary outcomes. On the other hand, Lee et al (2004) show that voters elect 
policies proposed by the parties instead of affecting the policy positions of the 
parties, and Ferreira and Gyourko (2009) find that the outcome of mayor 
elections in major U.S. cities does not affect size of city government, the 
allocation of public resources, property, and crime rates.  
 
Some work however has considered subjective assessments of welfare. Radcliff 
(2001) found that SWB is positively affected by left-wing governments i.e. 
liberal political systems, whereas – and somewhat contradictorily – Bjørnskov et 
al (2007) found that excessive government spending has detrimental effects on 
country aggregated SWB. Di Tella and MacCulloch (2005) find that when the 
government leans more to the right ideologically, right-wing individuals have 
higher SWB and left-wing individuals have lower SWB. Napier and Jost (2008) 
confirm this result although they attribute it to the fact that right-wingers are 
better able to justify income inequalities. Stutzer and Frey (2006) provide 
evidence from Switzerland to suggest that the opportunity to engage directly in 
the democratic process through referenda increases life satisfaction although 
Dorn et al (2007) have cast doubt on the robustness of this finding.  
 
There has been no work to date that has directly tried to test the Riker and 
Ordeshook (1968) theory, i.e. that a large determinant of voting in the rational 
model of voting is that people get satisfaction, in various forms, from voting. In 
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addition, many of the studies mentioned above rely on cross-sectional data, 
suffer from potentially serious specification errors and selection effects and 
cannot establish causality. Given the lack of causal work in this area, we 
approach this important gap in the literature by directly examining how elections 
can affect SWB. More specifically, we aim to test the following two hypotheses. 
H1: no effect of voting on SWB; and H2: no effect of voting on SWB allowing 
for type and strength of political affiliation 
 
7.3 Data and methodology 
 
We use data from the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS), which covers the 
1997, 2001 and 2005 general elections in the UK. The BHPS begun in 1991 and 
is a nationally representative sample of British households, which contains over 
10,000 adult individuals. The entire sample of the unbalanced panel contains 
30,336 observations (17,206 individuals). Of those, 4,197 stayed in all waves 
from wave 6 onwards (this is the first wave SWB ratings were elicited). The 
interviews for the BHPS take place between September and December of every 
year, and the general elections in 1997, 2001 and 2005 were in May, June and 
May respectively. So, the wave before an election is roughly six to nine months 
before and the wave after the election is roughly three to six months after the 
election has taken place. The SWB rating in the BHPS is based on a life 
satisfaction question: “How dissatisfied or satisfied are you with your life 
overall?”; with seven possible response categories ranging from “1. very 
dissatisfied” to “7. very satisfied”. Due to the fact that 2001 did not have a life 
satisfaction question, we omit the 2001 general election from our analyses. As a 
result, we use four waves of the BHPS, i.e. 1996 and 1997, and 2004 and 2005.  
 
To test whether the voting and the election affects SWB, we use a simple 
random effects model. Since the dependent variable is the life satisfaction 
variable, the average life satisfaction over time is not included as an error-
correction term. For the first hypothesis, we would have the simple differences-
in-differences model, which examines whether the election improves SWB: 
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    (4) 
 
where Vi is a dummy variable which is unity if the individual votes in the 
general election at time t and Tt+1 is a dummy variable which is unity for the 
sample wave after the general election takes place. For the years before the 
election, the V variable takes the value of one if the individual votes in the 
forthcoming election. So for H1, we test whether β3=0. For the second 
hypothesis, we would have the equivalent of a difference-in-difference-in-
differences model, where Pa,i is the type of party preference, a, for each 
individual i:  
 
,  v = 1,0 (5) 
 
So we run two partial regressions, where we examine those who vote (v=1) and 
those who do note vote (v=0) separately. This is equivalent to extending a 
further interaction effect to equation 5. The second hypothesis suggests that 
voting in the last election has not effect on SWB allowing for political party 
preference, i.e. ψb=0. The k set of x explanatory variables included are those 
already found to affect life satisfaction from the literature e.g. sex, age, 
education, marital status, employment status, number of people in the household 
and household income (Dolan et al, 2008). 
 
7.4 Results  
 
As can be seen from Table 1, the expected turnout for each election is higher in 
the BHPS than the actual turnout. It might be that respondents in the BHPS are 
more inclined to act pro-socially and/or that they simply over-estimate their 
likelihood of voting but we cannot test for the relative weight of these 
possibilities. Table 2 breaks down the BHPS sample and the electorate for the 
three largest political parties. From 1997 to 2005, the representativeness of the 
BHPS in terms of the electorate has declined. We appreciate that these data are 
not perfectly representative of the British electorate but it represents the best 
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dataset available to conduct longitudinal analysis at the national level on the 
relationship elections and SWB. 
 
Table 3 shows the various regressions that test hypothesis three. Unfortunately, 
the life satisfaction question was not asked in 2001 and so we cannot conduct a 
difference-in-differences analysis for this election. Regressions 3.1 and 3.2 
present the random effects generalized least squares model to see whether the 
elections of 1997 and 2005 had any effect on SWB. Whilst the variables 
expected to affect SWB behave in the expected ways, voting in the previous 
election does not appear to have any effect on SWB. Distinguishing between the 
strength of party preference, that is between partisan (regressions 3.3 and 3.4) 
and weak (regressions 3.5 and 3.6), does not change the previous result. 
 
What about when we account for political preferences? Table 4 splits the sample 
by those who voted and those who did not and also by strength of support. 
Regressions 4.1 and 4.2 show the results for the 1997 election for ‘strong’ and 
‘weak’ supporters, respectively. The 1997 election had no effect on the SWB on 
either set of supporters – not even on the strong Labour supporters, whose party 
had been out of power for 18 years. Regressions 4.5 to 4.8 are analogous results 
for the 2005 election. This time, there are some odd results: non-partisan Labour 
voters reported significantly (but only marginally) lower SWB and those who 
had no political preference had higher SWB after the election. Overall, the 
election results do not appear to affect SWB very much at all but these odd 
results mean that, strictly speaking, we should reject hypothesis four.  
 
7.5 Discussion  
 
We showed that voting in the last two out of three elections in the UK have not 
in themselves affected life satisfaction and, when linked to political affiliation, 
they produce some odd results that suggest that elections generally have no 
effect on SWB. These results are consistent with the literature on affective 
forecasting but are contrary to Riker and Ordeshook’s (1968) civic duty model. 
In order to test Riker and Ordeshook’s (1968) model to a greater extent, one 
would need access to data on: whether the respondent expects that the opposition 
   152 
party will make them more or less happy than the current party in power; and 
some subjective estimate of how much importance each individual places on the 
outcome of the election. These data are currently not available on any panel 
dataset around the world so we would welcome the inclusion of such questions 
within their surveys. One could then imagine conducting field experiments on 
varying individual SWB and eliciting their intention to vote and actual voting to 
clearly see the effect of SWB on voting.  
 
In general, it seems that we have a tendency to overestimate the intensity and 
especially the duration of our reaction to events (Gilbert et al, 1998). The issue 
of incorrect forecasting found in the previous chapter is very relevant here. For 
example, Gilbert et al (1998) asked voters in Texas during the 1990 election for 
governor (which was won by George W. Bush) how they would feel one month 
after the election if their candidate had lost. Respondents expected to feel 
miserable but when asked how they felt one month later, they were as happy 
whether their candidate had won or lost.  
 
One explanation for our defective forecasting is the focusing effect (Schkade 
and Kahneman, 1998; Wilson et al, 2000) whereby we over-estimate how much 
we will think about an event in the future. The very nature of thinking about 
something actually makes it appear more important than it will probably turn out 
to be. Many individuals may believe that the outcome of the election will affect 
them for much longer than it actually does because they imagine thinking about 
the election much more than they do. 
 
While our results are informative, there are obvious shortcomings. We limit 
ourselves to the last three general elections in the UK, which were all won by the 
Labour Party and there were no real surprises in the election results – this is 
clearly very important. Of course, our results may be peculiar to the UK and to 
the measure of SWB we used. The analysis should be extended to other 
countries, to local elections and, in particular, to elections where the outcomes 
are much less certain and where decisiveness becomes an important factor. In 
particular, it is an open question whether mood on the day of the election is an 
important determinant of the propensity to vote and the voting preference, and 
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how this impacts on mood and SWB after knowing the outcome of the election. 
One could also examine the reverse causality, so as to determine how SWB 
might affect political preferences (see Clark and D’Angelo, 2009). 
 
Nonetheless, we have shown that affective forecasting is prevalent in public 
choice and future research should examine other large-scale national effects in 
public goods, and how exogenous shocks in one country can impact upon 
preferences and experiences in other countries. For instance, did the recent US 
election victory by Barack Obama make UK individuals happier? Or does any 
event in another country have an impact on SWB in the UK? These questions 
are important for CBA but they are possible to find. 
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Table 1: Comparing intended voting turnout (in the BHPS) versus actual turnout  
 
Turnout Projected before election  from BHPS* Actual official turnout 
1997 General election 82% 71% 
2001 General election 75% 59% 
2005 General election 73% 61% 
*Are you planning to vote in next year’s general election? 
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Table 2: Comparing BHPS turnout preferences versus actual preferences 
 
General 
election 
Labour 
BHPS 
Labour 
actual 
Conservative 
BHPS 
Conservative 
actual 
Liberal Dem 
BHPS 
Liberal Dem 
actual 
1997 55.8% 43.2% 26.7% 30.7% 13.1% 16.8% 
2001 47.9% 40.7% 20.5% 31.7% 12.0% 18.3% 
2005  36.5% 35.3% 21.6% 32.3% 14.7% 22.1% 
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Table 3: The effect of the election on life satisfaction (LS) – random effects generalized least squares 
         (3.1)                (3.2)     (3.3)              (3.4)      (3.5)             (3.6) 
  All Strong (partisan) Weak 
  LS LS LS LS LS LS 
 
1997  
election 
2005 
election 
1997  
election 
2005 
election 
1997  
election 
2005 
election 
Vote in the last election 0.081 0.079 0.076 0.105 0.085 0.066 
 [0.036]* [0.023]** [0.082] [0.048]* [0.040]* [0.027]* 
Election year dummy -0.011 -0.109 -0.049 -0.115 0.001 -0.102 
 [0.037] [0.021]** [0.084] [0.047]* [0.042] [0.024]** 
Vote in the last election x Election year 0.000 0.024 0.049 0.050 -0.014 0.004 
 [0.042] [0.026] [0.092] [0.052] [0.047] [0.031] 
Regional dummies (20) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies (2) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Background variables (31) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 16,745 26,010 4,384 9,389 12,361 16,621 
R2 overall 0.08 0.09 0.11 0.09 0.08 0.09 
Standard errors in brackets.  * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. 1 Background variables included in these 
regressions are: sex, age, age2, education (7), marital status (10), employment status (9), household size, and the 
log of household income. The political reference group is the Labour party. We also include a variable to 
control for those who were ineligible to vote. The full table is available from the authors upon request. 
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Table 4: The effect of the election on LS allowing for partisanship and party political preference – 
random effects generalized least squares 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
       (4.1)                  (4.2)      (4.3)             (4.4)      (4.5)              (4.6)      (4.7)             (4.8) 
 Voted in the GE Not voted in the GE Voted in the GE Not voted in the GE 
 Strong Weak Strong Weak Strong Weak Strong Weak 
  LS LS LS LS LS LS LS LS 
Election year 1997 1997 1997 1997 2005 2005 2005 2005 
Conservatives party affiliation 0.279 0.084 0.317 0.336 0.070 0.058 -0.189 0.121 
 [0.082]** [0.042]* [0.268] [0.130]** [0.058] [0.048] [0.181] [0.100] 
Lib Dems party affiliation -0.008 -0.034 0.317 0.130 -0.047 0.052 -0.138 -0.037 
 [0.107] [0.055] [0.370] [0.169] [0.083] [0.047] [0.255] [0.109] 
Other party affiliation 0.127 -0.161 -0.427 -0.273 0.004 -0.050 0.048 0.024 
 [0.231] [0.095] [0.568] [0.193] [0.081] [0.051] [0.162] [0.093] 
No preference 0.583 -0.154 0.249 0.136 0.520 -0.038 -0.214 -0.020 
 [0.648] [0.085] [0.223] [0.106] [0.497] [0.071] [0.137] [0.070] 
Missing/refused/don’t know  0.253 -0.139 0.446 0.507 -0.127 0.011 -0.054 0.129 
 [0.276] [0.061]* [0.529] [0.154]** [0.202] [0.048] [0.283] [0.081] 
Election year dummy 0.033 -0.021 0.030 0.033 -0.034 -0.073 -0.316 -0.058 
 [0.044] [0.028] [0.172] [0.102] [0.033] [0.033]* [0.110]** [0.075] 
Conservatives party affiliation x Election year -0.040 -0.050 -0.285 -0.282 0.008 -0.068 0.218 -0.002 
 [0.077] [0.046] [0.309] [0.163] [0.054] [0.052] [0.208] [0.129] 
Lib Dem party affiliation x Election year -0.048 0.049 -0.299 -0.138 -0.004 -0.054 0.051 0.094 
 [0.101] [0.062] [0.452] [0.226] [0.080] [0.054] [0.311] [0.146] 
Other party affiliation x Election year -0.112 -0.022 0.081 0.690 -0.088 -0.025 0.275 -0.061 
 [0.223] [0.117] [0.633] [0.272]* [0.048] [0.057] [0.160] [0.117] 
No preference x Election year -0.399 -0.104 -0.158 0.018 -0.827 -0.014 0.286 -0.043 
 [0.685] [0.131] [0.252] [0.132] [0.509] [0.094] [0.135]* [0.086] 
Missing/refused/don’t know x Election year -0.179 0.235 -0.267 -0.263 0.097 0.018 0.167 -0.042 
 [0.272] [0.082]** [0.560] [0.191] [0.201] [0.060] [0.296] [0.106] 
Regional dummies (20) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies (2) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Background variables (31) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 3,362 9,698 757 2,201 7,233 10,394 1,666 5,656 
R2 overall 0.12 0.08 0.17 0.12 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 
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8. DESTRUCTION AND DISTRESS: THE IMPACT OF 
THE SEPTEMBER 11 ATTACKS ON BRITISH  
WELL-BEING  
 
 
 
8.1 Introduction 
 
Throughout this thesis, we have been primarily concerned with life satisfaction 
(or happiness) measures of subjective well-being and changes in goods that 
have been predicted/anticipated. Urban regeneration, wind farms, football 
matches, and voting and elections all have a very predictable element to them. 
So questions arise about whether we can use other SWB measures to value 
non-market goods and can we value unpredictable/unexpected changes in non-
market goods. Furthermore, so far we have only attempted to value non-market 
goods in the UK, but another interesting issue is whether we can use SWB to 
value international externalities.  
 
In this chapter, we use the example of terrorism, which is a major negative 
externality (Frey, 2004). Some costs of terrorism are very direct and relatively 
easy to measure, such as the value of lives lost, reduction in consumption, etc., 
whilst others are more indirect and much more difficult to measure, such as 
increased fear and anxiety. One of the most well-known terrorist attacks 
occurred on September 11th 2001 in the US. It has been shown that the attacks 
had detrimental effects to the economy in the US, particularly in the New York 
region (Chernick and Haughwout, 2006) as well as intangible psychological 
costs (Galea et al, 2002; Schlenger et al, 2002).  
 
The indirect effects of terrorism, which might be large in their own right, could 
extend beyond national borders as they dominate media coverage (Eisensee 
and Stromberg, 2007). It is very difficult to identify the causal effects of 
terrorist attacks on individuals, regions or countries since there are sometimes 
no good comparable counterfactuals. As a result of this, one way of valuing the 
indirect negative externalities would be through a stated preference study. 
Smith et al (2009) analysed US households’ ex ante WTP for three security 
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policies that all address a terrorist attack on commercial aircraft with shoulder 
mounted missiles. The main policy being proposed was anti-missile laser 
jamming countermeasures mounted on commercial aircraft, and this 
was compared to two other policies as well as the prospect of remaining with 
the status quo. Their WTP estimates for the anti-missile laser jamming 
intervention ranged from $100 to $220 annually per household. Using a 
random utility model Viscusi (2009) finds that reductions in deaths from 
terrorism have a value almost twice as great as reductions in deaths from 
natural disasters, suggesting a large premium for dread risk. To identify the 
international negative spillovers of the 9/11 attacks in the UK, we could ask the 
UK population how much they are willing to pay to eliminate the risk of 
terrorist attacks in another country, such as the US.  
 
This chapter however presents one of the first attempts to estimate an 
international spillover of terrorism using people’s SWB. We use the British 
Household Panel Survey (BHPS) to examine whether the 9/11 attacks in the 
US had an impact on the SWB of residents in the UK. The BHPS allows us to 
examine the 9/11 attacks in a quasi-experimental setting. The BHPS is 
administered annually between the months of September and December, but 
the majority of surveys take place in September in a random manner. So 
comparing the SWB of the UK population before and after the 11th of 
September in 2001, and comparing this to the same residents in 2000, provides 
us with a novel and powerful quasi-experiment.     
 
8.2 Background 
 
Terrorism and terror attacks have long been a major international problem, 
with potentially serious consequences for human welfare (Frey et al, 2007). 
The attacks of September 11th 2001, were one of the most prominent acts of 
terrorism in recent times but we need to determine the consequences of such 
attacks. Economists use the underlying exogeneity of terrorist attacks as a way 
of establishing the causal relationship between those attacks and various 
economic outcomes, such as tourism (Enders et al, 1992), national output 
(Abadie and Gardeazabal, 2003; Eckstein and Tsiddon, 2004), net foreign 
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direct investment (Abadie and Garzeazabal, 2008) and urban expansion 
(Blomberg and Sheppard, 2007). Terrorism however, only directly affects a 
small fraction of the capital stock (Becker and Murphy, 2001), and there are 
also studies which show that it does not affect all economic outcomes. For 
example Glaeser and Shapiro (2002) find that terrorism has not altered the 
urban form. The well-being consequences of terrorism have also been studied 
in terms of the birth weight of babies in areas with a higher concentration of 
land mines, where the causal mechanism is thought to be the effect of stress on 
mothers during pregnancy (Camacho, 2008).  
 
The terrorist attacks of September 11th 2001, have stimulated quite a bit of 
research in their own right. For example, there is now evidence to suggest that 
the attacks had a detrimental effect on the financial market (Chen and Siems, 
2004; Straetmans et al, 2008) and New York’s fiscal position (Dolfman and 
Wasser, 2004; Chernick and Haughwout, 2006). It has also been shown that the 
9/11 attacks reduced the demand for air travel (Blunk et al, 2006; Blalock et al, 
2007), with estimates ranging from $14 to $43billion a year (Santos and 
Haimes, 2004) to $214 to $420 billion (Gordon et al, 2007). There was also a 
significant increase in the number of fatal traffic accidents after 9/11 
(Gigerenzer, 2004; Su et al, 2009), which has been found for other terrorist 
attacks (Stecklov and Goldstein, 2004).  
 
In terms of the intangible effects of 9/11, it has been found that survivors from 
damaged buildings reported substantial physical and psychological health 
problems three years after the event (Brackbill et al, 2006). Post-traumatic 
stress disorder (PTSD) has been shown to be associated with direct exposure to 
the 9/11 attacks and the prevalence of PTSD in the New York City 
metropolitan area was substantially higher than elsewhere in the country (Galea 
et al, 2002; Schlenger et al, 2002). Eidelson et al (2003) find a significant 
increase in the amount of work – in terms of the number of clients – received 
by psychologists working closest to Ground Zero compared to those received 
by their colleagues working elsewhere in the country. 
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The intangible effects of 9/11 were felt elsewhere in the US. For example, 
PTSD was not limited to those who experienced the 9/11 attacks directly 
(Silver et al, 2002), although the actual levels of stress outside of New York are 
disputed (Schlenger et al, 2002). In a small sample from Wisconsin, Krueger 
(2007) found that 9/11 increased sadness temporarily and decreased 
enthusiasm for at least seven days after the attacks. In a nationally 
representative sample of Americans, Lerner et al (2003) found a heightening 
level of fear and anger amongst the US population following 9/11. More 
recently, the terrorist attacks in London (UK) in 2005 have been shown to have 
negative effects on stress and have altered travel behaviour (Rubin et al, 2005)  
 
Despite these and a range of other studies, we are unaware of any attempt to 
determine the effects of terrorism attacks on the SWB of those living outside of 
the attacked country, let alone quantify such effects.  
 
8.3 Data and empirical strategy 
 
This study examines the effects of 9/11 on the SWB of those living in the 
United Kingdom. This study has two main strengths. First, we use a large 
longitudinal dataset, consisting of approximately 10,000 individuals, which 
provides us with strong statistical power to discern patterns whilst controlling 
for individual heterogeneity and underlying trends. Second, 9/11 acts as an 
exogenous shock to the randomised sampled population, which provides us 
with a very powerful quasi-experiment.  
 
The British Household Panel Survey (BHPS) is a nationally representative 
survey of British households, and is conducted between September and 
December of each year (started in 1991). Respondents are interviewed in 
successive waves and the sample has remained representative of the British 
population since the early 1990s. For the study to be thought of a quasi-
experiment, the timing of terrorist attacks need to be exogenous and largely 
randomly assigned in terms of the BHPS interviews. The 9/11 attacks were 
clearly exogenous to the survey since many respondents are interviewed in 
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September each year and the date in September in which they are interviewed 
is randomised.  
 
The measure of SWB used in this analysis is the twelve items from the 
negative affect scale of the General Health Questionnaire (Goldberg, 1978). 
Respondents are asked how often (on a four point category scale) over the past 
few weeks they: (i) had lost sleep over worry; (ii) felt constantly under strain; 
(iii) felt they could not overcome difficulties; (iv) had been feeling unhappy 
and depressed; (v) had been losing confidence; (vi) had been feeling like a 
worthless person; (vii) were playing a useful part in things; (viii) felt capable of 
making decisions; (ix) had been able to enjoy day-to-day activities; (x) had 
been able to concentrate; (xi) had been able to face up to problems; and (xii) 
had been feeling reasonably happy. The number of times a person places 
himself or herself in the top two categories was given a one, and then all twelve 
questions were added together to produce what is known as a caseness measure 
of SWB. This is a well-being score from zero to 12, coded so that the response 
with the lowest well-being value scores 12 and that with the highest well-being 
value scores zero. For simplicity, this count is reversed here, so that higher 
scores indicate higher levels of well-being.  
 
This composite rating is a good proxy for the transient component of moods 
(Watson and Clark, 1984) and has been used as a measure of SWB in recent 
studies by economists (Blanchflower and Oswald, 2008; Clark, 2003; Clark 
and Etile, 2002; Clark and Oswald, 1994; Gardner and Oswald, 2007; Jones 
and Wildman, 2008). It has also been used to value intangible goods (e.g. 
Oswald and Powdthavee, 2008).  
 
The well-being equation in a difference-in-differences (D-i-D) setting takes the 
following form: 
 
  (1) 
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where denotes SWB of individual i at time t, is a binary variable 
which takes the value of 1 if the individual was interviewed post-9/11 attacks 
(between 12th September 2001 and 30th September 2001), is a year dummy, 
i.e. year 2001, and  is the error term. The parameter  represents the true 
causal effect of the September 11th attacks on SWB of those interviewed 
between 12th September 2001 and 30th September 2001. Assuming that in the 
absence of the September 11th attacks would have changed identically in 
the pre-9/11 and post-9/11 groups between 2000 and 2001. More formally, in 
the absence of treatment, would be zero, i.e. there would be no difference in 
the mean well-being scores between pre- and post-9/11 (see Meyer, 1995). In 
this case, an unbiased estimate of can be obtained by D-i-D as: 
 
    (2) 
 
Note that this approach can accommodate multiple time periods and multiple 
treatment groups. We can then estimate by applying OLS to equation (1).   
 
The panel nature of the BHPS allows us to follow the same individuals who 
were interviewed in September 2000 and September 2001 (excluding 
September 11th itself). A key assumption here is that, for those interviewed in 
September of each BHPS year, the date of the interview is orthogonal to the 
date of treatment, i.e. September 11th. This yields for the years 2000-2001 a 
balanced panel that consists of 9,535 observations (4,908 individuals). Of 
those, 1,020 individuals were interviewed between 1st and 10th of September in 
2001.  
 
8.4 Results  
 
By applying OLS on equation (1) – without any control variables – we obtain 
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This implies that whilst there is a significant increase in the average SWB 
scores for the control group from 2000 to 2001, the same cannot be said for the 
treated group, i.e. those interviewed after the September 11th attacks. The D-i-
D estimate is negative, statistically significant, and sizeable; the average 
treatment effect is -0.316 with a well-determined standard error of 0.105.  
 
To check whether the above results are not driven by seasonality – i.e. the 
control group may have done their interviews when the weather was gloomier 
in winter of 2000, whilst the treated group may have done their interviews in 
the Autumn time of the same year – we can rerun OLS on those interviewed in 
September of both years only. By restricting to the ‘September interviewees’ of 
both years only, OLS yields:  
 
 
The average treatment effect continues to be negative and statistically 
significant at the 1% level; those interviewed post-9/11 report a 0.430 lower 
SWB score than they should have experienced in absence of the September 
11th attacks. There is a slight difference in the size of the average treatment 
effect between the first regression (no seasonal adjustment) and second 
regression (restricting to September interviewees in both years). This implies 
that we may need to control for the seasonal effects, i.e. the month of the 
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interview before or after the September 11 attacks, if multiple time periods 
were to be incorporated into the D-i-D estimation. 
 
One of the key assumptions underlying validity of the above D-i-D estimate is 
that differences between treatment and control group would have remained 
constant in the absence of treatment (Meyer, 1995). We can check whether this 
is the case for the September 11 attacks by plotting the well-being trends for 
the control and the treated groups prior to 2001. Here, a 5-year period before 
and 1-year after the event is arbitrarily chosen to generate the plot, although 
similar patterns (but with significantly smaller N) can be obtained with longer 
leads and lags.  
 
We can see from Figure 1 that the average levels of SWB for both pre and 
post-9/11 groups follow a very similar trend in the years that precede 2001. 
The trend however diverges in the year of the September 11 attacks. That is, 
there is a noticeable increase in the average level of SWB of those interviewed 
pre-9/11 from 2000 to 2001, which could be due to a number of a reasons such 
as a very good summer, general mood in the country after the 2001 general 
election (see he previous chapter for the effects of national elections on SWB). 
However, consistent with the estimated average treatment effects obtained in 
the previous OLS regressions, the average SWB levels for those interviewed 
post-9/11 hardly changes at all from 2000. In other words, there appears to be 
an ‘offsetting’ effect on the rising trend of SWB for the treated group, thus 
providing some validations for the average treatment effect obtained in our D-
i-D model. Since both groups have already been exposed to the event by the 
time the survey was conducted in 2002, it is not surprising to see that the trend 
of SWB converges again one year after the 9/11 attacks. What is interesting is 
that the actual SWB levels do not return to the same levels as the previous year 
for the treated group. 
 
Table 1 provides further robustness checks on the D-i-D estimates. Column 1 
of Table 1 controls for a number of covariates that are consistent with the 
determinants of well-being (Dolan et al, 2008a), including household income, 
age, age squared, gender, education, employment status, health status, number 
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of children, and regional dummies. We also control for the pre- and post-9/11 
seasonal effects by including dummies for the month interviewed in 2000. In 
the full specification, OLS continues to produce a negative and statistically 
significant average treatment effect; the coefficient on the interaction between 
the post-9/11 group and the year (=2001) dummy is -0.342 with a statistically 
well-determined standard error of 0.107. 
 
To check whether the results might be driven by those individuals who were 
interviewed immediately after 9/11 in 2001, the second column of Table 1 
splits the post-9/11 group into two groups: interviews that took place between 
September 12th-20th and 21st-30th.. Whilst those interviewed between 21st and 
30th September 2001 reported a slightly lower average well-being score than 
those interviewed immediately after the September 11th attacks, i.e. between 
12th and 20th September 2001, both still reported a significant drop in SWB 
between 2000 and 2001 compared to the control group. It is interesting here 
that those who were interviewed later on in the month (i.e. 21st – 30th) appeared 
to be more affected by the terrorist attacks than those interviewed closer to the 
attacks (i.e. 12th – 20th).  
 
It could be argued that the selection process into the treated group is not 
random, i.e. the selection process may be correlated with unobserved factors 
that are also correlated with measures of SWB. To check for this, we estimate 
in the first column of Table 2 a D-i-D model with multiple time periods using a 
fixed effects estimator. Using a seven-year balanced panel (1996-2002), the 
fixed effects estimator produces a treatment effect of -0.345 with a statistically 
significant standard error of 0.138. This average treatment effect is remarkably 
similar to the one obtained in the OLS regressions, which suggests that even if 
there was selection by unobserved time-invariant factors into the treated group, 
the effect is negligible. The absence of unobserved heterogeneity bias also 
means that we can estimate equation (1) using either OLS or random effects 
models. 
 
Given that we have more than two time periods in our analysis, there is the 
potential for serial correlation which could understate the standard deviation of 
  167 
the estimated treatment effects, leading to an overestimation of the t-statistic 
(Bertrand et al, 2004). However, the introduction of AR(1) errors into the 
random effects regression in the second column of Table 2 does not lead to a 
substantial increase in the standard errors. In fact a virtually identical average 
treatment effect to the one obtained in OLS can still be obtained in a random 
effects model.  
 
 
8.5 Valuing the losses in SWB 
 
The effect of the 9/11 attacks on SWB seems large and robust, and valuing the 
impact in monetary terms would facilitate cost-benefit analysis. We can 
estimate monetary values in two ways: (i) cost of illness; and (ii) income 
compensations. 
 
8.5.1 Cost of illness 
 
A GHQ score of around 2 is a conservative threshold level at which lower 
levels of SWB can be diagnosed as clinical depression (Goldberg et al, 1998). 
Using this threshold we can see how many people in the United Kingdom may 
have suffered the equivalent of clinical depression as a result of the 9/11 
attacks. From the BHPS sample in 2001, there were 253 people with a GHQ 
value between 1.01 and 2. A 0.316 or 0.430 change in the GHQ (the range of 
values from our estimates) at this part of the distribution represents 80 to 109 
people. That is, 0.47% to 0.64% of the BHPS sample could have been 
diagnosed with clinical depression as a result of 9/11. Aggregating this up to 
the 45.5 million adults in the UK in 2001, around 214,000 to 291,000 UK 
residents may have experienced depression as a result of 9/11.  
 
To treat such clinical depression, GPs often provide a course of cognitive 
behavioural therapy (CBT). The cost of one course of CBT is around £800 
(NICE, 2008). Therefore, aggregating this up, we could argue that the 9/11 
attacks had the equivalent effect of costing £171million to £233million for the 
treatment of the depression. This range of values can be seen as a lower bound 
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estimate for three reasons. First, the depression threshold used here is a 
relatively conservative one. If we used a threshold of 3 on the GHQ, the costs 
would become between £211million to £273million. Second, CBT is not fully 
effective. The current effect rates are around 60% (Layard et al, 2007). So if 
we gave another course of CBT treatment to the 40% of people who did not 
recover first-time around, and still using the conservative threshold value of 2 
on the GHQ, our estimates would rise to £214million - £290million. Third, 
these estimates are local effects since they are based on one particular threshold 
– they are not average effects from the whole of the BHPS. 
 
8.5.2 Income compensations 
 
The calculation of the IC for the terrorist attacks is based on the implicit utility-
constant trade-off between the terrorist attacks and income. As demonstrated in 
chapter 3, the IC is defined as the increase in income necessary to hold utility 
constant if the individual has been exposed to the terrorist attacks. In an 
indirect utility function, this would be given by: 
 
 v(T1,y0 + IC) = v(T0,y0)     (3) 
 
where v(.) is the indirect utility function, y0 is the initial income, T0 is the pre-
9/11 attacks condition, and T1 is the post-9/11 attacks condition. Given this, 
and the micro-econometric specification in (1), the IC (at mean income levels) 
can be defined as: 
 
     (4) 
 
where  is average household income of the sample population.  
 
In our sample, we did not find a significant income effect due to our sample 
restrictions. As a result, we use the IC as a guide to what the costs could look 
like using this approach, but it cannot be considered a definitive result. There 
have been other studies, however, that have shown that an income effect in 
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GHQ regressions can be found, especially using instrumental variables (IV). 
We could, for example, use Oswald and Powdthavee’s (2008) estimate of the 
natural logarithm of personal income on GHQ – i.e. 0.818 for fixed effects 
using IV and 1.159 for random effects using IV.  
 
We can use these estimates in equation (4) to estimate the value of terrorism on 
SWB. The estimates of 0.316 (OLS no controls) to 0.430 (OLS seasonality 
controlled) represent our best causal effects of the terrorist attacks. Using these 
estimates, and an average UK personal income of £24,000, we find that the 
average treatment effect for each individual is worth between £7,500 and 
£17,000. This is a very large amount of income needed to compensate each 
individual for experiencing the 9/11 attacks. The cause of this large IC, apart 
from the large effect the 9/11 attacks have on SWB, is the income coefficient. 
This income coefficient is low because of the use of panel data, where the 
effects of income seem to be small. While the income-SWB debate will shed 
further light on our estimates, we do not currently have good estimates of the 
causal effect of income on SWB throughout the income distribution to know 
what coefficient to use and how to weight it. Therefore, these costs are a 
representation of what could be, and we arrive at the same conclusion as 
Deaton et al (2009) that without a more robust income coefficient, we cannot 
provide accurate income compensations. 
 
8.6 Discussion 
 
This chapter has shown that the 9/11 attacks in the United States lowered the 
SWB of United Kingdom residents – by a GHQ well-being score of 
approximately 0.3-0.4. Comparing this magnitude with other life events within 
our data is difficult since many events, such as marriage or being unemployed, 
are endogenous. Notwithstanding this, the magnitude of the 9/11 effect is 
potentially worse than becoming divorced, and about one-third of the effect of 
being unemployed or widowed in the same sample using the same methods. 
These are significant and robust effects. 
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The effects of 9/11 on GHQ provide us with cost estimates of the effect of the 
9/11 attacks on UK SWB of between £170million-£380million. Using an 
income compensation significantly inflates these numbers but we do not have a 
robust income coefficient to use, which renders such values as imprecise. 
These cost estimates go some way towards demonstrating that the 
psychological cost induced by terrorism is substantial and might greatly exceed 
the discounted physical harm (Sunstein, 2003; Becker and Rubinstein, 2004). 
This is due to the fact that ‘dread’ makes up a significant part of the risks from 
terrorism (Viscusi, 2009), and this especially true given that media coverage 
that was dominated by the 9/11 attacks (Eisensee and Stromberg, 2007).  
 
Whatever the precise scale the impact of 9/11 across the UK population, it is 
possible that individuals in the UK were affected by 9/11 because they believed 
that such events were more likely to happen in the UK in the near future, 
thereby increasing their fear and uncertainty. Given Krueger and Laitin’s 
(2008) finding that terrorists are more likely to attack wealthy countries, it 
seems natural for individuals in other wealthy countries to be affected by 
terrorist attacks overseas. Indeed, the results from our study support the Caplin 
and Leahy (2001) model, but here the events that caused the initial fear and 
uncertainty took place in another country.  
 
We can only speculate about such issues here as there has been little discussion 
of the international spillover effects of security or terrorism. The US Congress 
Joint Economic Committee (2002) has suggested that some of the largest costs 
of terrorism were the difficult to measure costs of added anxiety, stress, and 
psychological disorders associated with the increased threat of terrorism. This 
paper has shown that these costs may also have been very significant outside of 
the US.  
 
Overall, this chapter has demonstrated that it is possible to value non-market 
goods using alternative measures of SWB. Combining the GHQ with the cost 
of illness approach enables us to place a monetary value on terrorism. This 
chapter also shows that it is possible to find the effects of unexpected events on 
SWB. Much of the SWB literature to date has focused primarily on expected 
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events, for example, marriage, divorce, pay increases etc., which all have a 
sense of inevitability about them. It might be that unexpected events are 
especially important to SWB and more innovative research is needed to 
establish the effects of unexpected life changes on SWB and it would also be 
interesting to compare the effects of unexpected and expected life changes. The 
key underlying message from this chapter is that we can value non-markets 
goods without necessarily using ICs, and it is possible to use SWB in non-
market valuation in a wide range of contexts that might seem a priori very 
difficult or even impossible to value.  
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Figure 1: Trends in subjective well-being before and after 9/11/2001 
 
Note: This is a balanced panel, with 691 individuals completed the survey between 1st 
of September 2001 and 10th of September 2001, and 2,320 individuals completed the 
survey between September 12th 2001 and September 30th 2001. The same individuals 
are then tracked over the 7-year period from 1996 to 2003. The vertical line represents 
the year of the September 11 attacks. 
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Table 1: Well-being and the September 11 attacks: OLS regressions 
Dependent variable: Subjective well-being (1) (2) 
Post-9/11 (12th Sept-30th Sept 2001) 0.239  
 [0.112]*  
Post-9/11 (12th Sept-20th Sept 2001)  0.239 
  [0.121]* 
Post-9/11 (21st Sept-30th Sept 2001)  0.219 
  [0.127] 
T = 2001 0.308 0.311 
 [0.095]** [0.095]** 
T = 2001 x Post-9/11 (12th Sept-30th Sept 2001)  -0.342  
 [0.107]**  
T = 2001 x Post-9/11 (12th Sept-20th Sept 2001)   -0.268 
  [0.115]* 
T = 2001 x Post-9/11 (21st Sept-30th Sept 2001)   -0.425 
  [0.123]** 
Regional dummies (20) Yes Yes 
Month interviewed dummies (9) Yes Yes 
Background variables (20) Yes Yes 
Observations 9521 9240 
Overall R-squared 0.0635 0.0644 
 
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. **<1%; *<5% significance levels. 
Background variables include age2/100, log of household income, employment status 
(9), education (6), and marital status (5). All unique individuals interviewed after 
September in 2001 are dropped from the analysis. All of our regressions are available 
upon request. 
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Table 2: Well-being and the September 11 attacks: FE and AR(1) errors 
RE regressions 
Dependent variable: Subjective well-being Fixed effects AR(1) errors RE 
Post-9/11 (12th Sept-30th Sept 2001)  0.213 
  [0.126] 
T = 1996 -0.134 0.136 
 [0.159] [0.124] 
T = 1997 -0.104 0.099 
 [0.144] [0.124] 
T = 1998 0.032 0.167 
 [0.132] [0.123] 
T = 1999 0.158 0.229 
 [0.125] [0.116]* 
T = 2001 0.383 0.315 
 [0.125]** [0.116]** 
T = 2002 0.365 0.226 
 [0.134]** [0.124] 
T = 1996 x Post-9/11 (12th Sept-30th Sept 2001) 0.003 -0.038 
 [0.138] [0.140] 
T = 1997 x Post-9/11 (12th Sept-30th Sept 2001) -0.015 -0.044 
 [0.137] [0.140] 
T = 1998 x Post-9/11 (12th Sept-30th Sept 2001) -0.041 -0.056 
 [0.137] [0.139] 
T = 1999 x Post-9/11 (12th Sept-30th Sept 2001) 0.032 0.022 
 [0.137] [0.131] 
T = 2001 x Post-9/11 (12th Sept-30th Sept 2001) -0.345 -0.331 
 [0.138]* [0.132]* 
T = 2002 x Post-9/11 (12th Sept-30th Sept 2001) -0.244 -0.222 
 [0.138] [0.140] 
Regional dummies (20) Yes Yes 
Month interviewed dummies (9) Yes Yes 
Background variables (20) Yes Yes 
Observations 22,168  
Number of individuals 3,209  
Overall R-squared 0.02  
 
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. **<1%; *<5% significance levels. 
Background variables include age2/100, log of household income, employment status 
(9), education (6), and marital status (5). All unique individuals interviewed after 
September in 2001 are dropped from the analysis. 
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Table 3: The valution of the 9/11 attacks on UK SWB  
 Lower bound estimate Upper bound estimate 
Cost of illness   
(i) GHQ threshold of 2 – 100% CBT 
effectiveness 
£171 million £233 million 
(ii) GHQ threshold of 2 – 60% CBT 
effectiveness 
£239 million £326 million 
(iii) GHQ threshold of 3 – 100% CBT 
effectiveness 
£211 million £273 million 
(iv) GHQ threshold of 3 – 60% CBT 
effectiveness 
£295 million £382 million 
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9. CONCLUSION 
 
This thesis concludes by summarising the main results from the thesis and the 
implications it has for academic research and public policy (section 9.1). 
Section 9.2 then illustrates some of the limitations of the thesis and addresses 
what would be needed to circumvent the limitations. Section 9.3 addresses some 
of the important future research that could be stimulated from this thesis, and 
section 9.4 concludes the thesis. 
 
9.1 Summary 
 
The two main aims of this thesis were to determine how SWB compared to 
WTP for valuing non-market outcomes, and to establish whether SWB could be 
used for welfare appraisal and public policy. This thesis showed that valuing 
non-market goods by the SWB method produces different estimates of the non-
market good than the WTP approach. The SWB approach is a promising way to 
value non-market goods and, as a result, there is a large potential for SWB to be 
used to value non-market goods for public policy, especially as a complement to 
preferences. This would supplement what the UK HM Treasury currently 
practices in non-market valuation in the UK. The HM Treasury currently places 
ex ante preferences on a pedestal for welfare appraisal. As this thesis shows, 
however, ex ante and ex post preferences might generate different monetary 
values, and what people want ex ante does not always provide individuals with 
the same change in SWB over a certain time period. The role of mis-wanting 
creates problems for the sole use of preferences in welfare assessments. While 
using SWB is promising, a few issues remain that currently limit its potential 
for welfare economics, such as scale recalibration and the double focussing 
effect. These problems also apply to the preference-based approach. If SWB can 
be measured accurately, we could advise decision makers to use such 
assessments in welfare appraisal.  
 
This research therefore has clear implications for academic research in 
economics. While it has direct relevance to environmental, health and transport 
economics (and other non-market areas such as crime), there are other areas of 
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economics that this thesis might also impact upon. For instance, welfare 
economics uses people’s preferences for deciding the effect of policies designed 
to improve welfare. Clearly, we cannot know if these preferences improve 
happiness unless SWB is measured and analysed. There is also the potential to 
use SWB to measure and value the non-market effects of new inventions and 
innovations (Dolan et al, 2008c). The role of innovation policy is clearly very 
important to productivity and economic growth (Haskel, 2007; Nesta, 2008), 
and where public policy is directed to improve human well-being through 
innovation, there is the possibility to determine the effects of such policy on 
SWB (beyond productivity). 
 
Another relevant area is that of public choice, in that most models of voting, in 
local or national elections, explicitly argue that individuals do obtain some 
utility from voting. Using SWB explicitly allows us to test this in a range of 
public decisions. It might be that the role of public participation in shaping 
policies is very important to SWB. Not enough of the voting research focusses 
on the actual outcomes of individuals from voting and elections. 
 
The double focussing effect found in Chapter 6 has important implications to 
the subjective responses found in panel data within many disciplines. Given that 
the majority of social sciences use panel data in some form or another, this 
research might have consequences across the social sciences. Whether it is 
subjective data regarding well-being, health, preferences, behaviour, or 
attitudes, we may have to be careful to interpret the findings from panel 
surveys. There is clearly a trade-off here since panel datasets greatly improve 
the efficiency of our empirical estimates as opposed to the typical cross-
sectional estimates. There might however, be some people whose subjective 
assessments are shaped by the panel nature of the survey. This clearly needs to 
be researched further before we can assess its true implications for the social 
sciences.  
 
This thesis has implications for the foundations of microeconomics and the 
preference satisfaction account that indirectly assumes that what we want the 
most provides us with the greatest well-being. It has previously been argued that 
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the goal of economics is to evaluate the social desirability of alternative 
allocation of resources so as “to achieve the maximum well-being of the 
individuals in society” (Just et al, 2004: 3). Social desirability may well depend 
upon how well-being is defined, and this thesis could be used as the platform to 
evaluate the relationship between preferences and SWB for non-market goods, 
which will enrich the debate about how best to allocate scarce resources.  
 
On the potential for SWB to be used in welfare appraisal, if the causal role of 
absolute income on SWB can be established, then the SWB approach has the 
potential to generate meaningful monetary values of non-market goods for 
public policy. The research on generating monetary values for non-market 
goods from SWB, however, is still in its infancy and is literally thirty years 
behind that of generating monetary values from revealed and stated preferences. 
So, we need more research on using SWB for economic valuation and, in so 
doing, we will be in a better position in the future to judge just how meaningful 
and robust this method actually is. 
 
Beyond this thesis, there are still issues regarding scale recalibration and 
framing that need to be overcome before the regular usage of SWB in welfare 
economics and policy-making. The SWB approach may also be unable to elicit 
non-use values. Notwithstanding the normative issues surrounding the 
appropriateness of non-use values in public policy appraisal, a simple cost-
benefit rule might be viewed as inappropriate where non-market goods touch on 
issues such as beauty, knowledge, justice or morality. These aspects however 
might well affect SWB, but it has yet to be shown that they actually do. Many 
non-use values are for future states of the world, but expectations about future 
states of the world (Graham, forthcoming) in any sense might however impact 
on an individuals’ SWB today, even if they do not experience that state of the 
world. So while individuals in the UK might never go to Alaska and experience 
an oil spill in that state, it could still cause distress to them. Chapter 8 
demonstrated how events in another country could impact on the SWB of the 
UK population – i.e. cross-border impact on SWB. So non-use values (in the 
conventional preference sense) might actually generate changes in SWB for 
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some populations. Researchers have to be innovative to find and elicit such 
effects in these populations. 
 
9.2 Limitations 
 
While the originality of this research is that we have compared preferences to 
experiences for valuing non-market goods and demonstrated some measurement 
issues in using both WTP and SWB, we need to acknowledge the limitations of 
this research. The first limitation is that we have only used evaluative accounts 
of SWB, e.g. life satisfaction. We have not used any alternative measures such 
as affect or moment-to-moment well-being measures (which has been termed 
‘experienced utility’, Kahneman et al, 1997). Kahneman and Riis (2005) argue 
that there are two types of selves within an individual: the evaluator and the 
experiencer. The evaluator is what has been used in this thesis; it elicits people’s 
life satisfaction or general happiness. The experiencer refers to what we 
experience on a moment-to-moment basis (for example, five to ten episodes 
during the day), in terms of pleasure and pain. This Benthamite view of 
experienced utility is a simple calculation of the aggregation of the pleasure 
during the day minus the pain during the day (Kahneman et al, 2004).  
 
This distinction is important since experienced utility could be seen as being 
preferred to the evaluation because experiences can possibly be measured more 
objectively (Kahneman, 1999). For instance, Kahneman et al (1993) exposed 
students to two different cold-pressor episodes before giving them a choice of 
which episode they would repeat on a third trial. In the ‘short’ episode, students 
held a hand in water at 14°C for 60 seconds, experiencing substantial pain. The 
‘long’ episode lasted for 90 seconds. The first 60 seconds were identical to the 
short episode; over the final 30 seconds the temperature gradually raised to 
15°C, still unpleasant but less so. From the point of the experiencing self, the 
long trial is clearly worse. For the evaluative self, however, the peak/end rule 
implies that the added period of diminishing pain makes the memory of the long 
trial less aversive. Respondents chose to repeat the longer episode, reflecting the 
misguided preferences of the remembering self. As a result, the same event may 
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have different implications depending on what measure of SWB is used. Clark 
and Georgellis (2004) demonstrate such behaviour in the labour market.  
 
So the evaluator in us neglects duration and because of our memory, it may 
generally misguide us (Kahneman and Riis, 2005). The experiencer in us may 
be less likely to neglect important aspects such as duration or time. The issue of 
time is of importance because:  
 
“other things being equal, well-being is increased by spending more 
time in the good states and less time in bad or empty states. This 
formulation holds whether the good state is defined by positive affect 
or by intense engagement in a task or in a spiritual pursuit. Time is 
the ultimate finite resource of life, and finding ways to spend it well 
is a worthy objective both at the individual level at the level of a 
social policy that is concerned with human well-being” (Kahneman 
and Riis, 2005: 294) 
 
This quote should be recognised by future research using SWB methods on non-
market valuation, and researchers in this field must at least acknowledge the 
issue of measuring SWB by the evaluator and the experiencer. Further research 
should also recognise the normative issues as well as the empirical ones of 
using both types of SWB. 
 
Blanchflower (2008), however, provides general evidence to support the view 
that the experiencer and evaluator provide similar results, since both suggest 
higher well-being for the young and old, the educated, for the higher-paid, for 
the employed and for the married. He suggests that both types of data are 
complements and not substitutes, but acknowledges that we require further 
research from the experiencer on a larger scale before we can think about how 
to incorporate their results into the SWB literature. So, it is entirely possible that 
the results from this thesis might not change if we used both concepts of SWB.  
 
A second limitation concerns the generalisability, time frame and frequency 
dimensions of the primary data. The majority of this thesis used primary data 
that are not available elsewhere. The expense of gathering such data means that 
the number of observations are relatively small. This makes generalisability 
more difficult. To place this into context, in chapter 4 we show that wind farms 
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do not affect people’s SWB. Yet this result might be particular to the local 
population, and if a wind farm was built in the heart of an area of outstanding 
natural beauty or a densely populated area, it is imperative to question whether 
we would have obtained the same result. This is something that needs further 
research but we hope that this thesis sheds light on methodology as opposed to 
the direct application of the values generated. 
 
The time constraints of this thesis made it very difficult to conduct any primary 
data analysis of a long change in policy. We selected the Scout Moor wind farm 
project as the timing was ideal for the thesis. For many other policies, however, 
the process of change takes a great deal longer than the nine months that Scout 
Moor took. Quasi-experiments, such as that in chapters 3 and 4, are important to 
use, but ideally we would also want to examine preferences and SWB before the 
intervention is expected. This would allow us to examine the effects of non-
market goods on SWB if they are expected or unexpected. For instance, we 
could examine whether different factors such as consultation, deliberation or 
participation, may change the overall impacts of becoming unemployed, 
divorced, changes in pay, urban regeneration and wind farms on SWB. The 
effects of terrorism on SWB shown in chapter 8 were very large (in comparison 
to other life events), which may have not only resulted from the increased 
uncertainty, but also because of the unexpected nature of this type of non-
market good. This is something that we currently do not fully understand. 
 
Related to this, we would like to know how quickly preferences and experiences 
change after a policy. For the wind farm research, we analysed people’s ex ante 
and ex post preferences and experiences one year apart. It might be entirely 
possible that there were changes in preferences and/or experiences between this 
period that were omitted. In order to find out about these potential changes, it 
would be ideal to have greater monitoring of both preferences and experiences 
for non-market goods.  
 
A third limitation relates to focussing effects and the administration of surveys. 
All of the data in this thesis is derived from surveys, whether it be preferences 
or experiences. To take chapter 3 as a case in point, the surveys were posted to 
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each individual house. We did not interview respondents in person or over the 
telephone, so there is a possibility that respondents may look through the survey 
first and realise that there were some questions relating to urban regeneration in 
the survey. They may have then focussed their attention on urban regeneration 
when answering their life satisfaction question (even though this was the first 
question). This may have caused them to allocate attention to urban 
regeneration more so than they would have done without first looking through 
the survey. So the question that remains is if we had interviewed residents in 
person or by telephone, would we have achieved the same results? This is 
something that merits further research and has potential implications to the 
SWB questions in the BHPS since they are also presented in a self-assessed 
survey.  
 
9.3 Future research 
 
Clearly more research on valuing non-market goods using SWB is required. 
Firstly, there is a large potential to value a whole host of non-market goods that 
have yet to be valued by SWB (such as airport expansions, floods, temperature 
changes (e.g. heatwaves), and even the 2012 Olympics), and then use such 
values to compare against the traditional WTP approach. There is also the 
potential to use SWB to assess how changes in ecosystem services have an 
impact on human well-being (Nicholson et al, 2009), which is the central 
objective of the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment project (MEA, 2005).  
 
Secondly, in terms of the differing measures of SWB (such as moment to 
moment measures and life evaluation measures), there is a large potential to 
compare these measures in the context of non-market goods – see Deaton et al 
(2009) and Graham and Chattopadhyay (2009) for early examples of this using 
cross-sectional data. To determine how these measures might give different 
results for differing non-market goods is clearly very important. For instance, in 
a study such as the wind farm example presented in Chapter 4, we could have 
used the day reconstruction method in addition to life satisfaction in both areas 
over both time periods. There has been no longitudinal study to date using the 
experiencer (i.e. moment-to-moment utility) to examine the causal link of any 
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event or intervention. This would be an interesting area for future research in 
order to determine if there are differences in such measures and, if so, what 
measure is more in line with what people want.  
 
Thirdly, adaptation is clearly key to further research in this field, although in 
itself, it raises thorny normative issues about when adaptation should or should 
not be allowed for public policy. For instance, Graham and Chattopadhyay 
(2009) report adaptation to high crime and corruption rates in Afghanistan, 
notably because high levels of both are now the norm. They argue that while 
adaptation might be a key survival strategy at the individual level, it may be bad 
for overall welfare as it results in a collective tolerance for a bad equilibrium. 
The role of adaptation has been key in the debates on unemployment and SWB, 
especially as it seems that unemployment is a domain of life that humans do not 
easily adapt to (Clark et al, 2001; 2003; Clark, 2003; 2006). Thinking about 
how adaptation can be both desirable and undesirable for public policy is a 
worthwhile avenue for future research (Menzel et al, 2003). 
 
This work on adaptation goes hand-in-hand with the issue of scale re-
calibration. Unpicking the effects of scale re-calibration is very difficult 
empirically, but by using different SWB measures over time for the same 
individuals, we might be able to determine whether adaptation occurs in all 
measures of SWB or whether in occurs in just one measure. For instance, we 
could use biomarkers (e.g. cortisol levels, blood pressure etc), the DRM, and a 
life satisfaction measure to see if the effects an event or intervention diminish 
quicker for some measures than others. There could also be the possibility for 
future research to attempt to fix the end-points of scales over time to ensure that 
individuals’ end points do not change over time after experiencing a non-market 
good. For instance, the zero rating life satisfaction could be augmented to be 
labelled as being equivalent to being dead. This would link in well with the 
Quality-Adjusted Life Year (QALY) used in health allocation decisions, where 
full health is assigned a value of one and death is assigned a value of zero 
(Dolan and Kahneman, 2008). The potential for SWB to replace the Q in the 
QALY is large, but the SWB literature should learn lessons from the QALY 
literature in trying to fix the end points so as to mitigate scale recalibration 
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issues.  
 
Fourthly, future research should also pick up on the administration issue of 
eliciting SWB. While it may at some point be possible to measure well-being 
physiologically or neurologically, those days are not here yet, so the only 
possible methods involve subjective self-reports (Schooler et al, 2003). Self-
reports of global happiness have shown to be vulnerable to some biases and 
measurement problems (Schwarz and Strack, 1999) – as discussed in Chapter 2. 
As we showed in chapter 6, additional research is needed to determine more 
precisely the specific situations in which explicit evaluation of life influences or 
re-calibrates that evaluation. If life events can substantially change the 
underlying set-point in life satisfaction (Clark et al, 2004), then there may be 
reasons to expect that such events affect the end points of the scale. Only after 
such research is conducted will we be able to assess the full ramifications of the 
present analysis for economic and social science approaches that rely on the 
subjective reporting of experiences. Related to this is the need to find out the 
effects of survey administration on SWB reports and to determine how much of 
a focussing effect there is in such self-assessed surveys as opposed to in person 
or telephone interviews. 
 
Fifthly, while research on the effect of the non-market good on SWB will be 
very fruitful, examining the other direction of the relationship would also be 
important (for instance, see Graham et al, 2004; Lyubomirsky et al, 2005). 
Topics such as residential sorting and non-market behaviour would be ideal for 
such an analysis. For residential sorting, it would be very interesting to 
determine what types of SWB predict individuals moving to a particular 
location or geographic area and the possible selection effects by demographic 
characteristics. For instance, Clark (2009) has argued that income-comparison 
sensitive individuals will be especially attracted to live in localities that have 
lower average incomes. This may equally apply to other sorting issues such as 
in the workplace, and to the debates on reverse causality in general.  
 
In relation to this, work and housing (and/or locality) are the two areas 
traditionally used to examine revealed preferences. For SWB, there has been a 
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great deal of work on the former but not on the latter. For instance, there has 
been a great amount of research that has demonstrated that job satisfaction: 
follows the same age trend as life satisfaction (Clark et al, 1996; Clark, 1997); is 
affected by income comparisons (Clark and Oswald, 1996); and predicts 
quitting (Clark et al, 1998; 2009a; Clark, 2001). This latter result is interesting 
since it demonstrates how a domain of life satisfaction can impact on behaviour. 
There is little work examining the impact of local area or housing satisfaction 
on behaviour, so there remains a need to determine how local area satisfaction, 
or housing/financial satisfaction, predicts moving home to a new area. This 
relates to the aspects of reverse causality and non-market behaviours mentioned 
above. Determining whether high SWB enables individuals to become ‘better 
citizens’, in terms of trust, social contact, volunteering etc (Guven, 2007), 
without selection bias will be a difficult but fruitful area of research. 
 
The issue of causality is especially important in terms of the effect that income 
has on SWB and vice versa. Eliciting a robust causal coefficient of income on 
SWB is important for generating monetary values from SWB, so this area of 
research is especially important for non-market valuation. If robust and 
consistent income coefficients cannot be found from UK data, then more 
discussion should be directed as to whether it is best for public policy to use 
SWB within a cost-utility analysis framework as opposed to a CBA framework.    
 
Lastly, it will be interesting to see how key stakeholders view the results from 
this thesis or from the studies that use SWB more generally. In particular, it will 
be important to determine what policy-makers and the public think about using 
SWB data to inform particular policy issues. The use of SWB might stimulate 
issues of paternalism, since we might introduce a policy that people initially do 
not want, through fear (Slovic, 1993) or repugnance (Roth, 2007), but policy-
makers implement it as they know people will end up liking or enjoying it. We 
do not yet know how individuals and society would feel about policy-making 
being driven by what people enjoy rather than what they want. Whilst there 
might always be problems of the government not being able to determine what 
is in the best interests of society (Glaeser, 2006), allowing SWB to become 
routinely measured across individuals might help facilitate greater scrutiny by 
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academics of whether the government is maximising welfare. The creation of 
the UK Household Living Survey (from the BHPS) will help facilitate this, as 
well as the possibility of having some SWB questions in the 2011 and/or 2021 
UK censuses.  
 
In addition, it will be interesting to determine how citizens view the potential 
problems with SWB measures (e.g. adaptation) as compared to problems with 
other well-being measures, as well as where they think SWB measures are 
deemed suitable, and which measures are considered to be best suited to 
particular policy issues. As this thesis has shown, there could be differences in 
valuation from one measure to another and there could be large adaptation in 
some domains, so it would be interesting to determine the course of action 
different measures of well-being and SWB suggest different options for policy. 
All of this research will inevitably push the boundary of SWB research further 
and increase the academic and public debate as well as encourage the political 
take-up of such measures. 
 
9.4 Conclusion 
 
One of the central roles of public policy should be to protect and promote 
individual welfare when it is difficult for individuals to do so themselves. Going 
back to John Stuart Mill, where there are negative non-market effects of 
consumption, we should seek to intervene, and therefore we require a value of 
such non-market effects. Public policy should not always use individual 
preferences due to problems, such as the projection bias, reference dependent 
preferences and loss aversion, framing etc. The SWB approach might offer an 
alternative for non-market valuation and public policy, as it determines what is 
important for individuals as experienced by themselves – it is an autonomous 
measure in this sense. Given that SWB can be used as an outcome for economic 
valuation, it would be very useful as a metric for ‘joined-up’ welfare analysis, 
used in the very least as a complement to people’s preferences.   
 
There is an increasing literature that documents that individuals do not always 
accurately predict the consequences of a future event. This is especially true 
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with negative events, where the psychological immune system comes in to play, 
which has implications for large global policy issues, such as the environmental 
degradation arising from global climate change. This raises a normative 
question: Is welfare best measured after individuals experience that future 
event? If we can cope well (i.e. adapt) with climate change, does this 
necessarily mean that climate change is as severe a problem as prior attitudes 
and preferences would have suggested?  
 
The implications generated from the Stern (2007) report suggest that policies 
designed to lower greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions are justified by the fact that 
the costs of reducing GHG emissions now are less than the future benefits. If 
humans do not adapt to more extreme weather events and flooding, the benefits 
for mitigating climate change should outweigh the costs at a much quicker rate 
than suggested by Stern (ignoring issues on the discount rate). This is because 
the Stern report did not include non-market values of climate change. There is 
therefore a large potential for SWB to inform future debates on climate change, 
so as to include SWB non-market values into the long-run integrated assessment 
climate models currently being used. Knowing what individuals do and do not 
adapt to is crucially important for the debates on climate change, as well as in 
other domains such as health (e.g. obesity), crime/terrorism and migration (the 
latter resulting in part from climate change – Vörösmarty et al, 2000; Patz et al, 
2005). This adaptation is also important for using preferences, since adaptation 
can equally occur in preferences, as is shown in the literature on defaults (Choi 
et al, 2008) and choice architecture (Thaler and Sunstein, 2008), as well as in 
this thesis.  
 
At present SWB measures should be seen as work in progress, and resources 
dedicated to evaluating their performance and consistency are necessary. Even 
in their current form they still have a great deal to offer policy makers. Many 
determinants of an individual’s SWB can be influenced by both the external 
environment facing the individual and their personal choices. The provision of 
information on the determinants of SWB may help individuals make choices 
that are in their future best interests.  
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To close this thesis, despite some on-going measurement issues, it is possible to 
value non-market goods and hence allocate scarce resources based on what 
people experience and enjoy in addition to what they want. To allocate scarce 
resources based on the effect that the non-market good has actually had on 
people’s lives, as opposed to predicting the effect of the non-market good on 
people’s lives, does not seem an unreasonable future avenue for economics and 
public policy.  
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